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EVIDENCE OF LIES AND RULES OF EVIDENCE:  
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FMRI-BASED EXPERT OPINION OF 
WITNESS TRUTHFULNESS 
 
William A. Woodruff * 
 
Neuroscientists are exploring intriguing technology that some 
claim will revolutionize the jury’s search for truth. Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”) seeks to correlate brain 
activity with cognitive function. Current research with regard to lie 
detection indicates that laboratory studies have achieved accuracy 
rates in excess of 90% in identifying deception and verifying truth 
in study participants. But how likely will this new technology be 
useful in the context of the rules governing the impeachment and 
rehabilitation of witnesses at trial? Does the new technology meet 
the reliability standards demanded of expert scientific opinion? 
Has the neuroscience community generally accepted the reliability 
of fMRI as a lie detector? Will professional opinions on witness 
truthfulness actually help the jury in its fact-finding role? Or, will 
it confuse and confound the jury in its essential task of reaching a 
verdict?   
Judicial scrutiny and scholarly commentary to date has 
focused on the reliability of expert opinion and whether the 
neuroscience community has generally accepted this new 
application of fMRI with little consideration of other evidentiary 
requirements that may limit expert opinion testimony of witness 
truthfulness. This Article identifies thirteen impediments to 
admissibility and presents them under five major categories: (1) the 
regulation of impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses; (2) the 
requirement that expert testimony help the jury to understand the 
                                                
* Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law, Raleigh, NC. An 
earlier version of this paper was presented to the International Conference On 
Neuroscience In European and North American Case Law, European Center for 
Law, Science and New Technologies, Università Deglie Studi di Pavia, Milan, 
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evidence or decide a fact in issue; (3) the rule requiring expert 
testimony to be based upon reliable principles and methods; (4) 
the requirement in some jurisdictions that novel scientific 
principles be generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community; and (5) the balancing of unfair prejudice and 
probative value of the opinion testimony.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite media hype1 and at least one company still offering 
scientific expert testimony on whether a witness is telling the 
truth,2 proponents of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(“fMRI”) as a lie detector have failed in three attempts to admit the 
new technology as evidence of witness truthfulness3 at trial. A 
federal district judge in Tennessee,4 a New York state trial judge,5 
                                                
1 See Brains on Trial (PBS television broadcast Sept. 11 & 18, 2013), 
available at http://brainsontrial.com/; Your Cheating Brain, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
12, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1651974.stm; Lie Detection: 
Making Windows in Men’s Souls, THE ECONOMIST (July 8, 2004), http://www. 
economist.com/node/2897134/print?Story_ID=2897134; Steve Silberman, Don’t 
Even Think About Lying, WIRED (Jan. 2006), http://www.wired.com/wired/ 
archive/14.01/ lying.html; Why do People Cheat? Dateline Explores (Part 5), 
NBC NEWS (Dateline NBC television broadcast, May 8, 2009), http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/ id/30645239/ns/dateline_nbc-health_stories/; Mind Reading, 
CBS NEWS (June 28, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/mind-reading-
50073711; Adi Narayan, The fMRI Brain Scan: A Better Lie Detector?, TIME 
(July 20, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911546-1,00.html; 
Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: A Head Case, NATURE (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nature.com/ news/2010/100317/full/464340a.html. 
2 NO LIE MRI, INC., http://noliemri.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). Until 
early in 2013, a second company, Cephos Corp., http://www.cephoscorp.com 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014), also offered truth verification services using fMRI.  
3 With the exception of the emerging theory that fMRI can “decode” memory 
and reveal something that is in the subject’s memory but is either beyond the 
conscious recall of the subject or the subject denies having the memory, 
proponents of fMRI do not claim to be able to address witness credibility in its 
larger sense. See infra notes 594–95 and accompanying text. There are, 
however, other potential forensic applications of fMRI technology. Professor 
Hank Greely identifies five areas where fMRI may be relevant in legal 
proceedings: (1) detecting lies; (2) detecting memory or recognition; (3) detecting 
pain; (4) detecting bias; and (4) detecting consciousness. Henry T. Greely, Mind 
Reading, Neuroscience, and the Law in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 120-49 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina Roskie, eds., 2013). While 
bias may relate directly to witness credibility, the research into this area is just 
beginning. No one has suggested that fMRI is scientifically reliable or valid in 
detecting bias.     
4 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010). The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to exclude 
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and a Maryland state trial judge6 all rejected fMRI-based expert 
testimony on witness truthfulness. 
The hypothesis underlying fMRI as a lie detector is that telling 
the truth is the natural or normal response of the brain and one 
would not expect to see increased activity over and above the 
normal background level of brain activity. Lying, however, 
requires the person to first recall the truth, then suppress the truth 
while creating a lie that might plausibly fit the objective facts, and 
finally, verbalize the falsehood. This increased neural activity 
demands more energy. To supply the energy demand, more 
oxygenated blood is directed to those regions of the brain 
processing the lie. This relative difference in energy demand, 
called the blood oxygenation level-dependent (“BOLD”) 
differential by neuroscientists, is detectable by an fMRI scan. 
Comparing the BOLD differential between subjects known to be 
telling the truth with those deliberately lying allows researchers to 
hypothesize that an increased BOLD response in certain regions of 
the brain when the subject is answering questions is an indication 
of deception. 
Three recent cases have dealt with the admissibility of expert 
opinion of truthfulness based on fMRI testing.7 The defendant in a 
federal prosecution in Tennessee for Medicaid and Medicare 
billing fraud, Dr. Lorne Semrau, underwent fMRI scanning by Dr. 
Stephen Laken, an fMRI researcher and president of a company 
that provided forensic fMRI lie detection services.8 Dr. Laken 
conducted scans that addressed whether Dr. Semrau intended to 
defraud the government when he “upcoded” Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement claims by filing claims under a procedure 
code that reimbursed at a higher rate than the code for the 
                                                                                                         
the fMRI-based expert testimony was adopted by the district judge and affirmed 
on appeal. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). 
5 Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
6 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C 
(Montgomery Cty., Cir. Ct., M.D. Oct. 3, 2012). 
7 See infra notes 8–30 and accompanying text. 
8 Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *1–4. 
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procedure actually performed.9 Dr. Laken also attempted to 
determine whether he knew it was improper to seek separate 
reimbursement for an included procedure that was not to be billed 
separately.10 Dr. Laken concluded that Dr. Semrau was truthful 
during his fMRI scan when he denied the intent to defraud and 
when he claimed he did not know that billing separately for the 
included procedure was impermissible.11 Dr. Semrau’s counsel 
then notified the government of his intent to introduce fMRI-based 
expert opinion testimony to support Dr. Semrau’s truthfulness as a 
witness.12 The government moved to exclude the proffered expert 
testimony.13 The magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from Dr. 
Laken, two government experts, and reviewing scientific and legal 
literature on the subject, found that expert opinion testimony of 
truthfulness based on fMRI was not sufficiently reliable and was 
too prejudicial to put before the jury.14 Based on the magistrate 
judge’s recommendation, the district judge excluded Dr. Laken’s 
opinion testimony. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district Court’s 
ruling.15 
The second court to consider the admissibility of fMRI-based 
expert testimony on truthfulness was a New York state trial court 
hearing a case involving a plaintiff-employee alleging employer 
retaliation for reporting an incident of sexual harassment in the 
workplace.16 The plaintiff, who worked for a company that 
supplied temporary office workers, complained to her employer 
that a fellow employee sent her sexually explicit photos over an 
office fax machine.17 After she reported the sexual harassment by 
                                                
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 5–6. 
12 Id. at 1. 
13 Id. 
14 See infra notes 185–255 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
magistrate judge’s ruling on the admissibility of the fMRI evidence offered by 
Dr. Semrau. 
15 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). 
16 Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d 425, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
17 Id.  
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her co-worker, she was not assigned out for other temporary 
work.18 She sued for retaliation.19 In support of her claim of 
retaliation, plaintiff offered the testimony of another employee, 
who reportedly heard plaintiff’s supervisor say that plaintiff would 
not be assigned other temp work because she complained of sexual 
harassment.20 To bolster the credibility of the supporting witness, 
the witness underwent fMRI scanning by Dr. Laken.21 As in 
Semrau, the plaintiff notified the defendant that she was prepared 
to offer fMRI-based expert testimony that the witness was being 
truthful when he reported hearing the supervisor disclose his plan 
to retaliate against plaintiff.22 
Because this was in New York state court, the trial judge 
applied the Frye23 general acceptance standard and excluded the 
testimony without an evidentiary hearing.24 In granting the 
defendant’s motion to exclude the expert’s opinion, the court noted 
that “even a cursory review of the scientific literature demonstrates 
that the plaintiff is unable to establish that the use of the fMRI test 
to determine truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable in the 
relevant scientific community.”25 
The third case in which fMRI based expert testimony on 
witness truthfulness was offered was the re-trial of Gary James 
Smith, a former Army Ranger who was convicted of killing his 
roommate, Michael McQueen, Jr.26 After the conviction at his first 
                                                
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defendant 
offered evidence that he had taken and passed the “lie detector” test that was the 
predecessor to the modern polygraph. In excluding the examiner’s testimony 
that the defendant was telling the truth, the court held that novel scientific 
evidence was not admissible until it had achieved general acceptance by the 
relevant scientific community. Id.  
24 Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d at 426–28. 
25 Id. at 428. 
26 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5–6, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C, 
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012). The conviction in the first trial was 
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trial was reversed, Smith again claimed that McQueen committed 
suicide.27 To support this argument he underwent fMRI scanning 
by Frank Haist, a consultant for No Lie fMRI.28 Haist was prepared 
to testify that Smith was being truthful when recounting the fact 
that McQueen died of a self-inflicted wound and that Smith did not 
shoot him.29 The trial judge, after considering testimony by experts 
from both sides, reviewing scientific literature submitted by the 
parties, and hearing from each side’s expert, excluded the 
fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness because “it is 
clear . . . that the use of fMRI to detect deception and verify truth 
in an individual’s brain has not achieved general acceptance in the 
scientific community.”30  
Much of the legal literature on fMRI as a lie detector has dealt 
primarily with the reliability of the underlying scientific theory and 
whether expert testimony based on fMRI is admissible under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (“Rule 702”) or the Frye general 
acceptance standard.31 Little has been written on how this novel 
                                                                                                         
reversed because the trial judge excluded defense evidence on the victim’s state 
of mind. Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (Md. Ct. App. 2011).   
27 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C, 
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012). 
28 Michael Laris, Debate on Brain Scans as Lie Detectors Highlighted in Maryland 
Murder Trial, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
crime/debate-on-brain-scans-as-lie-detectors-highlighted-in-maryland-murder-trial/ 
2012/ 08/26/aba3d7d8-ed84-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_print.html. 
29 Id. 
30 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5–6, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C, 
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012) (copy on file with the author). Smith was 
convicted at the second trial but has not raised the exclusion of the fMRI evidence 
on appeal. Brief of the Appellant at 1–3, Smith v. Maryland, (No. 1832) 2013 
WL 6004017 (June 27, 2013). 
31 See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben, Detection of Deception with fMRI: Are We 
There Yet?, 13 LEGAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2008); Elena 
Rusconi & Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Prospects of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging as a Lie Detector, 7 FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1, 3–4 (2013); 
Charles Adelsheim, Functional Magnetic Resonance Detection of Deception: 
Great as Fundamental Research, Inadequate as Substantive Evidence, 62 MERCER 
L. REV. 885, 905–08 (2011); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science be Good 
Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 
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scientific technique fits within the larger context of the regulation 
of evidence of witness credibility.32 This Article seeks to fill that 
gap in the literature and considers the admissibility of fMRI based 
expert opinion on witness truthfulness within the framework of the 
rules governing the impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses, 
the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, as well as the 
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to offer evidence that may 
otherwise be excluded by a rule of evidence.     
Part II briefly explains MRI technology as it pertains to lie 
detection. Part III provides context for the debate over 
admissibility of fMRI opinion on truthfulness by reviewing the 
American tradition of assigning credibility decision to the jury. 
Part IV analyzes the rules governing the admissibility of expert 
opinion testimony on truthfulness and how they apply to 
fMRI-based opinion testimony that a witness lied or told the truth 
during an fMRI scan. Part V addresses the application of the rules 
regulating expert opinion testimony and considers whether the 
current state of the scientific research can satisfy either the relevant 
and reliable standard of Rule 702 or the Frye general acceptance 
standard followed by several state jurisdictions. Part VI explores 
whether fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness that 
clears the hurdles imposed by the impeachment and rehabilitation 
rules and the rules governing expert opinion can satisfy the 
probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403 and state analogs. Part VII considers 
whether the Constitution provides the criminal defendant a right to 
offer fMRI-based opinion testimony on witness truthfulness even if 
one or more of the other rules of evidence excludes the testimony. 
                                                                                                         
1192 (2010); Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be 
True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 491, 491 (2008); Laurence R. Tancredi & 
Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal use of 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 271, 280–86 
(2007); F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005).  
32 See, e.g., Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-examining the Brain: A Legal 
Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 509, 
545–51 (2006). 
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Part VIII concludes that fMRI as a lie detector cannot yet satisfy 
the reliable and relevant standards of Rule 702 and it has not yet 
reached the level of general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community to earn admission under Frye. It also concludes that the 
American tradition of assigning credibility determinations to the 
jury imposes additional burdens on proponents of fMRI lie 
detection that will further delay the day in which this technology is 
admitted in a jury trial. The obstacles imposed by the rules of 
evidence will, in turn, make the economic exploitation of the 
technology less likely and may hinder further research. This 
Article ultimately concludes that someday fMRI testimony on 
witness truthfulness may be admitted, but it will not be anytime 
soon.   
II.  EVIDENCE OF LIES: FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING 
Magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) is the latest noninvasive 
imaging technology currently in use in medical science.33 Unlike 
x-ray and other forms of medical imaging, MRI does not subject 
the patient to ionizing radiation. Using magnetic fields of different 
strengths to influence the alignment of hydrogen atoms in the 
body, the MRI scanner records the release of the energy stored by 
the hydrogen atoms’ single proton nucleus as it responds to the 
cycling magnetic fields. Processing the captured data through 
                                                
33 The first commercially available MRI scanners for medical imaging were 
marketed in the early 1980s. See RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO 
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2d ed. 2009). For a succinct 
explanation that highlights the aspects most likely to influence evidentiary 
issues, see Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: 
The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377 (2007). Other very 
readable sources of information on how fMRI works are Adina L. Roskies, 
Brain Imaging Techniques, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 
37-74 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013); Tancredi & Brodie, 
supra note 31, at 27; Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner 
Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past 
Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010). 
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computer algorithms creates an image of the body part under 
examination.34     
Scientists have long known that increased brain activity 
demands more blood to the area of the brain engaged in the 
activity.35 The interrelationship between brain activity, cerebral 
blood flow, and the metabolism of oxygen and glucose by the brain 
is the foundation of fMRI.36 This foundation is based on two 
principles: (1) regions of the brain that are more active receive 
more oxygenated blood than regions of the brain that are less 
active; and (2) oxygenated blood and deoxygenated blood behave 
differently in a magnetic field because they have different 
magnetic resonance.37  
The oxygen-carrying hemoglobin molecules in the blood do 
not disrupt the MRI’s magnetic field as the blood passes through 
it.38 Once oxygen is taken up by the surrounding tissue as the brain 
draws upon this energy source to fuel its activity, however, the 
oxygen-depleted blood does disrupt the magnetic field and the 
MRI scanner captures this disruption.39 By scanning a person’s 
brain while that person is performing some cognitive task and 
capturing the magnetic resonance resulting from cerebral blood 
flow, cerebral blood volume, and cell metabolism, the MRI 
scanner can produce an image revealing which regions of the brain 
are more active while the task is being performed.40 This BOLD 
signal allows scientists to locate the regions of the brain where the 
cognitive task under study is being performed.41 An fMRI scan 
taken before and during a cognitive task detects the relative 
                                                
34 See Langleben, supra note 31, at 2.  
35 See BUXTON, supra note 33, at 6. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 7. 
38 See Marcus E. Raichle, An Introduction to Functional Brain Imaging in the 
Context of Lie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC 
AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS, 3, 4 (Am. Acad. of Arts and Scis., 2009). 
39 See id. 
40 See Geoffrey K. Aguirre, Functional Neuroimaging: Technical, Logical, and 
Social Perspectives, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S8, S9 (2014). 
41 See id. 
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difference in the oxygenated blood in a given region of the brain 
and permits the construction of a graphic image of the BOLD 
responses associated with the brain state under study.42 While not a 
direct observation of neural activity, the BOLD signal is an 
indication of neural activity.43     
As it applies to lie detection, the theory is that when the subject 
is telling the truth, he is merely recalling facts from memory, a task 
that does not require particularly high levels of neural activity.44 
Lying, on the other hand, does require more neural activity because 
the person must suppress the truth while also constructing the lie.45 
This increased neural activity demands more energy.46 To meet the 
energy demand, more oxygenated blood is provided to that portion 
of the brain engaged in the cognitive task.47 To produce an image 
that represents the relative difference between the baseline or 
“truth” level of brain activity and the activity level when the 
subject is lying, the subject is told to respond to a series of 
questions truthfully during one scan and to respond to the same 
questions deceptively during a second MRI scan.48 The data from 
the two scans is processed through a computer algorithm to 
produce a graphical image of the hemodynamics associated with 
the respective conditions.49 The resulting images display the 
presence of oxygenated blood in the brain by assigning color to 
regions where the computer algorithms determined that the BOLD 
response was present.50 The presence of more oxygenated blood in 
certain regions of the brain while the subject is answering 
                                                
42 See id. 
43 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 3–4.  
44 See Sean A. Spence, et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: 
Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL 
SOC’Y OF LONDON 1755, 1757 (2004). 
45 See id. 
46 See Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie 
Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 11, 12 (2008). 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S12–S13. 
50 See id. at S11. 
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questions is said to be indicative of deception.51 Conversely, the 
absence of the BOLD response in those brain regions associated 
with lying are said to verify the truthfulness of the subject’s 
responses.52   
The final images produced by the scanner’s computer, 
however, are not photographs or X-Rays of the brain processing a 
lie. Rather, they are a complex combination of technologies from 
the fields of physics, neurophysiology, cognitive neuroscience, 
statistics, computer science, and software development that seek to 
represent relatively small changes in blood flow and oxygen 
metabolism in the part of the brain under study.53   
The spatial resolution of the typical MRI scanner produces 
incredibly detailed anatomical images of tissue and body 
structures.54 These images are most useful in the medical setting 
where physicians are looking for some structural abnormality, such 
as a tumor. In fMRI, however, the goal is temporal resolution, 
which is the change in metabolic activity over time.55 As temporal 
resolution increases, spatial resolution decreases.56 Thus, the 
“picture” of the BOLD response is not the clear, sharp image one 
might expect from an MRI scan seeking to identify anatomical 
structures or abnormalities. To be useful to the neuroscientist 
trying to determine whether a certain portion of the brain was 
activated while the subject was performing some cognitive task in 
the scanner, the raw data is cleaned up, background “noise” and 
artifacts are removed, spatial resolution is sharpened, signal data is 
averaged and then enhanced by computer algorithms to highlight 
the relatively slight BOLD response, and color is added to the 
                                                
51 See Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-based Lie Detection: Scientific 
and Societal Challenges, 15 NATURE REV. 123, 123 (2014). The most common 
brain regions to show activation during fMRI deception studies are the prefrontal 
cortex, the anterior cortex, and the parietal cortex. Id. 
52 See id. at 123–24.  
53 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at 1145.   
54 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S10. 
55 See id. at S9–S10. 
56 See id. at S8–S9. 
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active voxels57 to graphically display the relative strength of the 
BOLD response.58 The resulting image is then overlaid onto an 
anatomical image of the brain so the colorful highlights 
representing the BOLD response are associated with a particular 
region of the brain.59 Because the structural image is produced 
from an MRI scanning at one cubic millimeter voxel size and the 
BOLD image is produced from a three cubic millimeter voxel size, 
the BOLD image overlay and the structural image can never match 
exactly.60 Because the different resolution of the MRI and fMRI 
scans makes precise alignment impossible, the MRI image of the 
brain onto which the computer enhanced image of the BOLD 
response is overlaid may be a scan of a “standard” brain and not 
the brain of the subject under study.61     
Proponents of fMRI lie detection maintain that the BOLD 
response is a direct measurement of a completely involuntary 
physiological function directly related to the cognitive task of 
prevaricating.62 Compared to the polygraph, which measures 
physiologic functions thought to be related to stress that are 
                                                
57 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S10. Voxels are volumetric pixels; essentially, 
three-dimensional pixels. These voxels typically measure 3mm x 3mm x 3mm in 
fMRI compared to the 1mm x 1mm x 1mm voxel size in MRI. The smaller voxel 
size in MRI contributes to the high quality of spatial resolution in structural 
scans. But they are too small to capture the hemodynamic change over time, 
hence the need for larger voxels in fMRI and the decrease in spatial resolution. Id.; 
see also, Giorgio Ganis, et al., Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures 
Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55 
NEUROIMAGE 312, 314 (2011); Owen Jones, et al., Brain Imaging for Legal 
Thinkers, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 8, 12 (2009). 
58 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S9–S11. 
59 See id. at S12. 
60 See Roskies, supra note 33, at 63–65. 
61 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at 1145. See generally Aguirre, supra 
note 40, for a detailed explanation of the various steps needed to create the sort 
of fMRI BOLD image frequently displayed in the scientific literature, the popular 
media, and as exhibits to accompany expert testimony.  
62 See Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 605; see also K. Luan Phan, et al., Neural 
Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study at 
4 Tesla, 12 ACADEMIC RADIOLOGY 164, 170 (2005) (discussing the various sections 
of the brain associated with, and affected by lying). 
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assumed to be a product of lying,63 the fMRI measures the cerebral 
blood flow, volume, and metabolism of the portion of the brain 
thought to be processing the lie and compares it with that same 
portion of the brain when the subject is telling the truth.64 Thus, 
proponents argue, the fMRI image of the BOLD response is a more 
accurate and reliable indicator of truthfulness than the polygraph. 
Irrespective of any accuracy advantage the BOLD response 
may have to the physiological phenomena measured by the 
polygraph, it is important to note that fMRI is not measuring actual 
neural activity directly. It is not capturing deception itself. It is 
merely capturing what researchers believe are the neural correlates 
of deception.65 Like the polygraph, fMRI is looking at the shadow 
cast by deception and is not detecting lies in any direct sense. No 
current technology can directly distinguish between the neural 
activity of truth and the neural activity of deception.66   
The reliability of fMRI as a forensic tool to either detect 
deception or verify truth is very much an open question. Whether it 
is a more accurate screening device than the polygraph routinely 
used in law enforcement investigations, security and counterterrorism 
interrogations, or certain employment background checks, however, 
is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the concern this Article 
addresses is whether the technology is admissible to either impeach 
or support the credibility of a witness at trial. In this context, 
admissibility requires the evidence meet both the rules governing 
expert opinion testimony and those applicable to the impeachment 
and rehabilitation of witnesses. 
                                                
63 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 13 
(Nat’l Acads. Press, 2003). 
64 See Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: 
An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 
731 (2002). 
65 See Spence, supra note 46, at 12. 
66 See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 5. 
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III.  RULES OF EVIDENCE: THE CRUCIBLE OF THE COURTROOM 
The American jury trial is the reconstruction of a past event or 
incident.67 The jurors are the historians trying to determine what 
actually happened on the day in question. Witnesses with personal 
knowledge of various parts and pieces of the story tell the jury, 
under oath, what they saw, heard, felt, touched, or otherwise 
experienced. These percipient witnesses testify to their recollection 
of the facts. The jury must decide which witnesses to believe and 
what weight to give the testimony received in order to find the 
facts of the case. Determining the facts is the core function of the 
American jury.68 
When it will assist the jury in their task of historical 
reconstruction, witnesses who do not have personal knowledge of 
any of the historical facts but who have opinions based on the 
application of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
to the facts, information, or evidence from the event are permitted 
to testify to their opinions. These expert witnesses provide 
information, explanations, and opinions on matters that otherwise 
would be beyond the understanding, common knowledge, and 
                                                
67 See Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing 
Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67 (2006) (explaining how the jury trial is 
a uniquely American phenomenon and one deeply enshrined in our history, culture, 
and traditions). For a discussion of the evolution of the jury trial from colonial 
days to modern times and the ongoing debate over the jury’s power to decide 
questions of law as well as fact see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A 
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 
(1994). 
68 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (permitting the court to grant summary judgment 
to a party and dispense with the jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment 
only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact”); see Dimick v. 
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding 
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and 
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be 
scrutinized with the utmost care. The controlling distinction between the power 
of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the 
law and the latter to determine the facts.”); see generally Alschuler & Deiss, 
supra note 67, at 902–21 (discussing the long and controversial history of the 
allocation of authority between judge and jury on deciding questions of law). 
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experience of the jury. The jury considers the testimony of the 
percipient witnesses and the opinions of the experts, along with the 
other evidence in the case, to ultimately reconstruct the historical 
event in question so they can then apply the governing legal 
standards to reach a verdict in the case.   
Of course, in the usual case, the percipient witnesses are not 
consistent. Their versions of the event vary, sometimes wildly. The 
experts are not consistent, either. Well-qualified, well-trained, 
well-spoken, and well-meaning scientists, doctors, accountants, 
engineers or other experts routinely reach diametrically opposed 
positions on the same issue. Just as with the inconsistencies among 
the percipient witnesses, the jury of laypersons is charged with 
reconciling the divergent scientific or technical testimony and 
deciding which is more believable.   
Determining whom to believe, whom to trust, and whom to 
rely upon in reconstructing the historical incident is the sole and 
virtually sacred task of the American jury.69 Indeed, juries are 
typically instructed by the presiding judge, “You are the sole 
                                                
69 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891) (“There are 
many things sometimes in the conduct of a witness upon the stand, and 
sometimes in the mode in which his answers are drawn from him through the 
questioning of counsel, by which a jury are to be guided in determining the 
weight and credibility of his testimony. That part of every case, such as the one 
at bar, belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural 
intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men; and, so 
long as we have jury trials, they should not be disturbed in their possession of it, 
except in a case of manifest and extreme abuse of their function.”); see also 
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 (2009) (“Our legal system, however, is 
built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of 
competing witnesses . . . .”); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) 
(“A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie 
detector.”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414 (1980) (“The Anglo-
Saxon tradition of criminal justice, embodied in the United States Constitution 
and in federal statutes, makes jurors the judges of the credibility of testimony 
offered by witnesses.”). For an historical account of the evolution of the jury as 
the courtroom’s lie detector see George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 
107 YALE L.J. 575, 580–83 (1997).  
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judges of the credibility or ‘believability’ of each witness and the 
weight to be given to the witness’s testimony.”70 
While the jury is the sole judge of the facts in a case, the rules 
of evidence control what information the jury is permitted to use in 
its reconstruction of the event giving rise to the litigation. The 
threshold for admissibility is, of course, relevance.71 Evidence that 
simply has no logical or legal connection to the case is not 
admissible.72 But the rules of evidence also exclude a great deal of 
otherwise relevant evidence.73 Indeed, the body of law called 
evidence is a body of law that keeps facts from the trier of fact.74 
                                                
70 PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 1.08 (Comm. on Pattern 
Jury Instructions Dist. Judges Ass’n Fifth Circuit 2012); see also PATTERN 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.07 (Sixth Circuit Comm. on Pattern Criminal 
Jury Instructions 2014); FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT § 1.13 (Comm. on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 
2009); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURTS OF THE EIGHT CIRCUIT § 1.05 (Judicial Comm. on Model Jury Instructions 
for the Eighth Circuit 2014); CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.08 
(Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Comm. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit 2011); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL 
CASES) § 5 (Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Judicial Council of the 
Eleventh Circuit 2010). For a typical state pattern jury instruction on credibility, 
see N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES § 101.15 (N.C. 
Conference of Superior Court Judges Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions 2011). 
71 FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make 
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the 
fact is of consequence in determining the action.”). 
72 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the 
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; 
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence 
is not admissible.”). 
73 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
74 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (recognizing 
that judges exercising their gatekeeping function under Rule 104(a) “inevitably 
on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and 
innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of 
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Some exclusionary rules seek to further policy goals unrelated 
to accurate fact-finding in the case under consideration.75 Others 
seek to promote accurate fact finding by excluding unreliable 
information.76 Still other rules deny the jury information out of a 
fear the jury may not be able to properly weigh the information in 
the context of the case under consideration.77 Superintending the 
application of these rules is the trial judge who has tremendous 
discretion to admit or exclude evidence, control the mode and 
order of proof to promote accurate fact finding, avoid wasting 
time, and protect witnesses from harassment and undue 
embarrassment.78 
As we genuflect before the jury’s mystical powers to 
distinguish between fact and fiction, social science research reports 
that human beings are really not very good at separating liars and 
truth-tellers.79 The recent rash of publicized post-conviction relief 
cases where, typically, DNA evidence reexamined with new and 
                                                                                                         
Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but 
for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”). 
75 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures when offered to prove liability or culpable conduct); FED. R. EVID. 410 
(excluding evidence of plea discussions under certain circumstances); FED. R. 
EVID. 501 (allowing privileges). 
76 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (admitting only reliable expert opinion); FED. R. 
EVID. 802 (excluding hearsay). 
77 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding otherwise relevant evidence when 
the “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence”); FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (excluding most propensity 
evidence). 
78 FED. R. EVID. 104; FED. R. EVID. 611. 
79 See, e.g., Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and 
the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the 
Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing 
Witness Credibility, 72 NEBR. L. REV. 1157, 1190–97 (1993); Olin Guy Wellborn 
III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1082–88 (1991). But see Max Minzner, 
Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 
2560 (2008) (observing that when bias and context are considered along with 
demeanor juries may be better at detecting lies than when relying upon 
demeanor alone, but suggesting more research is needed). 
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more accurate technology vindicates the defendant and thoroughly 
discredits eyewitness accounts have added to the skepticism about 
the jury’s ability to accurately determine the historical facts.80 
When added to the claims of some neuroscientists that fMRI 
accuracy rates for lie detection exceed 90%, the rush to provide the 
jury with the opinion of the neuroscientist on whether a given 
witness is telling the truth or lying is understandable.81   
Despite rather serious and obvious weaknesses in the technology, 
some have suggested that since the neuroscience-based opinion on 
credibility is better than what the jury brings to the task, the jury 
should at least have the benefit of the expert’s opinion.82   
On the one hand, we tout our confidence in the jury’s ability to 
make credibility judgments and accurately weigh the evidence, while 
on the other hand we question whether the jury can understand and 
appropriately weigh complex scientific evidence.83 The fear is that 
lay juries may give excessive weight to colorful fMRI images 
showing a brain “processing a lie.” This schizophrenic notion of 
the competence of juries as accurate fact-finders explains why the 
rules of evidence restrict what the jury hears and limits how it can 
                                                
80 The Innocence Project reports 311 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the 
United States since 1989. DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). See, e.g., Mitch 
Weiss, Judges Clear Two in 2000 Killing, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 23, 
2011), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/09/23/1510069/judges-clear-two-in-
2000-killing.html. 
81 See, e.g., Kozel et al., supra note 34, at 608–10 (reporting accuracy rates 
between 90% and 93%); Langleben, supra note 34, at 4 (citing various studies 
claiming accuracy rates above 90%); Simpson, supra note 31, at 491 (comparing 
reported accuracy rate of fMRI of 90% with much lower rates for polygraph); 
see also Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, 
Vol. 1 at 91, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.) 
(reporting 100% accuracy in detecting deception).   
82 See Schauer, supra note 31, at 1210–19. 
83 See David L. Faigman, Admissibility of Neuroscientific Expert Testimony, 
in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 89, 109 (Stephen J. Morse 
& Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013). 
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use what is admitted.84 Ultimately, as imperfect as it is, the jury is 
the lie detector in the courtroom. The real question is whether our 
system should admit fMRI-based expert testimony on a witness’s 
truthfulness to assist the jury in that task. The answer to this 
question involves consideration of the trial context in which the 
evidence is offered, the limitations imposed by evidence rules on 
expert opinion testimony, including the scientific validity of the 
underlying principles and methods, the balancing of the probative 
value of the testimony against the risk that it will confuse rather 
than enlighten the jury, and whether constitutional concerns should 
permit criminal defendants to offer such testimony even if the rules 
of evidence say otherwise. 
IV.  RULES OF EVIDENCE: ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING 
CREDIBILITY 
Assuming that fMRI as a lie detector could satisfy the scientific 
reliability standards of Rule 702,85 expert opinion testimony based 
on fMRI scanning that a witness is truthful or deceptive must meet 
the admissibility principles governing the impeachment and 
rehabilitation of testifying witnesses.86 The trial itself is about the 
underlying historical facts that gave rise to the litigation, but the 
                                                
84 See, e.g., David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The 
Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 
343, 349–51 (2008) (finding scientific summaries more credible when accompanied 
by neuroimages); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of 
Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 470 (2008) (explaining that 
laypeople are dazzled by neurobabble); David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of 
fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 577 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
566, 572–75 (2011) (explaining that fMRI lie detection is more persuasive than 
other technologies in mock trial setting). But see Adina L. Roskies et al., 
Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing than Feared, 17 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE 
SCIS. 99, 101 (2013) (analyzing recent studies and finding no untoward impact of 
neuroscience images on juror decision making); Robert B. Michael et al., On the 
(non)Persuasive Power of a Brain Image, 20 PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN REV. 720, 
722–724 (2013) (finding brain images exerted little to no influence on whether 
people agree with conclusions in an article accompanying the image).  
85 See infra Sections V.A–V.C for a discussion of Rule 702 and fMRI. 
86 See generally FED. R. EVID. 601–615. 
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resolution of disputes surrounding those facts is often conditioned 
upon which witnesses the jury credits and which ones they 
discredit.    
“Credibility” in the context of testimonial evidence is broader 
than whether a witness is consciously telling a lie. Witnesses can 
contradict one another on factual points without lying. One witness 
could be mistaken. Another could have had a better perspective or 
angle of vision. Still another might have forgotten a key point or 
become confused as to what she actually saw or heard. All of these 
situations can and do occur in trials every day, and juries routinely 
deal with them in weighing the evidence and judging the 
believability of witnesses. At this point in time, fMRI makes no 
claim to be able to determine which of these divergent factual 
accounts are more accurate. Thus, the admissibility of fMRI-based 
opinion on truthfulness only arises when the credibility issue is 
whether a witness deliberately and consciously lied during 
testimony at trial.87 
Important as the credibility issue may be, however, it is still 
one-off from the central issue at the trial, the reconstruction of the 
historical event that gave rise to the litigation. Recognizing the 
importance of credibility evidence, as well as its potential to 
distract the jury from the merits of the case, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and most state evidence rules, regulate the timing and 
the form of admissible evidence on the issue of witness credibility. 
To be admitted, an fMRI-based opinion on witness truthfulness has 
to clear more than the scientific reliability hurdle; it must also 
                                                
87 Defining a “lie” is not a simple matter, especially a “lie” that can be 
detected by fMRI scanning. See, e.g., Keckler, supra note 32, at 539 (explaining 
that deception is a “continuous rather than discrete variable”); Jed S. Rakoff, Lie 
Detection in the Courts: The Vain Search for the Magic Bullet, in USING 
IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 40, 44–45 
(Emilio Bizzi et al. eds., 2009) (“The law recognizes many kinds of lies, ranging 
from ‘white lies’ and ‘puffing’ to affirmative misstatements, actionable half-
truths, and material omissions.”). For a discussion of the difficulty in defining 
lies for fMRI lab studies and applying that definition to the real-world of trial 
testimony see infra notes 364–99 and accompanying text.  
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negotiate the labyrinth of rules that govern impeachment and 
rehabilitation of witnesses. 
A. Timing: Impeach First, Rehabilitate Second 
Evidence to bolster or support the credibility of a witness is 
generally not admissible until the witness has testified and the 
opponent has attacked his credibility.88 Courts generally consider it 
a waste of time to admit evidence of a witness’s good credibility 
until the opponent has attacked the witness’s credibility through 
cross-examination and/or extrinsic impeachment.89 Allowing 
anticipatory rehabilitation of a witness’s credibility runs the risk of 
wasting time if no attack on credibility is forthcoming, injecting 
into the case credibility evidence that does not address facts 
subsequently introduced to attack credibility, and also risks 
distracting the jury from the underlying factual issues it must 
resolve.90 Though the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly adopted 
                                                
88 KENNETH S. BROUN, 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33 at 60 (6th ed. 2006) 
(“Both at common law and under the Federal Rules, the general norm is that the 
witness’s proponent may not bolster the witness’s credibility before any 
attempted impeachment.”); DAVID H. KAYE, ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A 
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 2.4 (2d ed. Supp. 2014) 
(“Testimony that merely attempts to bolster the credibility of another witness 
whose character for truthfulness has not been attacked normally is inadmissible.”). 
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these 
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or 
reputation evidence or otherwise.”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK AND CHARLES H. ROSE III, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE 
RULES § 6.18 at 488–89 (3d ed. 2009) (“At the outset it should be noted that 
generally a party may not support a witness who has not yet been attacked, 
which means especially that proof of good character may not be presented along 
with the initial testimony of a witness, and that prior consistent statements by the 
witness may not be offered along with his initial testimony.”).   
89 Fresh complaints in sexual assault cases and statements of prior identification 
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) are notable exceptions to this general rule. 
BROUN, supra note 88, at 84. 
90 Id.  
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this common law principle only with regard to evidence of a 
witness’s good character for truthfulness,91 federal courts have 
continued to apply it to other forms of bolstering credibility, or 
“oath helping,” through the balancing provisions of Rule 403 and 
the court’s broad power to control the mode and order of proof 
under Rule 611(a).92 Application of this principle in the 
fMRI-based expert opinion on truthfulness context precludes 
admission of such evidence before the witness has testified at trial 
and been impeached.93 Once this “timing rule” has been met, the 
admissibility of the positive fMRI opinion will depend upon 
whether the fMRI opinion refutes the form of the impeachment.94     
B. Form: Rehabilitation Must Meet the Impeachment 
It is axiomatic that evidence to support credibility must 
respond to that offered to impeach credibility: 
The [evidence supporting credibility] must meet the impeachment with 
relative directness. The wall, attacked at one point, may not be fortified 
                                                
91 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
92 See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (“Control by the Court; Purposes. The court 
should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective 
for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment.”). Id. advisory committee’s note (“Item (1) 
restates in broad terms the power and obligation of the judge as developed under 
common law principles. It covers such concerns as whether testimony shall be in 
the form of a free narrative or responses to specific questions, . . . the order of 
calling witnesses and presenting evidence, the use of demonstrative 
evidence, . . . and the many other questions arising during the course of a trial 
which can be solved only by the judge’s common sense and fairness in view of 
the particular circumstances. Item (2) is addressed to avoidance of needless 
consumption of time, a matter of daily concern in the disposition of cases. A 
companion piece is found in the discretion vested in the judge to exclude 
evidence as a waste of time in Rule 403(b).”) 
93 BROUN, supra note 88, at 84. 
94 It should also be noted that a hearsay declarant is subject to impeachment to 
the same extent as a live witness. FED. R. EVID. 806 (“When a hearsay 
statement—or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)—has been 
admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if 
attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for 
those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.”).   
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at another, distinct point. Credibility is a side issue, and the circle of 
relevancy in this context should be drawn narrowly. When we reach the 
stage of rehabilitation after impeachment, we are rather far afield from 
the historical merits of the case; and the courts justifiably insist on a 
stronger showing of relevance to minimize the risk that the jury will 
lose sight of the merits. As a rule of thumb, the courts demand that the 
rehabilitation be a response in kind to the impeachment. Precisely how 
responsive is a question of degree as to which reasonable courts differ.95 
A simple hypothetical illustrates the point. If the witness is 
impeached by evidence tending to show that the noisy and 
smoke-filled bar impaired his ability to see and hear the fight 
between the defendant and the victim, evidence that the witness is 
a truthful person is irrelevant. In the language of Rule 401, his 
truthful disposition does not have any tendency to make his ability 
to see and hear in the conditions of the bar any better or more 
reliable. 
C. Application: Impeaching and Rehabilitating with fMRI 
To appreciate how fMRI-based expert opinion on truthfulness 
fits into this regulatory scheme, we must first consider the methods 
of impeachment and whether the impeachment employed was an 
attack on truthfulness. Assume that the witness has undergone 
fMRI scanning and the expert witness is prepared to testify that the 
scanning indicated the witness was being truthful when he 
answered the questions pertaining to the historical facts 
surrounding the issues at trial.96 Also assume the witness’s trial 
                                                
95 BROUN, supra note 88, at 84. The three cases in which fMRI-based expert 
opinion testimony on witness truthfulness has been offered all decided the 
admissibility issue in a pre-trial hearing and did not consider the limitations that 
the rules governing impeachment and rehabilitation would place on otherwise 
admissible expert opinion. See supra notes 8–30 and accompanying text. 
96 From a practical standpoint, using fMRI as a “truth verifier” is the more 
likely scenario. Litigants, both civil and criminal, are more likely to seek fMRI 
opinions to support their own veracity, or the veracity of percipient witnesses 
supportive of their theory of the case, than they are to seek a court order for an 
opposing party or other witness to undergo fMRI scanning. The fMRI studies 
thus far have all included willing volunteers and there is no data on whether the 
BOLD response would be the same for a witness who was compelled to undergo 
fMRI scanning. Furthermore, when the witness is the criminal defendant the 
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testimony was consistent with the answers he gave during that 
portion of the fMRI scan where he was instructed to answer the 
examiner’s questions truthfully.97 Understanding how the rules 
governing witness impeachment and rehabilitation influences the 
admissibility question raised by this straightforward hypothetical is 
important in appreciating the potential uses of fMRI-based expert 
opinion on witness truthfulness at trial.   
Impeachment falls into one of five categories: (1) diminished 
capacity of the witness to observe, remember or relate the historical 
facts; (2) bad character for truth and veracity; (3) extrinsic evidence 
that contradicts the witness’s version of events; (4) prior statements 
of the witness that are inconsistent with in-court testimony; and 
(5) the presence of bias that may induce the witness to slant or 
color his testimony in favor of the calling party.98 To this commonly 
accepted list of impeachment methods, this Article would add 
another: (6) deliberate deception not inferred from one of the other 
impeachment modes. Due to fMRI’s claim that it can detect lies 
directly, a direct attack on sincerity of the in-court testimony that 
does not depend upon an inference of deception from other modes 
of impeachment but is the product of deliberate deception irrespective 
of character, bias, inconsistency, or contradictory evidence is 
conceivable.  
                                                                                                         
Constitution imposes significant hurdles to any compelled fMRI scanning. See, 
e.g., Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation 
Jurisprudence, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 341 (2007) (addressing self-incrimination 
and due process issues). Assuming scientific reliability, and the opposing party 
was aware of the result of the tests, there would appear to be no specific 
impeachment limits, other than balancing probative value versus prejudicial 
effect, if the opposing party offers the expert’s opinion to impeach after the 
witness testified. In this event, however, the likelihood of a trial is considerably 
diminished. In a jurisdiction that admits such evidence it is unlikely a party 
would proceed with the case if the key witness, or the party himself, has failed 
the lie detector. See infra notes 55–133 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed discussion.  
97 See supra notes 33–66 and accompanying text.  
98 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 6.26 (3d ed. 2012). 
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1. Capacity 
Impeachment by showing defects in capacity questions the 
witness’s ability to perceive, understand, remember, or relate the 
facts of which the witness purports to have personal knowledge. In 
a marked departure from the common law, modern evidence codes 
eschew the long list of factors that disqualified witnesses from 
testifying and, instead, leave many of those considerations to the 
jury in weighing the evidence.99  
But being competent to testify is not the same as being an 
infallible repository of historical facts relevant to the case. Casting 
doubt on the reliability of a witness’s testimony by showing 
defects in his capacity to observe, understand, recall, and relate the 
historical facts is regulated by the general principles of relevancy 
and the balancing of probative value against the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.100 No 
special rules limit the form of the evidence that may be offered to 
attack the witness’s ability to perceive the matter about which the 
witness has testified.101 Accordingly, evidence of the witness’s 
poor eyesight, obstructed vision, and other such matters are 
routinely presented to juries so that they may evaluate the accuracy 
and reliability of the witness’s versions of the events.102   
However, impeachment by showing some degree of defect in 
the witness’s capacity does not mean the witness is a liar or that 
the impeaching party is calling the witness a liar. For example, 
fMRI-based expert testimony that the witness was being truthful 
when asked about the events while in a scanner would not logically 
rebut evidence that the witness’s line of sight was obscured by 
                                                
99 FED. R. EVID. 601 declares every person “competent to be a witness unless 
these rules provide otherwise.”   
100 FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403, 611. 
101 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.21 
(5th ed. 2012). 
102 ROGER PARK, ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 8.1 (2nd ed. Supp. 2014) (“[T]he court 
will instruct the jury to draw its own conclusions about the faculties of a 
particular witness.”). 
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trees or a road sign.103 While the witness may sincerely believe she 
had a clear line of sight and unobstructed view of the scene and the 
resulting BOLD differential confirmed the sincerity of her belief, 
the issue is one of the accuracy of the witness’s perception of the 
historical facts, not truth-telling. fMRI-based opinion testimony 
that the witness sincerely believed her version of the facts was 
accurate and that she was not being deceptive in describing what 
she saw, or thought she saw, does not address the underlying 
question of how well the witness could observe, understand, recall, 
and relate the historical facts. Because the fMRI opinion on 
truthfulness does not rebut the defect in capacity impeachment, it 
would not be admissible to rehabilitate the witness regardless of 
the reliability of the opinion.104 
2. Character  
The rules of evidence have long disfavored evidence of a 
person’s character or trait of character to prove conduct in 
conformity with that character trait.105 With notable exceptions, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence codified the common law rule.106 Rules 
                                                
103 By the same token, fMRI-based opinion testimony that the witness was 
deceptive during a scan is not an attack on capacity.  
104 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
105 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (“The inquiry is 
not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh 
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a 
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular 
charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted 
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent 
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”). 
106 FED. R. EVID. 404; FED R. EVID 405. At common law, a criminal defendant 
could prove his good character through witnesses who were familiar with his 
reputation in the community. The modern rule permits witnesses who have 
sufficient connection to and knowledge of the person whose character is being 
proved to testify as to their personal opinion of the character, as well as the 
person’s reputation in the community. FED. R. EVID. 405(a). If the defendant 
attacks the character of the victim, the modern rule permits the prosecution to 
offer reputation or opinion evidence of that same character trait in the defendant. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, the modern rules depart from the 
common law in generally protecting the character of a victim of sexual assault, 
FED. R. EVID. 412, and in permitting the prosecution and the plaintiff in a case of 
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404(a)(1) and (2), 405, and 412–415 regulate the admissibility of 
evidence of pertinent character traits and specific acts of 
misconduct of criminal defendants, the victims of crimes, and civil 
defendants in cases arising out of sexual assault or child molestation. 
Rule 404(a)(3) regulates admissibility of character evidence of a 
witness in either a civil or criminal case. It permits a party to offer 
character evidence of a witness only if the evidence complies with 
limits imposed by Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609.107 Rules 
608 and 609 permit impeachment by showing the witness has a 
bad character for truthfulness, but they also carefully regulate the 
form that the impeachment evidence can take.108 
Under Rule 608, a party can impeach Witness 1 by calling 
Witness 2 to attack Witness 1’s “character for truthfulness.”109 This 
sort of impeachment, however, is quite constrained. Under Rule 
608(a), extrinsic evidence of Witness 1’s bad character for 
truthfulness is limited to his reputation for truthfulness within the 
community110 and/or Witness 2’s opinion of his character for 
                                                                                                         
sexual assault or child molestation to offer evidence in the case in chief of prior 
similar acts of the defendant to prove the defendants predisposition. FED. R. 
EVID. 413–415. 
107 “Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness’s character may be 
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.” FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3). Rule 607 
permits any party to impeach any witness, including his own and does not 
impose any substantive limits on the mode of impeachment or the form the 
evidence may take. 
108 Rule 608, for example, excludes extrinsic evidence of prior conduct 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Rule 609 
imposes limits on the type and age of prior convictions that are admissible to 
prove a witness’s bad character for truthfulness. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
109 FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or 
supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about 
that character.”). 
110 Reputation is, of course, what others say about the person whose character 
is in question. When offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., Bubba’s 
reputation for truthfulness in the community is terrible, reputation is hearsay. 
Rule 803(21) provides the exception: “Reputation Concerning Character. A 
reputation among a person’s associates or in the community concerning the 
person’s character.” FED. R. EVID. 803 (21). 
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truthfulness.111 Admission of this sort of impeachment evidence 
allows the jury to infer that Witness 1 is generally not a truthful 
person and is probably acting consistently with that untruthful 
character trait and is not telling the truth at trial. Of course, the 
party who called Witness 1 can rebut this adverse character 
evidence by introducing opinion and reputation evidence from 
Witness 3 that Witness 1 is a generally truthful person. 
Because the rules restrict the character witnesses to just their 
opinion of Witness 1’s character for truthfulness and/or the 
reputation within the community of Witness 1 for truth and 
veracity, the jury never learns of the myriad of specific acts and 
incidents that formed the basis of the opinion or reputation. 
Furthermore, Rule 608(a) specifically conditions admission of 
evidence of good character for truth and veracity to situations 
where the opponent has first offered opinion or reputation evidence 
of bad character for truth and veracity.112 In other words, absent an 
attack on Witness 1’s character for truth and veracity, evidence to 
bolster the witness’s credibility by introducing reputation and 
opinion testimony of good character for truth and veracity is 
specifically prohibited. 
Additionally, Rule 608(b) prohibits extrinsic evidence of prior 
acts of the witness that either support or undermine his character 
                                                
111 In both instances, the character witness must have personal knowledge of 
the witness’s reputation or a sufficient relationship with the witness to have an 
opinion as to the character trait of truthfulness. United States v. Whitmore, 359 
F.3d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 
734 (8th Cir. 2004). See infra notes 287–311 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of whether expert opinion is admissible on the issue of witness 
truthfulness, generally. In the context of opinion under Rule 608, fMRI opinion 
is not admissible because fMRI-based opinion on truthfulness does not address 
“character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET.AL., 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
§ 40:8 (2012) (“Rule 608 thus does not obviously apply to the situation in which 
the witness states ‘X’ on the witness stand and the polygrapher testifies as to 
whether the witness was truthful in saying ‘X’ during the polygraph test.”). 
112 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
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for truth and veracity.113 The Rule’s exclusion of extrinsic evidence 
of these acts forces the impeaching party to rely upon what the 
community thinks of the witness’s character or to offer the 
personal opinion of one who knows the witness whose character is 
under attack without providing the jury the details of the basis of 
either the reputation or the opinion. The lack of specificity in this 
sort of impeachment makes its utility of questionable value and 
may discourage its use except in limited circumstances where the 
credibility of a witness is critical and the evidence of reputation 
and opinion is clear and consistent. Excluding specifics instances 
of conduct also avoids time-consuming and distracting mini-trials 
over the details of acts probative of character for truthfulness that 
accumulate over a person’s lifetime. Permitting extrinsic evidence 
of this sort could easily bog the trial down in collateral matters far 
removed from the historical events giving rise to the litigation.114  
Similarly, Rule 609 permits the use of certain prior convictions 
as evidence of a witness’s bad character for truthfulness.115 At 
common law, felons were deemed not competent to testify at 
trial.116 The underlying felony conviction was evidence of a 
disregard of or failure to comply with the law and was evidence 
that the felon would not comply with the oath to testify 
truthfully.117 Modern rules removed the disqualification and admit 
                                                
113 “Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under 
Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a 
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for 
truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired 
into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: 
(1) the witness; or (2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-
examined has testified about.” FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see also FAIGMAN, ET AL., 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
§ 40:8 (2012) (“But subsection (b) [of Rule 608] specifically provides that ‘specific 
instances of conduct’ cannot be introduced to support or attack credibility.”) 
(emphasis added).  
114 See BROUN, supra note 88, at 73.   
115 FED. R. EVID. 609. 
116 BROUN, supra note 88, at 74. 
117 See id. 
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certain prior convictions as evidence of the witness’s bad character 
for truth and veracity.118   
If, for example, the defendant testified on direct examination 
that he did not rob the convenience store and the prosecution 
brought out on cross examination or offered extrinsic evidence that 
the defendant was convicted of filing a false income tax return five 
years earlier, the defendant’s character for truthfulness would have 
been attacked.119 The fact of the conviction for filing a false income 
tax return is evidence from which the jury may infer the defendant 
has an untruthful character and that his in-court testimony in the 
current trial may be consistent with that untruthful character. In 
other words, the bad character for truthfulness impeachment 
through a prior conviction allows the jury to conclude, “He lied on 
his income tax return five years ago so he’s probably lying today.” 
In responding to impeachment for bad character for 
truthfulness, Rule 608(a) specifically limits the rehabilitation 
evidence to opinion and reputation testimony about the witness’s 
good character for truthfulness.120 Opinion testimony by the fMRI 
expert, however, that on a specific day at a specific place and in 
response to specific questions the defendant was telling the truth is 
not an opinion as to the defendant’s character for truthfulness. 
Rather, it asks the jury to believe the witness today because, in the 
opinion of the expert, he told the truth about the incident on a past 
occasion. In this regard, the testimony is more akin to extrinsic 
evidence of specific acts of truthfulness, something the Rules 
forbid.121   
The fMRI expert, assuming he has sufficient knowledge and 
familiarity with the defendant so that he can form an opinion as the 
                                                
118 FED. R. EVID. 609.     
119 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
120 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). For example, in response to an impeachment by bad 
reputation for truthfulness or by a prior conviction admissible under Rule 609, 
rehabilitation is limited to opinion or reputation evidence of good character for 
truthfulness. 
121 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (“Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, 
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s 
conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.”). 
OCT. 2014] Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence 137 
defendant’s character for truthfulness, can only testify on direct 
examination that, in his opinion, the defendant is a generally 
truthful person. He cannot, on direct examination and in response 
to an attack on the witness’s character for truthfulness, go into the 
underlying events, interactions, or specific events that allowed him 
to reach the opinion that defendant is a person who has a truthful 
character.122 In reality, an fMRI expert hired to conduct an fMRI 
scan while questioning the defendant about the details of the 
charged offense is hardly going to possess the sort of relationship 
with the defendant that courts require in order to testify to general 
character for truthfulness.123 It is similarly unlikely that the retained 
expert would be sufficiently familiar with the community in which 
the defendant lives and works to testify to the defendant’s 
reputation for truth and veracity within that community.  
No proponent of fMRI as a truth verifier or lie detector has 
claimed that fMRI can reveal a person’s general character for 
truthfulness. To date, the claim has only been that the fMRI scan 
can reveal deception and verify truth solely when the person is 
undergoing the scan and being questioned about a past event.124 
Taken as a whole, the impeachment and rehabilitation rules 
concerning a witness’s character for truthfulness only admit opinion 
and reputation evidence of the witness’s character trait of 
                                                
122 FED. R. EVID. 608.     
123 Rule 608 does not specify the extent, length, or nature of the relationship 
between the character witness and the witness whose character is in question. 
Courts do, however, require a showing that the character witness has had 
sufficient contact and relationship with the principal witness to enable the 
character witness to form an opinion for truthfulness. See, e.g., United States v. 
Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding daily contact with 
child for four to six months sufficient to permit foster parent to give an opinion 
as to child’s character for truth and veracity).  
124 In Semrau, Dr. Laken “emphasized that he was not offering an opinion 
about what Dr. Semrau’s mental state was at the time that he allegedly 
committed the crime or whether Dr. Semrau possessed the requisite mens rea, 
[or whether Dr. Semrau was a generally truthful person]. Instead, Dr. Laken 
stated that he could only testify that, in his opinion, Dr. Semrau answered the 
questions during the fMRI scan truthfully ‘overall.’ ” United States v. Semrau, 
No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *7 n.15 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
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truthfulness. The only extrinsic evidence of bad character for 
truthfulness the rules permit, is certain prior criminal convictions.125 
The only way the specifics of an fMRI scan could even be 
mentioned is if (1) the retained expert had sufficient personal 
knowledge of the defendant to form the opinion that he was a 
truthful person generally; (2) the cross-examiner inquired into the 
basis of that opinion; and (3) the expert then revealed the fMRI 
scan and the results that supported his opinion.     
These limitations on the type of evidence admissible to 
impeach or rehabilitate a witness reflect the general policy goal of 
keeping the jury focused on the conduct of the accused on the day 
in question and avoiding mini-trials over the credibility of a 
witness. Because an fMRI-based opinion on truthfulness is not a 
statement about the witness’s character for truth and veracity 
within the meaning of Rule 608(a), it is not admissible either to 
impeach a witness for bad character for truthfulness or to 
rehabilitate the witness after a character impeachment. The Rule 
608(b) prohibition on extrinsic evidence of specific acts probative 
of character of truthfulness excludes the expert testimony about the 
fMRI scan itself and the expert’s interpretation of it.126 
3. Contradiction 
Impeachment by contradiction occurs any time a party 
introduces any substantive evidence that contradicts or is 
inconsistent with the testimony of any other witness in the trial. It 
happens in every contested trial. The plaintiff, for example, may 
testify that he had the green light when he entered the intersection. 
During the defense case-in-chief the defendant may testify that she 
had the green light at the time of the accident. When defendant 
testifies that she had the green light, she has not only offered 
                                                
125 See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
126 For a consideration of confronting the witness on cross-examination with 
the results of an fMRI scan, see infra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.  
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substantive evidence of the color of the light, but has also 
impeached the plaintiff by contradicting his version of events.127   
Impeachment by contradiction, however, does not necessarily 
mean the impeached witness consciously lied on the witness stand. 
The difference between the contradictory versions of events may 
be one of simple mistake, different perspective, or memory failure. 
The primary witness may even be correct from an historical 
perspective and the contradicting witness is relaying the faulty 
version. The jury must evaluate the competing versions in light of 
other evidence in the case and decide which is the most reliable 
and what credit to give the testimony of the various witnesses. 
Both witnesses could be sincerely “telling the truth,” yet still vary 
significantly in their recollection of the facts. Accordingly, merely 
offering evidence that contradicts an opponent’s witness on the 
historical facts does not open the door for the opponent to 
“rehabilitate” his witness by offering evidence of good character 
for truthfulness.128 To hold otherwise would bring a parade of good 
character witnesses into the court only to be followed by a number 
of bad character witnesses. The historical events giving rise to the 
litigation could quickly become lost in the clutter if the trial 
became centered on the character for truthfulness of the 
contradicted witness. Rehabilitation by offering evidence of good 
character for truthfulness would only be appropriate if the 
contradiction was connected to a direct attack on the witness’s 
veracity.129      
By the same token, only if the impeachment by contradiction 
carried a specific attack on the veracity of the impeached witness’s 
trial testimony would an expert opinion on truthfulness be 
                                                
127 The common law regulated this method of impeachment by excluding 
extrinsic evidence offered solely to impeach a witness on a collateral matter. 1 
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A 
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 573 (1989). While this principle was not 
specifically codified in the Federal Rules, courts reach the same result through 
the application of Rules 401, 402, 403 and 611. MUELLER, ET. AL., supra note 
88, § 6.43, at 558. 
128 BROUN, supra note 88, at 84.  
129 Id. 
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remotely relevant to rehabilitate the impeached witness. In the 
routine situation where impeachment by contradiction with extrinsic 
evidence is permitted, it is difficult to see how eliminating all other 
possible explanations for the difference in the testimony and 
leaving only a conscious and deliberate lie as the reason for the 
difference could be presented. Whether the reason for the 
difference in testimony was due to mistake, failed memory, poor 
perception, or an outright lie, the actual impeaching evidence is the 
contradictory testimony of another witness or some other proof of 
the contested fact. In other words, impeachment by contradiction 
tells the jury the witness “got it wrong,” not that the witness lied 
about it. Thus, offering fMRI-based opinion to rehabilitate the 
impeached witness would not resolve the question of whether a 
witness “got it wrong.” It would only tell the jury that the 
impeached witness believed her own story and does not meet the 
impeachment at the point of attack. Supporting evidence to 
rehabilitate the impeached witness would need to independently 
confirm the facts as she related them. fMRI proponents do not 
claim that fMRI can do that.130  
4. Inconsistency 
Inconsistency, or self-contradiction, occurs when the same 
witness tells different versions of the story on different occasions. 
Bystander, an eyewitness to the robbery of a convenience store 
may tell the police the perpetrator drove away in a dark blue four-
door sedan. At trial, Bystander may testify under oath that the 
perpetrator escaped on foot. The inconsistency between the two 
versions creates doubt as to Bystander’s reliability as a witness. It 
                                                
130 Some researchers have explored whether the brain responds differently to 
familiar objects than to unfamiliar ones, thus raising the question whether fMRI 
can expose “hidden knowledge.” Even less research has gone into this use of 
fMRI than has been devoted to identifying the neural correlates of deception. 
See, e.g., Matthias Gamer, et al., fMRI-Activation Patterns in the Detection of 
Concealed Information Rely on Memory Related Effects, SOC. COGNITIVE & 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 506, 506 (2012) (reporting on results of “guilty 
knowledge test” using fMRI but advising against any forensic application); 
Greely, supra note 3, at 127–30 (concluding fMRI and EEG-based tests to 
expose hidden memory needs more research).      
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does not mean, however, that he was telling a lie from the witness 
stand at trial. Maybe he was mistaken. Maybe his memory failed. 
Maybe he thought long and hard about what he had seen and he 
remembered things differently after that exercise. Any number of 
explanations other than consciously lying could account for the 
inconsistency, all of which are properly considered by the jury in 
deciding the weight to give his testimony at trial, but none of 
which are discernible by fMRI. 
Like contradiction, inconsistency generally does not implicate 
the witness’s character for truthfulness nor does it necessarily 
suggest the witness lied in court. It means the witness told different 
stories on different days and he is, at best, an unreliable source of 
historical information. fMRI-based opinion that the witness was 
truthful in the scanner would be relevant to rehabilitate the witness 
only if the in-court testimony can be classified as a lie.131    
5. Bias 
The fifth method of impeachment is evidence of a witness’s 
bias. Regulated only by the general rules of relevance and concerns 
of unfair prejudice, confusion, and waste of time, evidence that a 
witness favors a party, has antipathy toward a party, or has some 
self-interest in the matter that may color her testimony is generally 
admissible.132 The facts tending to show bias may be elicited on 
cross-examination of the witness or proved with extrinsic evidence.133 
From the facts establishing bias, the jury can infer the witness is 
likely to slant her testimony in a certain direction.   
 Bias does not necessarily imply the witness is telling a 
deliberate lie, however. Parties to a case routinely testify to their 
version of the facts and they, of course, have an interest in the 
outcome of the case. It does not follow that both the plaintiff and 
                                                
131 Inconsistency can, however, support a charge of deliberate deception. See 
United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F. Cir., 1996) (after testifying 
in his own behalf, Airman Scheffer was impeached with a prior inconsistent 
statement and on closing the prosecutor argued, “He lies. He is a liar. He lies at 
every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility.”).  
132 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). 
133 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 98, § 6.76, at 507. 
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the defendant in a case are telling deliberate lies from the witness 
stand because of their interests in the outcome. The same can be 
said of those who have some favorable or unfavorable relationship 
with a party. The nature and extent of the relationship may indicate 
a bias for or against a party and the resulting testimony may be 
delivered through such a filter. But the existence of the filter is not 
necessarily evidence of a deliberate lie. 
Additionally, bias may be unconscious: witnesses may be 
biased and not realize it. Their perception of the events at issue, 
their understanding of the situation, and their recounting of the 
experience may all be influenced by an unconscious bias. It does 
not mean, however, that they are deliberately lying.134  
Rehabilitating a witness after a bias impeachment generally 
involves introducing evidence to counter the existence of the bias 
itself, minimize its influence on the witness, or show the witness 
testified truthfully despite the bias. Like evidence of bias itself, 
evidence to refute bias is regulated only by Federal Rules of 
Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 611. If a particular bias impeachment 
expressly or impliedly charges that the bias motivated the witness 
to deliberately falsify her testimony, the fMRI-based expert 
opinion that the witness was truthful when recounting the same 
story in the scanner would be relevant to rehabilitate the witness. 
The fMRI-based opinion would be evidence that the witness 
testified truthfully and her testimony was not a product of her bias.  
                                                
134 Neuroscientists have begun to investigate whether fMRI can reveal the 
existence of unconscious bias. By comparing the results of a standard racial bias 
testing instrument, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), with fMRI results while 
subjects viewed photos of unknown men of the same and different race, at least 
one researcher has observed higher activation in the amygdala, the part of the 
brain associated with emotions, and a correlation with higher scores of racial 
bias on the IAT. Greely, supra note 3, at 132–33. The research into this area is 
too premature to make any useful predictions. Suffice it say, however, that if 
neuroscience could reliably identify hidden biases that influence how we think, 
act, decide, and interact, the issue may become whether judges and jurors, as 
well as witnesses, should undergo fMRI before participating in a trial. The 
implications for our justice system would be staggering. They are also beyond 
the scope of this article. 
OCT. 2014] Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence 143 
6. Deliberate Deception 
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion of the typical means 
of impeachment and rehabilitation, fMRI-based opinion that the 
witness was truthful during the scan is not admissible to bolster 
credibility before impeachment. Nor is the evidence that the 
witness was truthful during the scan admissible to rehabilitate the 
witness in most impeachment scenarios. There are times, however, 
when the impeachment does rise to the level of either expressly or 
impliedly attacking the witness’s trial testimony as a deliberate lie. 
In those situations, fMRI may be relevant to rebut the 
impeachment.135 To isolate the unique situations that would most 
likely trigger the admission of fMRI-based opinion testimony on 
truthfulness and to avoid the impression that fMRI evidence is only 
admissible if a particular mode of impeachment is employed, this 
Article has added the category of Deliberate Deception to the 
commonly recognized modes of impeachment.136  
Branding a witness a liar, whether a party, non-party percipient 
witness, or an expert witness, is a serious matter.  Trial judges have 
the responsibility to control the mode and order of proof to 
“protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”137 
Most courts forbid questions on either cross-examination or direct-
examination asking a witness to characterize the testimony of 
another witness as a “lie.”138 Similarly, courts take a dim view of 
lawyers using the “L” word during cross-examination or closing 
argument unless the evidence admitted at trial clearly supports that 
                                                
135 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) recognizes impeachment may raise “an express or 
implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated . . . [the in-court testimony] 
or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.” FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).  
136 See infra notes 138–65 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
fMRI could be used to impeach a witness with evidence of deliberate deception.  
137 FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3). 
138 4 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 611:18 (7th 
ed. 2012) (collecting cases).   
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conclusion.139 Calling a witness a liar is tantamount to alleging the 
witness committed perjury as he testified before the jury.  
a. Intrinsic Impeachment: Cross-Examining the Witness 
First, consider impeachment that levels a charge of deliberate 
deception. A typical scenario might be that a government subjected 
the “star” witness in a criminal case to fMRI scanning and the 
expert determined the witness was being deceptive when he 
implicated the defendant in the crime charged.140 The prosecutor 
disclosed the result of the fMRI examination to the defense, but 
still called the witness in the government’s case in chief.141 The 
witness’s testimony implicated the defendant in the crime charged. 
Can the defense counsel cross-examine the witness about the 
results of the fMRI scan, or call the expert in rebuttal to give his 
opinion that the witness was lying when during the scan he 
implicated the defendant in the charged offense? 
The impeachment on cross-examination would, necessarily, 
take the form of asking whether the witness failed the fMRI test. 
Of course, the witness has no way of knowing whether he “failed” 
the test unless he was so informed by either the person conducting 
the test or the prosecutors who arranged for the test. Accordingly, 
                                                
139 The facts of the case and the nature of the evidence determine where the 
line is between proper and improper questioning and argument. Compare United 
States v. Iacona, 728 F. 3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2013) (ruling no error for prosecutor 
to repeatedly refer to Defendant as liar; evidence at trial made such a charge fair 
argument), with United States v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 208 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(ruling plain error, but not reversible error, for prosecutor to refer to Defendant 
as liar during closing argument). For an entertaining look at the considerations, 
and pitfalls, associated with using the “L” word, see James W. McElhaney, 
LIAR! Dealing with Dishonesty in the Courtroom, 80 A.B.A. J. 74 (1994).  
140 For the sake of discussion, assume the witness voluntarily agreed to undergo 
the scan and cooperated fully with the fMRI expert. 
141 In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the Court held that 
impeachment evidence was subject to the disclosure requirements of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). But see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5 
(1995) (finding failure to disclose polygraph results to defense not a Brady 
violation because test results were not “material” and would not have affected 
the outcome of the trial).   
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the witness lacks personal knowledge of the outcome of the test as 
required by Federal Rule of Evidence 602.142   
If the question seeks to elicit what the witness was told about 
the test results, it would be hearsay if offered to prove that the 
witness did, in fact, fail the fMRI test.143 If, however, the witness 
learned of the results from the prosecutor, or if the examiner was 
an agent or employee of the government, the answer could be the 
statement of a party opponent and the hearsay rule would not bar 
admission.144 If the statement of the examiner, prosecutor, or other 
agent of the government informing the witness of the test results 
meets the Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) exemption from the 
definition of hearsay, the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 
602 no longer applies,145 clearing the way for admission of the 
                                                
142 “A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient 
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own 
testimony. This rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 
703.” FED. R. EVID. 602. 
143 FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). The question would be eliciting the out of court 
statement of the fMRI expert, “The fMRI scan shows you are lying,” to prove 
that fact.   
144 Rule 801(d)(2) exempts from the hearsay definition statements made by 
various individuals associated with an opposing party. When these statements 
are offered against the party whose agent or employee made or adopted the 
statement, the statement is not hearsay. Some Circuits have applied Rule 
801(d)(2) to statements made by agents of the government. See, e.g., United 
States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 131 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Morgan, 581 
F.2d 933, 937 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bellamy v. State, 941 A.2d 1107, 1115–16 
(Md. 2008) (collecting federal cases). Others have held that no individual could 
bind the sovereign by a statement and that Rule 801(d)(2) does not apply to 
statements by agents of the government. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 467 
F.2d 1089, 1095 (7th Cir. 1972); MUELLER ET AL, supra note 88, at 910 
(“[B]etter . . . [reasoned cases] indicate that the admissions doctrine may be 
invoked against the government.”). 
145 The exclusion of statements of party opponents from the definition of 
hearsay is a function of the adversary system and is not based upon notions of 
reliability and trustworthiness like the categorical exceptions. FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2) (“No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of . . . 
[statements of party opponents]. The freedom which . . . [statements of party 
opponents] have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance 
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results of the fMRI on cross-examination of the witness who 
underwent the procedure.   
If the defendant’s counsel cannot fit the statement of the results 
into Rule 801(d)(2)’s hearsay exemption, she might attempt to 
avoid the personal knowledge and hearsay barriers by offering the 
evidence for the non-hearsay purpose of showing effect on the 
listener (the witness) or the current state of mind of the witness. 
The problem with this approach is that learning he failed the fMRI 
test does not make it more likely that the story he told in the 
scanner and at trial is the product of deliberate deception. The 
question is still whether he told the truth at trial and the fact that he 
learned that the fMRI examiner thought he was lying does not 
make it more likely that the story he told was an actual lie. Thus, if 
the fMRI results are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted 
they are irrelevant to prove that the in-court testimony was a lie. 
One might argue that Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination of 
witnesses about specific instances of conduct that are probative of 
character for truthfulness and asking about the failed fMRI is 
merely applying the plain language of the rule. There are three 
problems with that argument. First, Rule 608 is concerned with 
character for truthfulness. In the impeachment setting, the prior 
acts must be probative of bad character for truthfulness. While 
voluntarily submitting to an fMRI exam may be probative of the 
witness’s subjective belief in the truthfulness of his story and one 
might be able to infer from that subjective belief that the witness’s 
character for truthfulness is good, the evidence here is being 
offered to prove the witness lied, not that he told the truth. The fact 
that he underwent fMRI scanning is not probative of his bad 
character for truthfulness.   
Second, the specific act of lying while in the scanner is 
probative of bad character for truthfulness only if we know and 
accept that the result of the examination concluded he was being 
                                                                                                         
of trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstances, and from the 
restrictive influence of the opinion rule and the rule requiring firsthand 
knowledge, when taken with the apparently prevalent satisfaction with the 
results, calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility.”). 
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deceptive while in the scanner. But any probative value into the 
truthfulness of the witness in these circumstances depends on the 
accuracy of the exam. As explained above, the fMRI-based 
opinion of the expert is not admissible through cross-examining 
the witness in order to impeach unless it fits within the Rule 
801(d)(2)(A)–(D) exemption for the hearsay rule.146 Further 
complicating the problem is that the typical fMRI lie detection 
examination will consist of at least two scans covering the same 
topic. On one scan the subject is asked to respond truthfully and on 
the other is asked to respond deceptively.147 The comparison of the 
two scans allows the examiner to see whether the BOLD response 
during the “truth” scan is equal to or greater than the BOLD 
response observed during the “lie” scan.148 If it is, deception is 
indicated. If not, the subject is thought to be telling the truth. 
Accordingly, all fMRI examinations require the subject to “lie” at 
some point during the scan.149 Conducting a cross-examination that 
suggests the “lie” during the scan is an act probative of character 
for truthfulness is, therefore, misleading and could lead to 
considerable confusion since the examination itself requires the 
subject to lie in order to capture the relative BOLD response 
between the brain state of “lying” and the brain state of “truth 
telling.”    
The third problem is that if the witness was asked whether he 
“failed” the fMRI and answered by either denying he underwent 
scanning or that he passed the test instead of failing it, the 
impeaching party would be stuck with that answer. Rule 608(b) 
permits cross-examination on prior instances of conduct probative 
of bad character for truthfulness. Lying while undergoing an fMRI 
exam may well be probative of bad character for truthfulness. But 
Rule 608(b) specifically precludes proving the prior act by 
extrinsic evidence and, accordingly, prevents calling the fMRI 
expert. Reliance upon Rule 608(b) as authority to cross-examine a 
                                                
146 Supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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witness about an fMRI scan creates a conundrum if the cross-
examiner does not like the answer and then tries to prove the 
specific act by calling the fMRI examiner.   
b. Extrinsic Impeachment: Calling the fMRI Expert 
To expand upon the current hypothetical, assume the 
cross-examiner did not ask the witness about the fMRI test during 
cross-examination but, instead, called the fMRI examiner as an 
expert and offered the opinion of the expert to directly impeach the 
witness’s in-court testimony. This form of impeachment does not 
implicate any of the five traditional methods of impeachment. It 
does not go to the witness’s capacity to observe, understand, 
remember, or relate. It does not seek to establish the witness’s bad 
character for truthfulness from which the jury can infer testimony 
at trial consistent with that bad character. If the scanner test itself is 
a prior statement, it is a consistent one. It does not offer a prior 
inconsistent statement; in fact, it does not impeach by offering 
contradictory facts that go to the merits of the case. And, it does 
not suggest some bias on the part of the witness that may have 
influenced his testimony. Rather, the offered evidence is scientific 
proof that the facts related by the witness are the result of 
conscious and deliberate deception. 
There is nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence that says 
only the five traditional methods of impeachment are permissible. 
Rule 607 allows any party to impeach any witness; “impeach” is 
not further defined by the rules.150 In this setting, the rules and 
practices that regulate our traditional methods of impeachment are 
not dispositive, and the admissibility is determined solely by Rules 
401, 402, 611 702–705 and 403.151 The expert opinion has some 
tendency to make it more likely that the in-court testimony was 
false.152 Rule 402 admits relevant evidence unless it is excluded by 
                                                
150 FED. R. EVID. 607. 
151 For this discussion assume that Rules 702–705 governing expert testimony 
have been satisfied. For a discussion of the application of Rules 702–705 to 
fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness, see infra Parts V.A–V.C. 
152 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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some other rule, statute, or provision of the Constitution.153 Rule 
403 is a rule that excludes otherwise relevant evidence if the 
probative value of the proposition for which it is offered is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or causing undue 
delay, waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.154 This balancing test is tilted decidedly toward 
admission, but the court has tremendous discretion in balancing the 
relevant factors.155 Thus, the only limits on this sort of testimony to 
impeach a testifying witness are those governing expert testimony, 
the balancing provisions of Rule 403, and the court’s power to 
control the mode and order of proof under Rule 611.   
While this frees the proponent from the labyrinth of textual 
rules and the unwritten common law rules that still influence 
judges, it does not necessarily mean that the door is wide open to 
fMRI-based opinion testimony on witness truthfulness. The 
testimony must, of course, clear the significant hurdle of Rule 702. 
Then the court must find that countervailing considerations under 
Rule 403 do not substantially outweigh the probative value of the 
evidence. Perhaps the biggest obstacle here is the practical one: the 
party calling the witness must have (1) subjected the witness to an 
fMRI exam; (2) the result of the fMRI exam must have indicated 
deliberate deception; (3) the exam and the results must have been 
disclosed to the opposing party; (4) in spite of the failed exam and 
the availability of the fMRI evidence to impeach, the proponent 
must have called the witness at trial; and (5) the witness must have 
testified at trial consistent with the story he told during the “truth” 
portion of the fMRI scan.156 Aligning all of the legal and practical 
stars to pave the way for admission of fMRI-based expert opinion 
to impeach a witness with extrinsic expert opinion that the witness 
failed the fMRI scan is a daunting task, is in large measure 
                                                
153 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
154 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
155 See infra Part VI. Rules of Evidence: Balancing Probative Value Versus 
Prejudicial Effect. 
156 See supra notes 135–55 and accompanying text. 
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controlled by the trial decisions and tactics of the opposing party, 
and will be the rare exception, not the routine. 
c. Extrinsic Rehabilitation: Calling the fMRI Expert to Support 
Truthfulness 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that if the party calling the 
witness subjected the witness to an fMRI examination that 
indicated deception and was obligated to disclose that fact to the 
opposing party, the door to admission of the expert’s opinion is 
opened, however slightly, if the witness testifies at trial. But what 
if the fMRI scan determined the witness was truthful? Assuming 
the rules governing expert testimony are satisfied, is the 
fMRI-based opinion that the witness was truthful admissible to 
rehabilitate the credibility of the witness? 
As the prior discussion of impeachment and rehabilitation 
explained,157 the question of supporting a witness with fMRI-based 
opinion on truthfulness only arises after the witness has testified, 
or the hearsay declarant’s statement has been admitted as an 
exception to the hearsay rule, and the witness has been impeached 
by means or methods that expressly or impliedly charge the 
witness with lying at trial.  
As has been shown, not all impeachment carries with it the 
charge of deliberate deception. The most likely impeachment 
scenarios that carry the charge of lying158 are: (1) vigorous cross-
                                                
157 See supra notes 55–133 and accompanying text. 
158 Interestingly, the form of impeachment that always infers the witness is 
lying in court is an attack on character for truthfulness in the form permitted by 
Rule 608 or Rule 609. The theory behind the impeachment is that the witness 
has the general propensity to lie and is acting consistent with that propensity 
while testifying at trial. The form the evidence must take to accomplish the 
impeachment is highly regulated, as is the evidence admissible to rehabilitate. 
Insofar as the fMRI examination of the witness is a specific act probative of 
truthfulness, Rule 608(b) does not admit extrinsic evidence of such acts to rebut 
the inference of in-court deception created by the impeachment. Because the 
fMRI-based opinion would necessarily come from the expert who conducted the 
scan, the bar on extrinsic evidence excludes it. Furthermore, expert opinion 
based on fMRI scanning is not an opinion of the witness’s character for 
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examination that expressly or impliedly attacks the veracity of the 
witness’s testimony; (2) introduction of contradicting facts that, if 
true, expose the witness’s contrary version as the product of 
deliberate deception as opposed to a difference in perception or 
perspective; (3) inconsistencies between the in-court testimony and 
prior statements that could only be explained by conscious 
deception at trial; and (4) bias or corruption so profound that the 
most likely conclusion is that the witness lied.159  
Whether the impeachment actually charges in-court fabrication 
so the fMRI-based opinion of truthfulness becomes relevant to 
rebut the charge is a matter trusted to the discretion of the trial 
judge. If the trial judge does not believe the impeachment included 
an express or implied charge of deliberate deception, the proffer of 
fMRI-based testimony of witness truthfulness would not meet the 
impeachment at the point of attack and would be irrelevant.160 
Because the admissibility of fMRI-based expert opinion on 
witness truthfulness will turn upon the manner in which a witness 
was impeached, control over the admissibility of the opinion lies, 
to some degree, within the power of the opponent. As a matter of 
trial tactics, if counsel knows opposing counsel has an fMRI expert 
waiting in the wings to rehabilitate the witness should impeachment 
charge the witness with lying, she may wish to either forego 
impeachment or rely upon a method that does not raise the specter 
of deliberate fabrication.  
The rehabilitation by introducing expert opinion of the fMRI 
scan raises the initial question of whether the statements made by 
the witness during the scan are admissible as substantive evidence. 
If the statements themselves are offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, the statements are hearsay and only admissible as 
substantive evidence if they meet an exemption or exception to the 
                                                                                                         
truthfulness as contemplated by Rule 608(a). See supra notes 105–25 and 
accompanying text.   
159 See supra notes 95–158 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
requirement that evidence offered to rehabilitate a witness after impeachment 
must correspond to the nature of the impeachment itself. 
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hearsay rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) exempts from 
the definition of hearsay prior consistent statements of a testifying 
witness offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the in-
court testimony was of recent fabrication or the product of an 
improper motive or influence. In Tome v. United States,161 the 
Supreme Court held that only statements made before the alleged 
motive to fabricate or improper influence arose are admissible 
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).162 The typical fMRI examination will 
usually occur long after any motive to fabricate arose. Otherwise, 
there would be no need for the fMRI-based opinion.  
                                                
161 513 U.S. 150 (1995). 
162 Application of the pre-motive requirement to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was not 
without some controversy. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, 
Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995); 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A 
Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. LEGIS. 329 (1995). 
Others have called for amending Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to allow all prior statements 
that are relevant for rehabilitation to be admitted for substantive purposes 
without regard to when the alleged motive to fabricate arose. Hon. Frank W. 
Bullock, Jr., & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent Statements and the Premotive 
Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509 (1997). This argument has gained considerable 
traction and the Supreme Court forwarded to Congress a recommendation to 
change to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to admit prior consistent statements as substantive 
evidence without regard to the pre-motive requirement if they are otherwise 
relevant to rehabilitate the witness. The amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will 
become effective on Dec. 1, 2014, unless Congress takes contrary action. See 
Supreme Court of the United States Order Apr. 25, 2014, amending FRE 
801(d)(1)(B) and 803(6)–(8) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/ 
courtorders/frev14_3318.pdf (last visited May 12, 2014). One commentator has 
argued that the rule against hearsay stands as the major obstacle to the 
admissibility of scientifically valid fMRI-based expert testimony on witness 
truthfulness. Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if any) for the Federal Criminal 
Justice System of Advances in Lie Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711, 
727 (2007) (“The most cogent evidentiary objection to scientifically valid expert 
lie detector testimony is that it is hearsay.”). The pending amendment to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) eliminates this argument. Some states freely admit prior consistent 
statements of testifying witnesses for the non-hearsay purpose of corroboration 
of the witness’s in-court testimony. See, e.g., State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 39–
40, 678 S.E.2d 618, 637 (N.C. 2009) (admitting prior statements of testifying 
witnesses given to police during station house interview as “corroborative 
evidence”). 
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 If the statements of the witness made during the scan are not 
offered for their truth value but are only offered as a basis of the 
expert’s opinion, or for other non-truth purposes, neither the 
hearsay rule nor the pre-motive requirement presents a problem. 
Experts may rely upon otherwise inadmissible evidence “if experts 
in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts 
or data in forming an opinion on the subject . . . .”163 Obviously, 
fMRI experts on witness truthfulness would all rely upon the MRI 
data generated by the witness’s statements during the scan. The 
actual statements of the witness in answering “yes” or “no” to the 
questions about the incident are not what the opinion is based upon 
in the first instance. It is the BOLD response those statements 
generate that is the basis of the opinion of truthfulness. 
Furthermore, in the typical scan the examiner will go through the 
questions twice, once instructing the witness to lie and once 
instructing the witness to tell the truth. Only if the BOLD response 
during the “truth” scan is less than the response during the “lie” 
scan does it indicate deception.164 Accordingly, the hearsay rule 
and the pre-motive requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) do not 
present a serious obstacle to fMRI-based opinions of truthfulness. 
To summarize how the rules regulating impeachment and 
rehabilitation of witnesses at trial apply to the fMRI-based expert 
opinion on truthfulness we can say: (1) fMRI-based expert opinion 
testimony that the witness testified truthfully is not admissible 
unless and until the witness has testified and been impeached in a 
way that constitutes an attack on the veracity of the in-court 
testimony; (2) whether the witness has been impeached in a way 
that constitutes an attack on the veracity of the in-court testimony 
is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge; and (3) whether 
a party can impeach a witness through extrinsic evidence that the 
witness failed an fMRI examination is not prohibited by the 
                                                
163 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
164 Spence, supra note 46, at 12. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence and is a matter left within the discretion 
of the trial judge.165  
The common theme running through these three principles is 
that admissibility of the fMRI-based expert opinion is influenced 
greatly by the trial strategy and tactics of the opponent and is 
ultimately within the broad discretion of the trial judge. Only time 
will tell whether litigants will spend the time and money to obtain 
fMRI opinions when their ultimate admissibility depends upon 
factors largely beyond their control. What is known, however, is 
that the rules applicable to impeachment and rehabilitation of 
witnesses will place some real constraints on the admissibility of 
fMRI-based evidence of witness truthfulness. In light of the 
prevailing judicial attitude that excludes expert testimony of 
witness truthfulness,166 coupled with the regulation of impeachment 
and rehabilitation, the opportunities to offer fMRI-based testimony 
on witness truthfulness are limited.167  
V.  RULES OF EVIDENCE: EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY 
To this point we have assumed that the fMRI expert opinion 
satisfied the standards for expert testimony and did not run afoul of 
                                                
165 A jurisdiction may have a per se ban on polygraph evidence and if fMRI is 
included within the scope of that ban, the judge would not have the discretion to 
admit the fMRI evidence. See, e.g., MIL R. EVID. 707 (banning polygraph 
evidence). No jurisdiction to date has specifically addressed whether fMRI lie 
detection is within the scope of a ban on “polygraph” evidence. 
166 See infra notes 287–312 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
prevailing judicial attitude toward admitting expert testimony on witness 
truthfulness. 
167 Of course, admission at trial to rehabilitate a witness is not the sole use of 
fMRI-based expert opinion on truthfulness. As is true with regards to polygraph 
evidence, the fact that the witness underwent the examination and was found 
truthful by the expert may be useful in negotiating the disposition of the case 
with the prosecutor. Furthermore, if opposing counsel is aware of this evidence 
he may forego an impeachment that would rise to the level of an attack on 
veracity in order to avoid the issue. Both uses have utility. The question is 
whether fMRI-based evidence is worth the time and expense when its ultimate 
use is so difficult to predict and, in large measure, dependent upon the trial 
strategy of the opponent. 
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Rule 403. When those two standards are coupled with the rules 
regulating impeachment and rehabilitation, the likelihood of the 
jury hearing from the fMRI expert is reduced further. The next 
sections address those limitations. 
A. Rule 702: The Relevant and Reliable Standard  
Generally, the rules of evidence in both state and federal courts 
require witnesses to testify based on their first-hand knowledge of 
the historical facts and do not permit, with certain exceptions, 
opinion testimony.168 The major exception is when the testimony is 
based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.169 
Rules 702 through 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence govern 
the admissibility of this important category of evidence in federal 
trials. Trials in state court are governed by the various state rules of 
evidence, which may or may not mirror the standards of the federal 
rules. Because the fMRI image only reveals brain activity based on 
the BOLD response while the subject is undergoing some 
cognitive task, explaining what a given image means with regard 
to the subject’s truthfulness requires expert opinion testimony.  
The Supreme Court set out a two-prong test for admissibility 
under Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.170 In Daubert, the Court rejected the Frye v. United States171 
                                                
168 FED. R. EVID. 602; FED. R. EVID. 701. Lay witnesses (non-experts) are 
permitted to testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion is “(a) rationally 
based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the 
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issues; and (c) not based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 
702.” FED. R. EVID. 701. 
169 FED. R. EVID. 701. 
170 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Rule 702, as it existed at the time Daubert was 
decided, read, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED. R. 
EVID. 702 (1993) (amended 2000). Daubert and its progeny have been the 
subject of too many articles and publications to count. For a summary of the 
case and its impact on the law of expert testimony, see, e.g., Robert Robinson, 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and the Local Construction of Reliability, 
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standard of admitting expert testimony if the relevant scientific 
community generally accepted the scientific theory underlying the 
testimony and held that Rule 702 requires the trial judge to “ensure 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not 
only relevant, but reliable.”172   
The Daubert Court found the relevance standard embodied in 
Rule 702’s requirement that expert opinion evidence “assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.”173 This helpfulness standard requires a valid scientific 
connection, or “fit,” between the opinion and a disputed issue in 
the case.174 Specifically, “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires 
a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a 
precondition to admissibility.”175 
The reliability prong of the Rule 702 standard finds its locus in 
the “scientific . . . knowledge” language of the rule.176 The court 
                                                                                                         
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39 (2009); David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2139 (1999); Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert 
Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999); Ruth Saunders, The Circuit Courts’ 
Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 46 DRAKE L. REV. 
407 (1997).  
171 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Like Daubert, the Frye decision has been the 
subject of extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Steven M. Egesdal, The 
Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1769 (1986); John R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission 
of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 
(1984); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in The Evolution of Scientific 
Evidence—A Primer on Evaluating The Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 261 (1981); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel 
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1197 (1980). 
172 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their 
inclusions of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention ‘general 
acceptance,’ the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is 
unconvincing.”). 
173 Id. at 591.  
174 Id. at 591–92. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 590. 
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defined “scientific knowledge,” as “derived by the scientific 
method” and supported by “appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good 
grounds’ . . . .”177 The Court explained, “in a case involving scientific 
evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific 
validity.”178  
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) (“Rule 104(a)”) places the 
responsibility on the trial judge to determine “whether the reasoning 
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid 
and . . . whether the reasoning or methodology can be applied to 
the facts in issue.”179 The Court suggested five factors for judges to 
consider: (1) whether the technique or theory can be, or has been, 
tested in some objective sense; (2) whether the technique or theory 
has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential error 
rate of the technique or theory when applied; (4) whether there are 
standards or controls that govern the application of the technique 
or theory; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been 
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.180 
In response to Daubert, Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to 
specifically require expert testimony be based upon sufficient facts 
and data, be the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
that the expert applied the principles and methods reliably in 
                                                
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 600, n.9 (emphasis in original). 
179 Id. at 592–93. 
180 Id. at 593–94. Some courts, like the magistrate judge and the Sixth Circuit 
in Semrau, and commentators combine the “error rate” factor and the existence 
of “standards or controls” into the same bullet point and list only four Daubert 
factors. Subsequent cases expanded the non-exclusive Daubert factors to 
consider, (6) whether the expert’s testimony is based on information growing 
out of independent research or was developed for the purpose of litigation, 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); 
(7) whether there is “too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered,” General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); 
(8) whether alternative explanations have been considered and accounted for, 
Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994); (9) whether the expert 
has applied the same care and attention to his paid litigation consulting that he 
applies to his regular professional practice, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137, 151–53 (1999).  
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reaching his opinion.181 As noted by the Advisory Committee, in 
proposing the 2000 amendment, “[n]o attempt has been made to 
‘codify’ [the Daubert factors] . . . . The standards set forth in the 
amendment are broad enough to require consideration of any or all 
of the specific Daubert factors where appropriate.”182 The Advisory 
Committee also made clear that the admissibility of expert 
testimony is purely a matter for the trial court under Rule 104(a) 
and that the proponent of the testimony has the burden of 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that all of the 
admissibility requirements have been satisfied.183  
Like Daubert, the 2000 amendment to Rule 702, did not 
impose a checklist of factors that must be applied in each case. 
Rather, the rule set out a framework to analyze whether the 
proffered testimony is relevant and reliable to address the issues at 
trial. The allure of a checklist, however, has proven too much for 
some courts to resist. In performing their gatekeeping functions, 
many courts cite to Rule 702 and then proceed to analyze the 
admissibility of the proffered testimony under the Daubert factors 
without considering the analytical framework of Rule 702. The 
Daubert factors have, in many instances, become a proxy for the 
analysis of the scientific validity of the principles and methods 
underlying an opinion. Some courts, however, have recognized 
                                                
181 Rule 702 reads: 
Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
182 Id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
183 Id. 
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that the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 superseded the Daubert 
decision but the Daubert decision serves as the foundation for the 
rule.184  
B. Evidence of Lies: Judicial Scrutiny of fMRI Expert Opinion on 
Truthfulness 
The most detailed judicial scrutiny of fMRI as a truth verifier 
to date, under Rule 702, is the magistrate judge’s Amended Report 
and Recommendation in United States v. Semrau.185 Dr. Lorne 
Semrau, a psychologist, was charged with sixty counts of defrauding 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care benefit programs for 
submitting false reimbursement claims for psychiatric services 
provided to patients in nursing homes in Tennessee and Mississippi 
between 1999 and 2005.186 To convict Dr. Semrau of health care 
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, the Government had to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Dr. Semrau: (1) “knowingly devised a 
scheme or artifice to defraud a health care benefit program . . . ; 
(2) executed or attempted to execute this scheme . . . ; and (3) acted 
with intent to defraud.”187  
                                                
184 United States v. Para, 402 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2005). 
185 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010). The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which 
excluded the fMRI-based testimony, was adopted by the district judge. Out of a 
71 count indictment, the jury found Dr. Semrau guilty of three counts Health 
Care Fraud, Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. United 
States v. Semrau, No. 1:07CR10074-01-MI, 2011 WL 1114441, (W.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 24, 2011). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s exclusion 
of the fMRI testimony and upheld the conviction. United States v. Semrau, 693 
F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). The courts in Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 
3d 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) and State v. Smith, No. 106589C (Cir. Ct. 
Montgomery Cty., MD, Oct. 3, 2012) excluded the fMRI testimony under the 
“general acceptance” standard for admission of novel expert testimony in New 
York and Maryland, respectively, and did not engage in a detailed inquiry into 
the scientific reliability of the technology.  
186 He was also charged with eleven counts of money laundering, but those 
charges were not specifically addressed in the fMRI scanning. United States v. 
Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *2 (W. D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
187 Id. at *2 n.4. 
160 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 16: 105 
Specifically, the government alleged Dr. Semrau “upcoded” his 
bills for reimbursement by instructing his billing clerks to submit 
bills for procedure codes that were different than and were 
reimbursed at a greater rate than the billing codes for the 
procedures and examinations actually performed by the doctors 
working for his company.188 He also submitted separate bills for 
Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale (“AIMS”) tests that his 
psychiatrists performed as part of their regular monitoring of their 
patients’ condition.189 The Government charged that Dr. Semrau 
knew that AIMS tests were part of the routine monitoring and were 
not to be billed separately.190  
Dr. Semrau contested the Government’s claim that he 
“knowingly” devised a scheme to defraud, denying that he “acted 
with intent to defraud.”191 He did not dispute that he submitted bills 
with differing codes than those recorded by the treating physicians 
in their encounters with the patients. He claimed the procedure 
codes were confusing and inconsistent and his billing practices 
were reasonable under the circumstances.192 Dr. Semrau claimed 
that representatives of the companies processing the Medicare and 
Medicaid claims told him that he could submit separate bills for 
the AIMS tests. Dr. Semrau’s defense was that he did not intend to 
defraud the government when he submitted the bills between 1999 
and 2005.193   
To bolster the credibility of his denial of the intent to defraud, 
Dr. Semrau underwent fMRI scanning conducted by Dr. Steven J. 
Laken, Ph.D., founder and president of Cephos Corporation, a 
company that provided lie detection and truth verification services 
using fMRI.194  
                                                
188 Id. at *2. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at *2 n.4. 
191 Id. at *2.  
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at *4–7; CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/about-us/index. 
php#about (last visited Sep. 6, 2010). Cephos Corp. discontinued their lie detection 
and truth verification services in early 2013. The current version of the 
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Dr. Semrau’s counsel contacted Dr. Laken in December 2009, 
and arranged for Dr. Laken to perform fMRI scanning to determine 
whether Dr. Semrau was truthful when he denied having the intent 
to defraud the government.195 Dr. Laken worked with the defense 
counsel to develop Specific Incident Questions (“SIQ”) related to 
the charged offenses.196 The SIQs dealt with the basic facts alleged 
in the indictment, including whether Dr. Semrau intended to defraud 
the government by submitting his claims for reimbursement, and 
were phrased to elicit a “yes” or “no” response.197 For the purposes 
of the fMRI, the charges were divided into two major areas.198 The 
first area focused on whether Dr. Semrau was telling the truth 
when he denied submitting the reimbursement bills with an intent 
to defraud.199 The second area focused on whether he knew that 
AIMS tests were not to be billed separately.200  
On December 30, 2009, Dr. Semrau traveled to Dr. Laken’s lab 
in Massachusetts.201 After a medical exam and preliminary tests to 
determine whether any impediments to scanning existed, Dr. 
Laken went over the procedures and the SIQs with Dr. Semrau.202 
Prior to the scan, Dr. Semrau practiced answering the SIQs on a 
computer to become familiar with them and the response device he 
                                                                                                         
company’s website does not mention or refer to the fMRI truth verification 
services previously offered by Cephos. In an email exchange with the author, 
Dr. Laken expressed frustration with the reluctance of the legal system to accept 
what he believed was highly reliable evidence of truthfulness. His company now 
devotes its time and resources to forensic DNA services. Personal communication 
with Dr. Laken, on file with the author. 
195 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
196 Id.  
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at *4–5. 
200 Id. at *5–6. 
201 Dr. Laken’s company covered all the expenses associated with the fMRI 
scanning including Dr. Laken’s time and travel to testify at the hearing. United 
States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4 n.12 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010). 
202 Id. at *4–7. 
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would be using while in the scanner.203 The first scan dealt with the 
intent to defraud issue.204 Dr. Semrau entered the scanner and 
responded to the randomized presentation of the SIQs.205 He was 
first instructed to respond truthfully to each question.206 The 
questions were presented again and this time he was instructed to 
respond falsely.207  
After the scans on the intent issue, Dr. Semrau told Dr. Laken 
he was tired but felt capable of continuing.208 Dr. Laken then 
scanned him while he responded to the SIQs dealing with the 
AIMS testing issue.209 As before, he was told to respond truthfully 
the first time through and falsely the second time.210 At the 
conclusion of the second scan, Dr. Semrau again mentioned he was 
tired and that the SIQs seemed complex and confusing, even 
though he had practiced them before getting in the scanner.211  
After all the scans were completed, Dr. Laken processed the 
data through his proprietary computer program and evaluated the 
resulting images.212 By comparing the BOLD responses between 
the two scans on the intent issues Dr. Laken concluded that Dr. 
Semrau was being truthful during the scan, in which he denied 
having the intent to defraud when he submitted the claims for 
reimbursement.213  
On the scan dealing with the AIMS tests, however, the BOLD 
response indicated deception.214 Dr. Laken surmised that fatigue 
and the confusing and complex nature of the AIMS SIQs were 
                                                
203 Id. at *6. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at *7. 
214 Id. 
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responsible for the deception finding.215 After revising the SIQs 
dealing with the AIMS test, Dr. Laken arranged for Dr. Semrau to 
return to Massachusetts to repeat the AIMS test scan.216 After 
processing the data from the repeat scans, Dr. Laken concluded 
that Dr. Semrau was being truthful when he denied knowing that it 
was improper to seek reimbursement for AIMS tests as separate 
items.217  
Dr. Semrau’s counsel notified the government that Dr. Laken 
was prepared to testify that Dr. Semrau was telling the truth when 
he denied having the intent to defraud the government and that he 
did not know submitting separate bills for AIMS testing was 
inappropriate.218 The government moved to exclude Dr. Laken’s 
testimony under Rules 702 and 403.219 On May 13 and 14, 2010, 
the magistrate judge conducted a hearing on the government’s 
motion. Dr. Laken testified to the reliability of fMRI as a truth 
verification technology and offered affidavits of other scientists 
and scientific literature to support his theory.220 The government 
called two experts of its own to dispute the reliability issue of 
fMRI-based opinion testimony on truthfulness generally, and on 
the specific application to Dr. Semrau, offering scientific and legal 
literature that questioned the reliability of fMRI as a lie detector.221  
In his report recommending exclusion of Dr. Laken’s expert 
opinion, the magistrate judge analyzed the testimony and exhibits 
presented at the hearing in light of the Daubert factors.222 First, he 
                                                
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at *1. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at *9–14. By combining the known or potential error rate and the 
existence of protocols or standards into one inquiry, the magistrate judge read 
Daubert as suggesting four factors instead of five. Obviously, fMRI as a truth 
verifier is based upon scientific knowledge and the magistrate judge first found 
that Dr. Laken’s was qualified to offer an opinion based on his experience, 
education, and training. Id. at *10. Not mentioned in the analysis under Rule 702 
was the requirement that the testimony “assist the trier of fact,” though 
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considered whether the underlying principles can be and have been 
tested.223 He found the underlying theories of fMRI-based lie 
detection had been subjected to laboratory testing “at some 
level.”224 He noted, however, that only three of the laboratory 
studies attempted to determine whether fMRI could accurately 
detect deception in individuals as opposed to looking at average 
BOLD responses across the group of subjects in a given study.225 
The first Daubert factor could only be satisfied by Dr. Laken’s 
limited work in his laboratory, rather than any implementation of 
the fMRI technology in the real world.226 In fact, Dr. Laken 
acknowledged that he did not know how fMRI for lie detection 
could be tested in a real-world setting.227  
The magistrate judge also found theories supporting fMRI as a 
lie detector have been published in peer reviewed scientific 
publications, though the studies upon which the articles were based 
                                                                                                         
Magistrate Judge Pham did allude to that requirement in his Rule 403 analysis. 
Id. at *16. Furthermore, Magistrate Judge Pham found it unnecessary to address 
the “relevance prong” of FED. R. EVID. 702 because he found the opinion 
testimony unreliable under the Daubert factors.  
223 Id. at *9. 
224 Id. at *10.  
225 Id. at *10 n.16. In the typical fMRI study, all of the subjects are scanned 
and the voxel activation pattern is averaged across the group to identify the 
regions of the brain where the BOLD response is greatest. Because the final 
image is a group average of the scan data across all the subjects, it may not 
represent the actual activation pattern in any single individual. See Aguirre, 
supra note 40, at 2. 
226 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
227 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, 
Vol. II at 191, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.). 
The applicability of a laboratory study to outside persons in different settings 
involve problems of external validity and ecological validity. These validities 
concern how well the laboratory findings translate to people and situations as 
they occur in the dynamics of everyday life as opposed to the controlled 
environment of the scientific laboratory. See infra notes 478–95 (discussing 
external and ecological validity of fMRI studies on detecting deception). 
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were conducted only in laboratory settings.228 He noted several 
additional studies analyzing fMRI in the lie detection context have 
been published since 2008.229 
The lack of known error rates for an fMRI lie detector in a real-
world application, especially as applied to a sixty-three year-old 
subject, raised additional concerns about the reliability of the 
opinion.230 While Dr. Laken testified at the Daubert hearing that 
known error rates could be calculated from the fMRI studies upon 
which he relied, a government expert disputed the doctor’s claim 
by pointing to the sample sizes of the existing studies, which were 
too small to draw statistically significant error rates.231 
Furthermore, it was undisputed that there were no known error 
rates, or even efforts to discover them, in any setting beyond the 
laboratory using.232 In addition, Dr. Semrau’s age at the time of the 
scan was outside the eighteen to fifty-year-old used by Dr. Laken 
to establish his error rates.233 The small sample sizes Dr. Laken 
relied on,234 coupled with the complete absence of any known error 
rates in a real world applications for sixty-three year-old subjects,235 
and conclusions in the scientific literature from other researchers 
that “[fMRI] is currently not ready to be used in real-world lie 
detection”236 seriously impeded Dr. Semrau’s efforts to convince 
the magistrate judge that Dr. Laken’s opinion was reliable. 
Similarly, the lack of any established protocols or controls in 
the real-world application of fMRI as a lie detector were held as 
negative factors against admitting Dr. Laken’s testimony.237 Dr. 
Laken did testify that he used his own protocols and control, but 
                                                
228 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W. D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
229 Id. at *10 n.16. 
230 Id. at *11. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at *12 n.17. 
234 Id. at *11. 
235 Id. at *12 n.17. 
236 Id. at *12. 
237 Id. at *13. 
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there were no uniform industry standards applicable to real world 
testing.238 “Without such standards,” the magistrate judge found, “a 
court cannot adequately evaluate the reliability of a particular lie 
detection examination.”239 
The magistrate judge also found that Dr. Laken likely departed 
from his own self-developed protocols.240 If the deception finding 
on the initial scan regarding AIMS testing was caused by Dr. 
Semrau’s fatigue, as Dr. Laken testified, it was an indication that 
Dr. Laken either did not have a reliable protocol for developing 
proper SIQs, or he failed to follow an established reliable 
protocol.241 If the outcome of a scan varies with the form of the 
questions, it would seem that scientific reliability would require a 
rather clear and precise protocol for question format. None of the 
published studies of fMRI scans for truth verification have 
indicated any efforts to test what effect, if any, the form of the SIQ 
has on the outcome. The magistrate judge was not comfortable 
with a procedure that led to a deception finding based on flawed 
SIQs and fatigue, and a methodology calling for repeat scans with 
revised SIQs until the results supported the client’s claim.242 Thus, 
the lack of standards and failure to follow protocols seriously 
undermined the reliability of Dr. Laken’s opinions. 
Finally, the magistrate judge evaluated the level of acceptance 
of fMRI as a lie detector in the neuroscience community.243 Dr. 
Laken admitted at the Daubert hearing that another court excluded 
his fMRI opinion regarding truthfulness in a civil case. That court 
applied the Frye general acceptance test and found that fMRI as a 
lie detector was not generally accepted by the neuroscience 
community.244 The magistrate judge, relying upon experts in the 
field, found that fMRI as a means to detect deception is not 
                                                
238 Id 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at *7. 
241 Id.  
242 Id. 
243 Id. at *3 n.7. 
244 Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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generally accepted by the neuroscience community as a scientifically 
sound and reliable way to detect lies in a real world setting.245     
The magistrate judge concluded that Dr. Laken’s testimony 
failed the reliability prong of Rule 702 and recommended the 
District Court grant the government’s motion to exclude the 
evidence.246 As a result, the magistrate judge did not evaluate the 
relevance or “fit” requirement of the Rule.247  
The district judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation and excluded Dr. Laken’s testimony. Dr. Semrau 
was ultimately convicted of three counts of healthcare fraud.248 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Laken’s testimony 
under Rule 702 for the reasons set out in the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation.249 
Because the Magistrate and District Court did not consider the 
“fit” aspect of Rule 702, neither did the Sixth Circuit. The 
appellate court noted, however, that jurors without advanced 
scientific degrees and training would be “poorly suited” to weigh 
the importance of the distinctions between past studies in the field 
and the specifics of the exam administered to Dr. Semrau.250 The 
                                                
245 Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *13. 
246 Id. at *14. 
247 The magistrate judge noted that Dr. Laken’s opinion spoke to Dr. Semrau’s 
“overall” truthfulness and not to the validity of any individual SIQ. Id. at *5 
n.15. The first sixty counts of the indictment all alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1347 in submission of claims for reimbursement on specific dates to specific 
third party payors. Id. at *2. Specifically, the government alleged Dr. Semrau 
submitted reimbursement claims under Code 99312 instead of Code 90862 with 
an intent to defraud. Id. One of the SIQs asked, “Did you bill CPT Code 99312 
to cheat or defraud Medicare?” Id. at *5. Dr. Laken could not offer an opinion 
on whether Dr. Semrau was lying or telling the truth when he said, “No,” in 
response to that question. Id. at *8.          
248 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 531 (6th Cir. 2012). 
249 Id. at 523.   
250 Id. 
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judge decided that jurors would “more likely . . . be confused rather 
than assisted by Dr. Laken’s testimony.251   
C. Evidence of Lies: Analyzing Expert Opinion on Truthfulness 
The magistrate judge and the Sixth Circuit in Semrau resolved 
the admissibility of Dr. Laken’s opinion on a rather straightforward 
application of the Daubert factors. They were, after all, reviewing 
the evidence and argument of counsel in a specific case and were 
not engaged in a general academic inquiry as to the reliability of 
fMRI. Precisely because the Semrau court did not delve deeper 
than the record before it required, some additional evaluation of 
fMRI lie detection’s relevance and reliability is appropriate.   
fMRI as a lie detector or truth verifier is in its infancy. It is 
hardly surprising that the first three courts to consider its 
admissibility rejected it. As the technology improves and its 
application to deception is refined, other lawyers are likely to offer 
it into evidence and other courts will have to determine its 
admissibility. Thus, a closer look at the current state of the science 
and the legal standards for expert testimony will assist researchers, 
lawyers, and judges when that day arrives.  
While the Daubert factors are a useful proxy for assessing 
reliability in many cases, the admissibility question under Rule 702 
is broader than just the Daubert factors. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence impose six conditions on the admission of expert opinion 
testimony: (1) the witness must be qualified expert in the field by 
virtue of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; 
(2) the subject matter of the testimony must deal with scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge; (3) the testimony must 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact 
in issue; (4) the witness must have had sufficient facts and data 
upon which to base an opinion in the specialized field; (5) the 
principles and methods relied upon by the expert must be reliable 
when applied to the question presented; and (6) the witness must 
                                                
251 Id.  
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have applied those reliable principles and methods reliably to the 
facts and data needed to answer the question in the case at hand.252   
The magistrate judge in Semrau did note that Dr. Laken met 
the “qualifications” requirement of Rule 702 and the subject matter 
dealt with “scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge.”253 None 
of these factors were disputed by the government.254 With regard to 
the remaining four Rule 702 requirements, and like many other 
courts facing similar issues, the magistrate judge cited Rule 702 for 
the general proposition that expert testimony must be relevant and 
reliable and turned immediately to the Daubert factors.255 
                                                
252 FED. R. EVID. 701(c); 702. The requirement that the subject matter deal 
with scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge is found in the text of 
Rule 701(c); the other five requirements are found in the text of Rule 702.        
253 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
254 Id. 
255 See id. Some courts have viewed Daubert as the last word in the 
admissibility of expert testimony and have ignored the other two cases in the 
Daubert trilogy, Joiner and Kumho Tire, as well as the amendments to Rule 702. 
See David Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert 
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 29 (2013) (“These judges ignore the 
text of Rule 702, and instead rely on lenient precedents that predate (and conflict 
with) not only with the text of amended Rule 702 but also some or all of the 
Daubert trilogy.”). Others have suggested that the three-prong inquiry into the 
sufficiency of the facts and data, the reliability of the principles and methods, 
and the reliable application of those principles and methods to the issue at hand 
as set out in Rule 702 (b), (c), and (d) are no more exacting than the Court’s 
Daubert analysis and should be viewed as a single question. MICHAEL H. 
GRAHAM, 5 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 702.5 (7th ed.) (The following 
articulation combining three numbered separate requirements of Rule 702 is 
suggested: “[a]s actually applied in the matter at hand to facts, data, or opinions 
sufficiently established to exist, are there sufficient assurances of trustworthiness 
present that the expert witness’ explanative theory produces a correct result to 
warrant jury acceptance?”). This may explain why some courts reviewing the 
admissibility of expert testimony cite Rule 702 and then proceed immediately to 
review the testimony under the Daubert factors, much like the magistrate judge 
and the Sixth Circuit did in Semrau. Others have noted that the amendments to 
Rule 702 imposed a more exacting inquiry into the basis of the proffered 
testimony and consider each of the subsections of Rule 702 as distinct 
requirements imposed by the language of the Rule. See, e.g., Rudd v. General 
Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“[T]he plain 
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However, analyzing the admissibility of fMRI-based testimony on 
credibility through the analytical framework suggested by the text 
of Rule 702 reveals important considerations that were not 
specifically addressed in either the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation or in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Semrau. 
Using this case as the factual context, the following sections apply 
the Rule 702 textual framework to fMRI-based expert opinion 
testimony on witness truthfulness. 
1. The Qualifications of the Expert Witness 
A witness offering expert opinion testimony must have 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to 
enable him to apply his area of expertise to the issues before the 
court.256 In Semrau, for example, Dr. Laken’s qualifications as an 
expert in fMRI research were undisputed, and the government 
conceded that he was otherwise qualified.257 That may not be true 
in every case, and careful litigants should always verify the 
qualifications of the experts. The qualifications set forth in the 
Rule are in the disjunctive, and the witness need not have gained 
his knowledge through higher education; practical experience may, 
in an appropriate case, suffice.258 In the realm of neuroscience and 
                                                                                                         
language of the new Rule 702, as well as the advisory committee notes to the 
new Rule, makes it clear that this court in now obliged to screen expert 
testimony to ensure it stems from, not just a reliable methodology, but also a 
sufficient factual basis and reliable application of the methodology to the facts.”) 
(emphasis in original). This is not to suggest that Rule 702 displace the Daubert 
factors. On the contrary, the Court’s non-exclusive list of factors to consider in 
assessing the reliability of expert testimony are just as useful after the 2000 
amendment as they were before the amendment. In sum, Rule 702 is not 
satisfied by merely applying the Daubert factors without considering the other 
requirements of the rule. 
256 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
257 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010).  
258 In a case dealing with whether the brakes on a car were defective, the brake 
mechanic at the local garage who dropped out of high school but who has thirty 
years’ experience fixing brakes and a PhD in automotive engineering may both 
qualify as expert witnesses. Equally important, experts from different scientific 
or technical disciplines may employ principles and methods from their 
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fMRI, however, higher education, as well as training and 
experience, will be necessary to qualify a witness to give an 
opinion. A trial lawyer overlooks the qualification issue of his or 
her own expert, as well as her opponent’s experts, at his or her 
peril. Following the analytical framework embodied in the text of 
Rule 702 ensures this important consideration is not overlooked. 
2. The Appropriateness of the Subject Matter 
The next issue is whether the subject matter is appropriate for 
opinion testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish 
between opinions offered by lay witnesses and those offered by 
experts.259 Rule 701 permits opinion testimony of lay witnesses if 
(1) the opinion is based on the rational perception of the witness; 
(2) admitting the opinion would help the jury understand the 
witness’s testimony or determine a fact in issue; and (3) the 
opinion is not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the meaning of Rule 702.260     
Rule 702 picks up where Rule 701 leaves off and requires 
expert testimony to be based on “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.”261 Application of Rule 702’s limits on 
permissible subject matter to fMRI generally poses no problem 
because it is clearly an area of scientific knowledge. While the 
substantive law does not require litigants to offer fMRI testimony 
in order to establish a charge, claim, or defense, any expert 
testimony purporting to apply fMRI technology to an issue in the 
case obviously requires scientific knowledge.   
                                                                                                         
respective disciplines to the same issue. See, e.g., Smith v. BMW N. Am., Inc., 
308 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding an abuse of discretion in excluding 
plaintiff’s expert forensic pathologist’s opinion as to the cause of plaintiff’s neck 
injury in an automobile crash because the witness was not an expert in 
biomechanics, physics, or engineering like the defendant’s expert).  
259 FED. R. EVID. 701. 
260 Id. 
261 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
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3. Help the Trier of Fact 
The third condition for admission of expert testimony requires 
that the opinion assist the jury in its task of historical 
reconstruction of the events giving rise to the litigation.262 The text 
of Rule 702(a) puts this factor in terms of understanding other 
evidence or determining a fact in issue.263 This limitation on the 
admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence serves two policy 
goals: (1) “promote the trier-of-fact’s search for truth by helping it 
to understand other evidence or determine the facts in dispute,” 
and (2) “preserve the trier of fact’s traditional power to decide the 
meaning of evidence and the credibility of witnesses.”264 The 
Daubert Court considered this as an aspect of relevance or “fit” 
between the opinion and the issue in dispute.265 
Relevance is a binary concept: the proffered evidence either 
has some tendency to make the fact of consequence relevant or 
irrelevant.266 The “any tendency” standard of Rule 401 is rather 
easily met and some have even argued that the standard is so low 
that it is virtually meaningless.267 fMRI-based expert opinion that a 
witness was truthful in the scanner makes it more likely that in-
court testimony consistent with the scanner statements is truthful. 
While the logical connection between the results of the fMRI scan 
and the credibility determination at trial is sufficient to pass the 
low bar of general relevancy, Rule 702’s helpfulness standard 
demands a closer connection between the underlying science, the 
opinion, and the issue to be decided. This heightened connection 
comes after the opinion passes the basic relevancy test applied to 
                                                
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., VICTOR JAMES 
GOLD, & MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 29 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: 
EVIDENCE § 6262 (2013). 
265 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591–92 (1993). 
266 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 n.4 (1997). 
267 David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1997) (“[T]he relevancy ‘standard’ in Rule 401 is no standard at all, because it 
indiscriminately admits every arguable proposition no matter how low its 
probative value.”). 
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all evidence under Rule 401, and before weighing the probative 
value of the opinion versus the prejudicial effect under Rule 403.268   
The text of the Federal Rules of Evidence supports this 
conclusion. Rule 402 declares that evidence meeting the low bar 
established by Rule 401 is admissible unless otherwise excluded 
by “these rules . . . .”269 Rule 701 excludes opinion testimony based 
upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge unless it 
meets all of the standards imposed by Rule 702, including the 
“help the trier of fact” requirement.270 Rule 702 is one of “these 
rules” referred to in Rule 402 that excludes evidence that would 
otherwise pass the relevance test of Rule 401.271   
Rule 702 requires the proponent of the expert opinion to 
affirmatively establish the “fit” between the opinion and the facts 
of the case in order for the opinion to meet the “help the trier of 
fact” standard.272 If the Rule 702 standard was the same as the Rule 
401 general relevance standard, the language in Rule 702(a) 
requiring expert opinion to help the trier of fact would be 
superfluous. All evidence must meet the “any tendency” 
requirement of Rule 401, and all relevant evidence helps the jury to 
some degree. However, Rule 702(a) uses different language273 to 
impose an additional test applicable to expert opinion testimony 
that has already cleared the low bar of Rule 401 and places the 
                                                
268 See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (referring to Rule 403 as another 
limitation on expert testimony). 
269 FED. R. EVID. 402. (“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the 
following provides otherwise: The United States Constitution; a federal statute; 
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence 
is not admissible.”).   
270 FED. R. EVID. 702(a) 
271 By the same token, Rule 403 is also one of “these rules” that excludes 
evidence that clears other admissibility hurdles. 
272 FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee’s note (explaining that under Rule 
104(a), “the proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent 
admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence”) (citing 
Bourjaily v. Unites States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)).  
273 FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (requiring the expert’s knowledge to “help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). 
174 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 16: 105 
burden on the proponent to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the opinion will help the jury.274 
fMRI opinion testimony on truthfulness easily satisfies the 
“any tendency” standard of Rule 401. Since Rule 401 already 
requires all admissible evidence to have a tendency to make a fact 
of consequence more or less probable, the question becomes: what 
does Rule 702’s helpfulness standard demand in addition to the 
basic requirement of relevancy?275 The answer requires consideration 
of the second policy goal embodied in the helpfulness requirement 
and how courts have treated expert opinion on whether a witness at 
trial lied or told the truth.   
a. The “Fit” Requirement             
In Daubert, the Court addressed this helpfulness aspect of Rule 
702 as “whether expert testimony proffered in the case is 
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in 
resolving a factual dispute.”276 To meet the helpfulness standard, 
the Court said it requires “a valid scientific connection to the 
                                                
274 Daubert itself clarified that admissibility of expert opinion was a matter for 
the court under Rule 104(a). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
591 (1993). In applying Rule 104(a) to questions of admissibility of evidence, 
the trial court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 592 n.10 
(citing Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175–76). This does not mean, however, that Rule 
403 is inoperative when dealing with expert testimony. Id. Testimony that 
satisfies the admissibility standards of Rule 702 may still run afoul of the Rule 
403 balancing test and be excluded on that basis. Id. at 595.  
275 Expert testimony is singled out for special treatment in the discovery rules 
applicable to both civil and criminal litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G). It is not surprising that Rule 702 would impose requirements 
on admissibility in addition to those applicable to non-expert testimony. See also  
DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW 
WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE: WHY ALL EXPERT TESTIMONY SHOULD RECEIVE 
SERIOUS SCRUTINY § 10.2 (2d ed. 2013) (rejecting a “let it all in” attitude toward 
expert testimony and giving four reasons for special scrutiny of expert 
testimony: (1) avoid wasting time with un-founded areas of expertise; (2) avoid 
expert shopping by the parties; (3) avoid professional witnesses; and (4) juries 
lack expertise to fully critique expert opinion). 
276 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
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pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”277 The “fit” 
between the expert opinion and the issues before the jury requires 
more than the basic “any tendency” standard of Rule 401 that 
applies to all evidence: 
The relevancy, or fit, requirement has two important variations in the 
context of expert testimony. The first refers to the more traditional 
question of whether the expert’s opinion logically relates to some 
specific issue in dispute under the substantive law. The second 
variation, and the one more particular to expert evidence, is whether the 
research basis for the expert’s opinion generalizes to a legal issue in 
dispute. Both of these are described as matters of fit, but they typically 
arise in different ways. The first is primarily a concern of the 
substantive law and whether the fact that is the subject of the expert 
testimony is an issue in the case. The second primarily concerns the 
underlying research basis for the expert opinion and whether it can be 
extrapolated to help resolve a disputed fact that is an issue in the 
case.278 
Professors David Faigman, John Monahan, and Christopher 
Slobogin explain the “fit” requirement as consisting of both “legal 
                                                
277 Id. at 592. 
278 Faigman, supra note 82, at 93; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE 787–88 (4th ed. 2013) (“Expert 
and scientific testimony usually reflects, and brings to bear on the case, theories, 
tests, and experience generated in situations unrelated to the events in litigation. 
Hence, its utility turns partly on the degree of resemblance between the 
transaction in suit and the situations in which the science or expertise was 
generated. Expert testimony also extrapolates or draws conclusions resting on 
theories, tests, and experience, and its utility turns in part on how closely the 
conclusion is connected to the underlying data—whether it is but a short step 
from data to conclusion or a long inferential leap. The closer the connection the 
better the fit, although this criterion does not demand there be perfect 
congruence between proffered testimony and the facts or issues in the case.”); 
see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“[T]he [fit] standard is higher than bare relevance.”). The relevance prong of 
Rule 702’s “help the jury” standard also differs from Rule 401 in that the issue 
addressed by the proffered expert opinion must be “in dispute.” Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 591. The existence of a factual dispute is not an aspect of relevance 
under Rule 401. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997). 
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fit” and “empirical fit.”279 Legal fit asks whether the opinion helps 
the jury determine a “factual question that the substantive law 
requires to be answered.”280 Empirical fit addresses “whether the 
expert testimony proffered in the case is based on research 
methods that relate to the factual question in issue.”281 Considering 
fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness under this 
paradigm reveals serious “fit” problems.  
i. Legal Fit  
Legal fit in this paradigm encompasses simple relevancy. 
Credibility is always a “fact of consequence” within the meaning 
of Rule 401.282 Furthermore, the opinion of one who professes to 
have some special or scientific basis upon which to determine 
truthfulness has some tendency, however slight, to make the truth 
or falsity of the testimony more or less likely. For example, if one 
who professes to have a scientific basis upon which to distinguish 
between truth and lies is of the opinion that the witness told the 
truth when undergoing that scientific test, it logically follows that 
testimony at trial consistent with that given during the test is more 
likely to be true. The opinion does not “prove” the witness is 
telling the truth, but it has some tendency to make it more likely 
that the consistent in-court testimony is truthful.     
The legal fit inquiry also considers whether the expert 
testimony addresses a disputed issue the substantive law requires 
the jury to resolve.283 This goes beyond the mere “any tendency” 
                                                
279 David L. Faigman, John Mohahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual 
(G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298909. 
280 Id.      
281 Id. 
282 Cf. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Proof of bias is almost 
always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has 
historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the 
accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”). 
283 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; see also Faigman, Mohahan & Slobogin, supra 
note 279, at 23 (“Legal fit calls upon courts to determine whether the expert 
testimony proffered in the case is material to a factual question that the 
substantive law requires to be answered.”). 
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standard of Rule 401 and reaches the second policy of goal of 
preserving the jury’s role in determining the meaning of evidence 
and deciding matters of credibility. The substantive law does not 
require the jury to decide whether a given witness was lying or 
telling the truth at trial. The jury may, of course, make that 
determination in their deliberations, and evidence offered on that 
point may satisfy basic relevancy, but the substantive law does not 
demand an answer to that question.  
Using Semrau as an example, the opinion Dr. Laken was 
prepared to give was that Dr. Semrau “believes that he is telling the 
truth . . . .”284 His opinion was limited to an “overall” impression of 
truthfulness, and he specifically denied being able to tell whether 
Dr. Semrau answered any of the SIQs truthfully.285 Accepting the 
fact that credibility is “of consequence” within the meaning of 
Rule 401, Dr. Laken’s opinion, based upon his fMRI scan of Dr. 
Semrau, had some tendency to make it more likely that Dr. 
Semrau’s in-court testimony, if consistent with his scanner 
statements, was truthful. Arguably, one who is “overall truthful” 
during an fMRI scan or who subjectively believes he is telling the 
truth is more likely to be telling the truth when testifying consistent 
with the scan statements than one who was determined to be 
deceptive during a scan or one who does not believe he is telling 
the truth. The scan results have some “tendency” to support the 
credibility of Dr. Semrau because the jury could infer his 
testimony at trial was truthful based upon the opinion of Dr. 
Laken.   
 The substantive law, however, did not require the jury to 
decide whether Dr. Semrau was telling the truth or lying at trial. 
Dr. Semrau’s trial testimony of his intent was probative of his 
intent at the time of the charged offenses and, if believed by the 
jury, would have exonerated him of those charges. But whether he 
was lying on the witness stand was not an element the government 
                                                
284 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, 
Vol. I. at 99, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn., June 
1, 2010). 
285 Id. at 137–41. 
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was required to prove in order to convict. In fact, the law did not 
even require him to place his credibility in issue at all.286 He could 
have exercised his right not to testify. The trial strategy to take the 
stand and place his credibility before the jury was sufficient to 
make his credibility relevant in the general sense, but it did not 
create a situation where the jury was required to decide whether he 
was lying or telling the truth in order to decide the case. One might 
infer from the jury’s ultimate verdict whether they credited his 
testimony, but the substantive law did not require the jury to label 
him either a liar or a truth-teller in order to decide the case. Using 
Professor Faigman’s paradigm, one could say the “legal fit” 
required by the helpfulness standard was not met.        
In addition to the disconnect between fMRI-based opinion on 
witness truthfulness and what the jury must actually decide, there 
are broader policy reasons that counsel against professionalizing 
the task of determining witness truthfulness. The “help the jury” 
standard imposed by Rule 702 is broad enough and flexible enough 
to determine whether admitting this sort of testimony will help a 
specific jury in a specific case and whether it will help the jury in 
the systemic sense.   
Federal court decisions both before and after the adoption of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence have generally found expert opinion 
on whether a witness is telling the truth unhelpful because 
credibility decisions are committed exclusively to the jury and the 
opinion of an expert merely tells the jury whom to believe.287 Some 
                                                
286 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
287 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that there was plain error to admit expert opinion on witness credibility 
because it “(1) ‘usurps a critical function of the jury’; (2) ‘is not helpful to the 
jury, which can make its own determination of credibility’; and (3) when 
provided by ‘impressively qualified experts on the credibility of other witnesses 
is prejudicial and unduly influences the jury’ ”) (quoting United States v. 
Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993)); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. 
Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2013) (excluding expert historians who 
interviewed associates of the parties and constructed a picture of the relationship 
between the parties, including credibility); United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 
437, 448–49 (4th Cir. 2013) (excluding expert testimony that sleep deprivation 
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caused the defendant to give inconsistent statements; jurors could understand 
point without aid of expert); United States v. Allen, 716 F.3d 98, 105–06 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (finding expert testimony offered solely for the purpose of 
undermining the credibility of the codefendant witness is “not the function of an 
expert”); Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“First, 
‘[a]s a matter of law, the credibility of witnesses is exclusively for the 
determination by the jury, and witnesses may not opine as to the credibility of 
the testimony of other witnesses at the trial.’ ”) (quoting United States v. 
Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1995)); Nimely v. City of New York, 414, 
F.3d 381, 397–98 (2d Cir. 2005) (“It is a well-recognized principle of our trial 
system that ‘determining the weight and credibility of [a witness’s] 
testimony . . . belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their 
natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of 
men . . . .’ ”) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891); 
Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that it was 
not error to exclude expert’s opinion on plaintiff’s credibility); United States v. 
Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (admitting expert testimony when the 
expert “made quite clear that he did not intend to tell the jury whether . . . [the 
witness] was lying or telling the truth”); Goodwin v. MTD Prod., Inc. 232 F.3d 
600, 609 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n expert cannot testify as to credibility issues; 
[r]ather, credibility questions are within the province of the trier of fact . . . .”); 
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In general, 
expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another 
witness encroaches upon the jury’s vital and exclusive function to make 
credibility determinations, and therefore does not ‘assist the trier of fact as 
required by Rule 702.’ ”); Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 496 (6th Cir. 
1999) (finding error, but harmless, for expert to comment on the credibility of 
eyewitness’s account of accident); United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 
545, 548 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Testimony regarding a witness’ credibility is 
prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence.”); United States v. Call, 
129 F.2d 1402, 1405–06 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming exclusion of polygraph 
evidence to corroborate defendant’s testimony under Rule 403 because “it 
usurps a critical function of the jury and because it is not helpful to the jury, 
which is capable of making its own determination regarding credibility”); 
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (“It is the exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the believability of a witness. . . . An expert is 
not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or truthfulness of a 
victim’s story.”) (quoting Bachman v Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Expert 
medical testimony concerning the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is 
generally inadmissible because it invades the jury’s province to make credibility 
determinations.”); Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (“It is the function 
of the jury alone to evaluate the credibility of a witness . . . . When an expert 
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commentators, however, have argued that the adoption of the 
                                                                                                         
witness testifies with respect to the credibility of a victim/witness there is a real 
danger that jurors will lend too much credence to the expert’s evaluation of the 
victim’s credibility, at the expense of their own independent judgment of 
credibility.”); Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Nor 
may an expert pass judgment on a witness’ truthfulness in the guise of a 
professional opinion.”); United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785–86 (8th Cir. 
1993) (“A doctor also cannot pass judgment on the alleged victim’s truthfulness 
in the guise of a medical opinion, because it is the jury’s function to decide 
credibility.”); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Credibility is not a proper subject for expert testimony; the jury does not need 
an expert to tell it whom to believe, and the expert’s ‘stamp of approval’ on a 
particular witness may unduly influence the jury.”), modified on reh’g, on other 
grounds, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 
339–41 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding error to admit pediatrician’s opinion that victim 
of child sexual abuse was telling the truth when she identified defendant as her 
abuser), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 
F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Price, 722 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“But in some instances, the introduction of . . . testimony bolstering the 
credibility of witnesses may cause harm that goes beyond the mere wasting of 
time. When bolstering testimony suggests to the jury that it may shift to a 
witness the responsibility for determining the truth of evidence, its admission 
may constitute reversible error.”); United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 
(9th Cir. 1979) (“Under the Federal Rules, opinion testimony on credibility is 
limited to character; all other opinions on credibility are for the jurors 
themselves to form.”); United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(“Expert testimony will . . . be precluded if it would usurp the jury’s role as the 
final arbiter of the facts, such as testimony on witness credibility and state of 
mind.”); see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. 
CAPRA, 3 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 702.02[15] (10th ed. 2011) 
(“[I]f the expert does intrude on areas left for the jury—such as the credibility of 
a witness—the trial judge should exclude the testimony as unhelpful.”). But see 
United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 723 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding under 
Daubert defense evidence that government’s key witness failed a polygraph 
administered by the FBI without mention of general prohibition of expert 
opinion testimony on witness truthfulness); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 
F.2d 1529, 1535–37 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (reversing per se ban on 
polygraph evidence and conditioning admissibility of polygraph examiner’s 
opinion on (1) parties stipulate to the admission; and (2) whether the opinion 
satisfies the rules governing impeachment or corroboration of a witness’s 
testimony); see also United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding Daubert effectively overruled per se bans on polygraph testimony and 
conditioned admissibility on Rules 702 and 403).   
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Federal Rules of Evidence paved the way for admission of 
opinions on truthfulness if they meet Rule 401 relevancy and Rule 
702 reliability standards irrespective of the tradition of leaving 
credibility judgments to the jury.288 Generally, they argue that Rule 
702’s regulation of expert testimony replaced the traditional 
                                                
288 See, e.g., Arthur Best & Jennifer Middleton, Winking at the Jury: “Implicit 
Vouching” Versus the Limits on Opinions About Credibility, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 
265 (2013) (arguing that allowing explicit testimony on credibility of child 
abuse victim is preferable to current practice of implicitly vouching for 
credibility by describing attributes of victim of abuse); Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI 
and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J. 
L. & MED. 319, 334 (2007) (“Courts with no doubts about reliability would 
accept the science and find ways to deal with the problems of implementation 
that such acceptance would present.”); Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair 
Subject for Expert Testimony, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1004–05 (2007) (“[R]ather 
than invoking the maxim that the determination of credibility is the jury’s 
special province, courts should welcome expert testimony that helps the jury 
determine whether a particular witness is being truthful and whether a particular 
account of the facts is accurate.”); Keckler, supra note 32, at 543 (“The evidence 
presented by the expert is about the scan, or perhaps at most the statement, and 
not directly about the witness. Consequently, evidence of this sort allows a jury 
to make its own assessment of the witness.”); Ric Simmons, Conquering the 
Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and the Professionalization of Fact-
Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1066 (2006) (“Essentially, if we can 
determine that there are experts that can provide reliable and useful information 
about credibility (and the evidence suggests that we are at or very near that 
point), why would we want a lay jury to make these most critical decisions 
without any guidance? It is now past time to jettison this tradition altogether and 
give the juries all the available tools to carry out the immensely difficult task 
that we assign to them.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried and James R. McCall, Issues 
Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory 
Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1080 (1997) 
(“[T]estimony about an exculpatory polygraph examination is no more and no 
less than scientific evidence of the accused’s subjective consciousness of 
innocence.”); James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph 
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 422 (predicting 
increased admissibility of polygraph evidence of witness truthfulness after 
Daubert); Margaret A. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law 
Approach to an Expert’s Opinion About a Witness’s Credibility Still Does Not 
Work, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 559, 586 (1989) (“Opinion testimony on credibility 
offered on a theory other than to prove character should . . . be admissible 
provided it satisfies the relevancy test of Rule 401.”). 
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practice of assigning credibility matters exclusively to the jury. 
Empirical studies, they posit, support the fact that juries are not 
particularly good at making credibility judgments, and since we 
admit a host of other forensic evidence of uncertain reliability, 
there is no sound policy reason why an exception should exist 
when the subject matter is witness truthfulness. The historical 
notion that expert testimony on witness truthfulness “invades the 
province of the jury,” they argue, should be abandoned in favor of 
application of the rules governing the admissibility of all expert 
testimony.289  
But is there something unique about witness truthfulness that 
supports the argument that the jury is the lie detector and expert 
opinions on witness truthfulness are not helpful to the jury?290 
Professor Ric Simmons argues that courts should reject the 
traditional notion that expert opinion on truthfulness is not helpful 
to the jury in favor of the relevant and reliable standard of Rule 
702.291 In urging the admissibility of polygraph evidence, he argues 
that credibility issues are relevant292 in jury trials and that 
                                                
289 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 288, at 1015 (“[T]he province-of-the-jury 
prohibition is poorly defined, lacks a legitimate doctrinal basis, and should be 
abolished in its entirety, so that every piece of expert testimony is evaluated 
under the same standards and admitted or excluded on the reliability standards 
of Daubert.”); Bellin, supra note 162, at 718–21 (commenting that the argument 
that lie detection technology invades the province of the jury is “unlikely to 
serve as [a] significant obstacle” to admitting expert opinion on witness 
truthfulness based on reliable technology).   
290 For a detailed historical account of the legal system’s delegation to the jury 
issues of witness credibility, especially the problem of resolving conflicting 
factual accounts presented by sworn testimony, see Fisher, supra note 69, at 
577. 
291 Simmons, supra note 288, at 1028–46. 
292 Professor Simmons views the jury assistance prong of Rule 702 
coextensive with Rule 401 and does not appear to accept the view that Rule 702 
imposes a more exacting standard on expert testimony. Id. at 1050. But see 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“The Supreme Court recognized that the fit requirement goes primarily to 
relevance, but it obviously did not intend the second prong of Rule 702 to be 
merely a reiteration of the general relevancy requirement of Rule 402.”); In re 
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polygraph evidence has reached a reliability threshold on par with 
other forensic evidence, so unless there is something unique or 
different about the credibility of polygraph evidence, it should also 
be admissible.293 
Whether a given witness is lying as he sits before the jury and 
recounts his perception of the historical event is a question 
potentially present in any contested jury trial. Gone are the days 
where the law avoided such direct conflicts between witnesses, 
each sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth.294 But it cannot be denied that resolving such conflicting 
testimony is, unquestionably, a core function of the jury. Professor 
George Fisher ably demonstrates that over the centuries the law 
inexorably moved toward placing that critical determination solely 
in the hands of the jury, primarily as a way to support the 
legitimacy of the system.295 “The jury’s role as the system’s lie 
                                                                                                         
Paoli RR Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
the Rule 702 “standard is higher than bare relevance”). 
293 Professor Simmons does not consider the polygraph a “lie detector” in a 
technical sense. He explains that the interrogation techniques most commonly 
employed by polygraph examiners, the “control question” method and the 
“guilty knowledge” test, reveal the subject’s guilty conscience or his knowledge 
of incriminating facts, respectively. Accordingly, he argues that polygraph 
examiners are really offering opinions on the subject’s state of mind during the 
interview and not whether they were lying or telling the truth during the 
polygraph examination. Simmons, supra note 288, at 1038–39 (“In this sense, 
polygraph examiners are not ‘credibility experts’ but rather ‘state of mind 
experts,’ because they claim to be able to interpret physiological reactions to 
certain stimuli in order to reach conclusions about the mental state or knowledge 
possessed by the subject.”).          
294 See Fisher, supra note 69, at 600. 
295 Id. at 705 (“The jury, in contrast [to the oath requirement and competency 
limitations], promised a remarkably reliable source of systemic legitimacy. Its 
usually private and inarticulate decision making protected it from the sort of 
embarrassing public failures that so regularly threatened the oath. There never 
has been a mechanism by which the defendant or anyone outside the system 
could command the jury to reveal its decision making processes. The jury's 
secrecy is an aid to legitimacy, for the privacy of the jury box shrouds the 
shortcomings of its methods.”). 
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detector,” he argues, “has only grown and has never, for a 
sustained time, diminished.”296     
Credibility, especially witness truthfulness, does occupy a 
unique place in the role and function of the jury. It is a serious 
thing to label a person a liar. The history of the jury system and the 
elaborate rules employed over the centuries to avoid conflicting 
accounts from sworn witnesses is evidence that the system itself 
was concerned, perhaps overly so, with the problem of competing 
oaths and witness truthfulness.297 If, as history demonstrates, the 
legitimacy of the jury system and the public’s confidence in its 
verdicts depend upon the secrecy of the collective deliberations of 
the members of the jury, the professionalization of witness 
truthfulness offers the jury a tempting way out of struggling 
through the difficult task of weighing all the evidence, considering 
all the facts, applying reason and common sense to the various 
accounts, reconciling discrepancies, and, yes, even deciding 
whether a given witness lied on the stand. Instead, they can defer 
to the “expert” and be done with it. While their deliberations will 
remain secret and their verdicts general, we might reasonably 
suspect they did not fulfill their role as a “valuable safeguard to 
liberty [and] . . . the very palladium of free government.”298 If 
juries are tempted to rely upon professional witnesses and colorful 
images produced by powerful computers and modern machines, 
they probably will.299 If a group of American citizens sitting on a 
                                                
296 Id. at 703. 
297 Id. 
298 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library 
College ed., 1964). 
299 See McCabe et al., supra note 84, at 572–75 (finding fMRI lie detection 
evidence influenced mock jurors more than polygraph or thermal imaging 
evidence of deception, but was no greater than the control group when its 
validity was questioned); see also McCabe & Castel, supra note 84, at 350 
(finding neuroscientific explanations more persuasive when accompanied by 
brain images). But see N. J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a 
Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 357 (2011) (finding 
neuroimages had no enhanced influence on mock jurors); Roskies et al., supra 
note 84 (reviewing studies and concluding that neuroimages did not unduly 
affect mock juror decisions).  
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jury debating the fate of a fellow citizen is “the very essence of our 
democracy,”300 injecting colorful images of a brain “lighting up” 
while purportedly processing a lie, may diminish the jury’s 
essential role in our system by fostering the notion that machines, 
not people, are actually determining the outcome of trials.     
The move toward professionalizing witness truthfulness not 
only diminishes the jury’s traditional role as the fact-finder, but it 
exposes the hidden and controversial role of the jury as a political 
actor and the issue of jury nullification of the law. Professor Julie 
Seaman argues that as machines determine the truth, juries will be 
left with the notion that their only choices are to “rubber-stamp the 
prosecution’s demand for conviction or . . . exercise their non-fact-
finding functions” specifically, by a verdict nullifying the 
applicable law.301 This would raise the issue of “whether the jury is 
merely a fact-finding machine that should be replaced by a better 
fact-finding machine, or whether it has a political, institutional role 
worth preserving apart from its ability to judge the credibility of 
witnesses and the historical facts.”302 Professor Seaman concludes: 
[W]ere an accurate lie detector developed, the jury's unique role in 
determining witness credibility would be called into question. At that 
moment, in many cases, the criminal jury would exist either to rubber-
stamp the prosecution's version of the historical facts, or instead to 
serve distinct, non-fact-finding functions in addition to determining 
historical fact. The former vision of the jury would relegate it to an 
increasingly trivial role, one at odds with the history, precedent, and 
purposes of the right to jury trial embodied in the Constitution. The 
latter vision, in contrast, would allow the jury knowledge of its 
                                                
300 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Foreword to ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY 
JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION, at xvii 
(2013).  
301 Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 486 (2008); see also 
Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury 
Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2006) (discussing the history and current role of 
jury nullification in American jurisprudence); Daryl K. Brown, Jury 
Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997); H.B. 1452, 
2013 Leg., 163d Sess. (N.H. 2013) (pending) (requiring the court to give an 
instruction to the jury regarding jury nullification or declare a mistrial if the 
instruction is not given to the jury). 
302 Seaman, supra note 301, at 486. 
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legislative function, even while risking that it might exercise it in ways 
that courts or the public find illegitimate.303 
Despite the promise, and desirability, of more accurate fact-
finding, expert opinion testimony on truth-telling is a radical 
departure from the established American practice. The benefit of 
more accurate fact-finding must be weighed against the risk of 
delegitimizing the jury as the bulwark between the citizen and the 
power of the state and, in civil cases, the unbiased umpire in 
private disputes. 
In addition to delegitimizing the core function of the jury, 
when machines determine truth it risks dehumanizing the 
participants of the trial. Witnesses and parties become objects upon 
which to apply the mysteries of modern science. Modern science, 
of course, often informs juries of the nature of a substance, the 
likelihood of a defendant’s presence or participation in the crime 
based upon DNA analysis, or the cause of death or disease and in 
doing so may create doubts about a witness’s story. But it creates 
those doubts by establishing other relevant facts, not by reaching 
into the mind of the witness to determine whether the witness is 
lying or telling the truth.   
In State v. Lyon,304 a case where the parties stipulated to the 
admissibility of polygraph results, the Oregon Supreme Court 
ruled that polygraph evidence was inadmissible because the 
stipulation did little to enhance the reliability of the polygraph and 
that the jury may be unduly persuaded by the scientific evidence.305 
In a separate opinion, Justice Linde concurred with the court’s 
reasoning but raised the more profound question of the system’s 
unease with machines detecting lies and verifying truth: 
The polygraph does not independently establish any past, present, or 
future fact. It purports neither to replace nor to supplement the 
assertions of the tested person with other evidence on the matter in 
question. The polygraph is indifferent to what the assertions are about 
and whether they are factually correct. As its popular name suggests, 
the lie detector only purports to detect whether a person is uttering a lie. 
                                                
303 Id. at 488. 
304 744 P.2d 231 (Ore. 1987). 
305 Id. at 235–36. 
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. . . . 
The institution of the trial, above all, assumes the importance of human 
judgment in assessing the statements of disputing parties and other 
witnesses. The cherished courtroom drama of confrontation, oral 
testimony and cross-examination is designed to let a jury pass judgment 
on their truthfulness and on the accuracy of their testimony. The central 
myth of the trial is that truth can be discovered in no better way, though 
it has long been argued that the drama really serves symbolic values 
more important than reliable factfinding. One of these implicit values 
surely is to see that parties and the witnesses are treated as persons to 
be believed or disbelieved by their peers rather than as electrochemical 
systems to be certified as truthful or mendacious by a machine.306 
 Whether one thinks Justice Linde has carried the values 
argument too far to the detriment of accurate fact-finding,307 his 
view does require reflection upon whether professionalizing 
witness truthfulness helps or hinders the larger role of the jury in 
our society and in our system of justice. While perhaps not the 
determining factor on whether expert opinion on witness 
truthfulness helps the jury, it is a factor.    
Credibility issues, whether they concern poor memory, poor 
perception, poor character for truthfulness, or consciously lying at 
trial, are collateral to the central question in the case: guilt or 
innocence, liable or not liable.308 If expert testimony on whether a 
witness told the expert a lie or the truth while in the expert’s office 
is admissible because it meets the any tendency standard of Rule 
401 and is as reliable as other questionable forensic evidence 
routinely admitted,309 conscientious trial lawyers will present that 
                                                
306 Id. at 236–37 (Linde, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
307 See, e.g., James. R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph 
Evidence, Or “Even if the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit the 
Results?”, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 925, 941–43 (1998) (acknowledging the importance 
of the issue but arguing that accurate fact-finding is the more important value). 
308 See supra note 201. 
309 A 2009 report by the National Academy of Sciences found serious 
deficiencies in the reliability of many forms of forensic science routinely 
admitted in American courtrooms. Two major concerns were “the extent to 
which particular areas of forensic science are based upon reliable scientific 
methodology . . .” and “the extent to which . . . human interpretation [of test 
results] could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the absence of sound 
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evidence in support of every significant witness in the case. Failure 
to do so may be seen as falling beneath the standard expected of a 
reasonably competent trial lawyer. Trials will be more expensive, 
take more time, and demand more resources than they do now. Of 
course, the experts involved will make more money because their 
services will be more in demand. That does not mean, however, 
that more justice will be done or the system will be better served.310 
While the commentators may have a point that the Federal 
Rules did not explicitly codify the common law “invade the 
province of the jury” prohibition on expert opinion on witness 
truthfulness, the “help the jury” requirement in Rule 702 is both 
broad and specific enough to justify consideration of the impact of 
such evidence on the system of justice, generally, and the conduct 
of a given trial specifically.311  
Admittedly, the above concerns are value judgments rather 
than objective factors established by empirical data. Some may 
argue they are throw backs to an old way of thinking about human 
thinking. But they are values deeply rooted in our system of 
dispute resolution, both criminal and civil, and should not be 
lightly abandoned in a quest for a more accurate lie detector.  
                                                                                                         
operational procedures and robust performance standards” within the discipline. 
COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 9 (2009).  
310 See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal 
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 131 (2000) 
(commenting that admitting polygraph evidence “is likely to lead to profound 
alterations in the entire litigation system, alterations which cannot be predicted 
and which may not be desirable once they are played out,” including 
diminishing the jury’s core function of determining witness credibility). 
311 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & CHARLES H. ROSE 
III, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 7.6 (4th ed. 2012) (“[W]here the 
issue and subject are ones that lay jurors can appreciate and evaluate by 
applying common knowledge and good sense, admitting expert testimony seems 
the wrong thing to do and may warrant reversal if it is likely to dissuade the jury 
from exercising independent judgment or to take over the jury’s traditional 
function of appraising the credibility of witnesses.”).   
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The arguments of the commentators that expert opinion on 
truthfulness should be admitted have not persuaded the courts.312 
The long line of authority excluding expert opinion on witness 
truthfulness is a significant obstacle for proponents of fMRI-based 
lie detection. The underlying reliability of the technology does not 
matter if the opinion based on the technology is otherwise not 
something that will help the jury in its core function, or worse yet, 
actually undermine one of the policy goals behind Rule 702 itself. 
To hold otherwise disregards the “fit” requirement of Rule 702, 
diminishes the jury’s core-function of fact-finding, distorts the jury 
system by devoting disproportionate time and resources to the 
collateral matter of credibility, downplays the jury’s importance in 
our system of justice, and runs the risk of dehumanizing the 
participants.   
ii. Empirical Fit     
In addition to the issues presented by the “legal fit” prong of 
the helpfulness standard, the “empirical fit” component presents 
even more substantial problems for fMRI-based expert opinion on 
                                                
312 See supra note 287 (listing cases decided after the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence excluding expert opinion testimony on whether a witness 
testified truthfully). See also Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the 
Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 223 (1990) 
(concluding that the traditional approach of excluding expert opinion on witness 
credibility has merit except in some narrowly defined circumstances and 
proposing a new rule of evidence to address those circumstances); DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 17:9 (2012–2013 ed. 2012) (“Courts nearly uniformly 
prohibit experts (or any witness) from offering an opinion regarding the 
trustworthiness of a witness’ specific allegations.”); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE 
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 2.4 (2014) 
available at Westlaw WIGEVEE (commenting that predictions in earlier 
versions of the WIGMORE treatise, as well as WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE treatise, 
that expert testimony on witness veracity would become admissible had failed to 
materialize and noting that, “[t]he traditional rule—that expert testimony on 
whether a witness is telling the truth or has the tendency to do so is not 
permitted—remains the law in most jurisdictions”); SALTZBURG, MARTIN & 
CAPRA, supra note 287, at §§ 702.02(15), 702.03(24)(b) (collecting cases and 
noting that expert testimony on witness credibility should be excluded as not 
helpful to the jury). 
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truthfulness. Professors Faigman, Mohahan, and Slobogin phrase 
the question of empirical fit as “whether particular scientific results 
have external validity with respect to the circumstances the law 
makes relevant.”313 The external validity of a scientific study is the 
degree to which the findings can be applied to groups or 
individuals who were not participants in the study itself.314 
The “empirical fit” requirement resembles the analysis of 
probative value under Rule 403.315 The better the fit between the 
facts of the case and the proffered opinion, the greater the 
probative value of the opinion and, as a result, the more it helps the 
trier of fact. Including this consideration at this point in the 
admissibility determination, however, reveals that the helpfulness 
standard of Rule 702 requires more than the low bar of general 
relevancy found in Rule 401. Unlike Rule 401, which applies an 
“any tendency” standard, and Rule 403, which includes consideration 
of counterweights to probative value, the fit requirement of Rule 
702 focuses on whether and how much the proffered testimony 
will assist the jury in its fact-finding task. The rule does not, 
however, establish a threshold that evidence must clear in order to 
be found “helpful.” Rather, the assessment is left to the discretion 
of the trial judge.      
 Dr. Laken’s expert opinion was offered in an effort to 
convince the jury that Dr. Semrau was telling the truth when he 
testified he did not intend to defraud years earlier when he 
submitted his claims for reimbursement.316 Dr. Laken, however, 
                                                
313 Faigman, Mohahan & Slobogin, supra note 279, at 25. 
314 See infra notes 477–83 and accompanying text for a discussion of external 
validity in the context of fMRI lie detection studies. 
315 “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, 
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Compare 
Calvin William Sharpe, Reliability Under Rule 702: A Specialized Application 
of 403, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 289 (2004) with Dale A. Nance, Reliability and 
the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003). 
316 Dr. Laken’s opinion was never offered at trial because it was excluded 
after a pre-trial hearing. Had it passed the admissibility standards of Rules 702 
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had no opinion on that point and admitted that he could not reach 
an opinion on that issue. He could only say his fMRI scan 
indicated Dr. Semrau subjectively believed he was telling the truth 
when he denied having an intent to defraud. The jury, however, 
had to decide whether Dr. Semrau had the intent to defraud in each 
of the sixty counts of fraud for which he stood accused. The issue 
for the jury was not whether Dr. Semrau was “overall” truthful, but 
whether he had the intent to defraud for each claim specified in the 
indictment.317 There was a gap between the issue the jury had to 
decide and the opinion Dr. Laken was prepared to give. Dr. Laken 
could not give an opinion on whether the in-court testimony was 
truthful; he could only speak to his scan results. While it would not 
be illogical for the jury to infer truthfulness at trial from the scan 
results, there is still an analytical gap between Dr. Laken’s 
interpretation of the scan and what the jury must determine. The 
inferences from Dr. Laken’s opinion to actual truthfulness of trial 
testimony denying intent to defraud may satisfy the “any 
tendency” standard of Rule 401, but the “help the jury” standard of 
Rule 702 requires not just a bare logical connection between the 
opinion and the fact to be determined; it requires the court to assess 
the strength of that connection.318  
                                                                                                         
and 403, the rules governing impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses would 
have required Dr. Semrau to testify at trial and suffer impeachment that 
contained an express or implied charge that his in-court testimony was 
deliberately false before the opinion testimony could be presented. See supra 
Part IV.  Rules of Evidence: Attacking and Supporting Credibility. The Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion notes that Dr. Semrau testified in his own defense, but does not 
discuss any impeachment. Dr. Semrau argued on appeal that Dr. Laken’s 
opinion should have been admitted because it “‘does not confuse the issues’ but 
rather ‘corroborates his testimony.’” United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523 
(6th Cir. 2012).  
317 Jury Instructions, United States v. Semrau, No. 2:07–CR–10074–JPM, 
2011 WL 9258, at *22, *25 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2010) (copy on file with the 
author). 
318 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591–92 (1993) 
(holding that expert opinion must be “sufficiently tied to the facts” to help the 
jury; “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection to 
the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”).  
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 One might argue that Dr. Laken’s opinion as to Dr. Semrau’s 
subjective belief in his own truthfulness, as evidenced by the 
BOLD response to the SIQs during the scan, is circumstantial 
evidence of his actual innocent state of mind at the time of each of 
the alleged offenses and is, therefore, of some utility to the jury in 
deciding the underlying facts of the case. But the same can be said 
of the not guilty plea itself and the presumption of innocence that 
cloaks a criminal defendant. The fact that a defendant pleads not 
guilty and opts for a trial is, arguably, some evidence that he 
subjectively believes his own defense. Furthermore, as a matter of 
common sense it would seem that one who takes the witness stand, 
recites an oath or affirmation to tell the truth, and then recounts his 
version of the historical events usually believes he is telling the 
truth. Expert opinion of a subjective belief in the truth of his 
version of events does not add anything to what the jury already 
knows and presumes.319 Of course, if evidence is introduced to cast 
doubt on the truthfulness of the witness’s story, then counter 
evidence as to truthfulness would become more germane. But that 
evidence, too, would need to be more than the subjective belief of 
the witness in order to rebut evidence that the witness consciously 
lied during his testimony.   
Whether Dr. Semrau actually did not have the intent to defraud 
when he submitted bills for reimbursement or whether he 
convinced himself of that over the years and after being confronted 
with criminal charges is something Dr. Laken and the neuroscience 
community cannot answer because they have not studied it.320 
Neuroscientists have found that the brain can change, both 
structurally and functionally, due to learning, life experiences, and 
                                                
319 Faigman, supra note 83, at 93 (“As an initial matter . . . the testimony 
should concern matters that fall, at least somewhat, outside the ordinary 
understanding of the average juror.”). 
320 A recent study by researchers in China and the United States suggested that 
“prepared lies” the subject developed before undergoing scanning were more 
difficult to identify in the fMRI context and recommended further research. 
Xiaoqing Hu, Hao Chen & Genyue Fu, A Repeated Lie Becomes Truth? The 
Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception, 3 FRONTIERS IN 
PSYCHOL. 1, 506 (2012). 
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in recovery from injury. The brain is not a static set of stable neural 
pathways.321 Whether one accused of a criminal offense, or a 
percipient witness to any historical event, can “learn” the details of 
his story over time so that it becomes “truth” to him is something 
the fMRI researchers have not studied. If, for example, Dr. Semrau 
convinced himself that his actions in upcoding claims for 
reimbursement and billing separately for AIMS tests were 
justified, reasonable, and appropriate, would repeating his sincere 
belief in his innocence during an fMRI scan produce a BOLD 
response consistent with truth? If fMRI researchers do not have an 
answer to that question then the opinion of witness truthfulness is 
of no help to the jury who must determine past events from in-
court testimony. The “empirical fit” between Dr. Laken’s opinion 
and the issue to be decided was lacking.322  
 A final empirical misfit between Dr. Laken’s opinion in 
Semrau and the jury’s fact-finding task is the application of fMRI 
technology to Dr. Semrau, who was sixty-three years-old, and the 
subjects upon which the technology was tested were in the 
eighteen to fifty year-old age range. No one knows whether the 
thirteen year difference between the top end of the age range and 
Dr. Semrau is significant because no one has tested older subjects. 
Because the images from the group studies were produced by 
averaging the data from the entire group, it is not known where the 
BOLD response in the older subjects fell in an absolute sense. 
Furthermore, the average age of those tested was around thirty 
years-old — a thirty-three year difference in age between the 
participants in the underlying studies and Dr. Semrau.323 Whether 
the neural correlates of deception are the same in the brain of a 
                                                
321 Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al., Characterizing Brain Cortical Plasticity and 
Network Dynamics Across the Age Span in Health and Disease with TMSS-EEG 
and TMS-fMRI, 24 BRAIN TOPOGRAPHY 302 (2011); Alvaro Pascual-Leone et 
al., The Plastic Human Brain Cortex, 28 ANNUAL REV. OF NEUROSCIENCE 377 
(2005). 
322 See Faigman, Mohahan & Slobogin, supra note 279, at 25. 
323 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. I at 156, Vol. 
III at 400, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn. May 
13, 2010). 
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thirty year-old and a sixty-three year-old is unknown because it has 
not been studied.324 There is considerable evidence, however, that 
the brain changes over time; children’s and teenagers’ brains are 
not as fully developed as an adult brain.325 Similarly, as time 
marches on, the brains of adults change with advancing age.326 
Testimony on witness truthfulness based on fMRI must be derived 
from information that fits the demographic of the witness under 
scrutiny or it cannot help the jury in making credibility 
determinations. At the very least, studies must demonstrate that 
such disparities do not make a difference.   
Accordingly, the disconnect between the opinion offered and 
the issues the jury had to decide in Semrau, as well as the 
divergence between the underlying scientific data upon which the 
offered opinion was grounded and the actual facts of the case, 
supports the conclusion that Dr. Laken’s opinion would not have 
helped the jury and could have been excluded on that basis 
alone.327  
But what if the current fMRI technology is better than leaving 
the jury to decide credibility in the traditional manner?328 Juries, as 
                                                
324 Id. Vol. II at 190. 
325 Barry C. Field, B. J. Casey, & Yasmin L. Hurd, Adolescent Competence 
and Culpability: Implications of Neuroscience for Juvenile Justice Administration, 
in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, 7–10 (Stephen J. Morse & 
Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013) (discussing the differences between adult and 
juvenile brain development, and the implication of these differences in the 
juvenile justice system). 
326 See generally Elizabeth R. Sowell, Paul M. Thompson & Arthur W. Toga, 
Mapping Changes in the Human Cortex Throughout the Span of Life, 10 
NEUROSCIENTIST 372 (2004) (summarizing the morphological changes of the 
human brain spanning childhood through the entirety of adult life). 
327 The magistrate judge in Semrau did consider some of these same facts in 
his application of the Daubert factors in his reliability analysis, but specifically 
noted that due to his conclusion that the proffered testimony was unreliable, “the 
court need not address the relevancy prong.” United States v. Semrau, No. 07–
10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *14 n.19 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
328 Professor Frederick Schauer argues that whether science is “good” enough 
for the courtroom should be based on legal norms, not scientific ones. See 
Schauer, supra note 31, at 1207–09 (arguing that although fMRI results may not 
be good enough by science standards for reliability, they are not necessarily any 
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the argument goes, are so bad at determining credibility and 
assigning proper weight to witness testimony that any help 
supplied by the current state of fMRI technology should be 
gratefully accepted.329 But when the neuroscientists themselves 
admit that they cannot tell whether the subject is lying or telling 
the truth in response to questions about the specific allegations of 
the indictment, can the technology really be that helpful?   
When the time gap between the events in question and the date 
of the fMRI scan are measured in years instead of weeks and the 
neuroscientists have not even asked whether that time gap might be 
of some significance in evaluating the neural correlates of 
deception, does the technology really add anything to the 
credibility question the jury must answer? 
If neuroscientists cannot develop a study that will address the 
significance of the BOLD response when the subject is being 
questioned about a real crime that carries real consequences for the 
witness but instead merely assume the neural response would be 
the same as an undergraduate who can earn $50 by participating in 
a mock crime study, can the resulting opinion really help the jury 
decide the important questions placed before them?330 
These disconnects between fMRI deception studies and what 
juries have to do in a real case are not isolated or unique to the 
situation in Semrau. The inability to identify specific lies related to 
critical facts in a given case, the unknown impact of a large time 
                                                                                                         
less reliable than other types of evidence admitted in court, and thus possibly 
should be admissible). While Professor Schauer makes an interesting argument, 
the Supreme Court held that “evidentiary reliability” is based upon “scientific 
validity.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).    
329 Schauer, supra note 31, at 1213. 
330 Interestingly, neuroscientists may be scratching the surface of the answer 
to this very question. See Mohammad Dastjerdi, et al., Numerical Processing in 
the Human Parietal Cortex During Experimental and Natural Conditions, 
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 4:2528 (2013) (finding a high degree of correlation 
between brain patterns detected through intracranial electrodes when subjects 
were engaged in specific math exercises as part of a study and the brain patterns 
when subjects were monitored in the non-study setting but were using math or 
math-related concepts in normal social interaction). 
196 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 16: 105 
gap between the alleged offense and the fMRI scan, and the total 
absence of any studies involving real consequences faced by real 
people in a real world setting are present in every attempt to use 
current fMRI technology to detect deception or verify truth. These 
shortcomings not only do not help the jury in determining 
credibility, but could affirmatively mislead the jury in that 
important task. While the misleading aspect of these shortcomings 
would be properly considered in a Rule 403 analysis, Rule 702 
imposes an affirmative burden on the proponent to establish that 
the opinion will help the jury.      
To their credit, the neuroscientists readily admit these 
shortcomings are present. They are not trying to hide them or slip 
them past unsuspecting judges. In Semrau, Dr. Laken readily 
admitted to all of the aforementioned shortcomings.331 But the 
transparency and good faith of the neuroscience community does 
not change the fact that there is a wide gap between what their 
studies purport to show and what juries have to do. The 
neuroscience lab is a dynamic environment where the search for 
“truth” is a never-ending exercise. What science finds today may 
be clarified, modified, or even rejected tomorrow. The courtroom, 
however, has an end point. A decision in this case about these facts 
and this defendant must be made. The finality of jury verdicts 
requires a perspective that is different than the scientists’ 
continuing search for answers. While those unresolved questions 
may not overly concern neuroscientists who claim fMRI is able to 
detect deception, the “help the jury” standard of Rule 702 makes 
them a very real concern to judges, lawyers, and the legal system. 
4. Sufficient Facts and Data 
Rule 702(b) asks whether the qualified expert witness has 
sufficient facts and data upon which to apply the principles and 
methods of inquiry required by her area of scientific, specialized, 
                                                
331 Testimony of Dr. Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, 
Vol. I at 134, 137–38, 156–62, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM 
(W.D. Tenn.). 
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or technical knowledge.332 This is the first broad area of inquiry in 
the reliability prong of Rule 702.  
This aspect of the inquiry requires an abstract analysis of the 
facts and data needed by experts in the field whenever they are 
seeking answers to similar questions. The type of information, as 
well as the quantity and quality, will depend upon the issues in the 
case and the question the expert is attempting to answer. The field 
of scientific or technical knowledge may have developed a 
baseline set of necessary data needed by any competent expert in 
order to formulate an opinion using the tools of the particular 
discipline. For novel areas of scientific inquiry, like fMRI for lie 
detection, the type and quantity of information necessary may not 
be settled. Nevertheless, the trial judge, in performing the 
gatekeeping function imposed by Rule 702, must determine 
whether the expert has enough information to permit the principles 
and methods of the expert’s discipline to operate.     
There is a case-specific aspect of the sufficiency of the facts 
and data requirement, as well. Not only must the expert have 
access to the facts and data required by the area of scientific 
inquiry generally, but he must also have those that apply to the 
specific issue in the case at hand. In the fMRI lie detection context, 
the expert needs facts and data about the witness, as well as the 
facts and data compiled through the fMRI research dealing with 
truthfulness.333 The fMRI scan of the witness must fit within the 
parameters of the research upon which the hypothesis of lie 
detection is based.  
Witness-specific data would include the details of the proposed 
testimony and their relationship to the factual issues to be resolved 
                                                
332 FED. R. EVID. 702(b). 
333 The data generated by the various fMRI lie detection studies is properly 
considered under Rule 702(a), the sufficiency of the facts and data underlying 
the opinion, as well as under Rule 702(b), the reliability of the principles and 
methods used to form the opinion. See Brian Reese, Using fMRI as a Lie 
Detector-Are We Lying to Ourselves, 19 ALBANY L. J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 218 
(2009) (observing that the underlying fMRI research implicates both FED. R. 
EVID. 702(a) and (b)).  
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by the jury. This information would then be used to develop the 
SIQs the witness will answer in the scanner. An insufficient factual 
picture may produce SIQs that are not sufficiently connected to the 
issues the jury must decide. 
The social and medical history of the witness and his suitability 
for MRI scanning is also an important part of the sufficient factual 
basis. For example, if the witness has a history of brain 
abnormalities, neurological disease, or drug or alcohol addiction, 
he may not respond to fMRI scanning in a way that one could draw 
meaningful conclusions about his truthfulness.334   
5. Reliable Principles and Methods 
The second question in the reliability inquiry under Rule 702 is 
whether the principles and methods employed by the expert can 
produce a trustworthy result when applied to a sufficient body of 
facts and data.335 This is an abstract analysis of the scientific 
validity of the principles and methods relied upon by the expert. 
                                                
334 See id. at 219–26 (identifying pathological liars, the mentally retarded, 
environmentally damaged, physically damaged, emotionally damaged and those 
with a neurodegenerative disease as inappropriate candidates for fMRI lie 
detection). 
335 “Reliability” in the context of scientific studies is a measure of how often 
and well the applied procedures produce the same results. ROBERT M. LAWLESS 
ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 42 (2010). In Daubert, the Court 
specifically noted that they were not using “reliability” in its technical sense. 
Rather, for evidentiary purposes, “reliability” is synonymous with 
trustworthiness. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993). 
(“We note that scientists typically distinguish between ‘validity’ (does the 
principle support what it purports to show?) and ‘reliability’ (does application of 
the principle produce consistent results?) . . . our reference here is to evidentiary 
reliability—that is, trustworthiness. In a case involving scientific evidence, 
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”) (citations omitted, 
emphasis in original). Furthermore, “reliability” for Rule 702 purposes is not the 
same as “the merits standard of correctness.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000 
amendment advisory committee note), quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994).       
OCT. 2014] Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence 199 
This is the point in the analytical framework, suggested by the text 
of Rule 702, where most of the Daubert factors come into play.336  
Publication in recognized scientific journals of the result of 
laboratory studies of fMRI to detect deception is some indication 
that the principles and methods are based on the scientific 
method.337 But merely counting the number of published articles is 
a poor proxy of reliability. The substance of those published and 
peer-reviewed articles is what is important in the reliability 
determination. Furthermore, peer-review does not necessarily 
mean reviewed by scientific peers and found worthy. The recent 
revelation that an essential finding in an oft-cited psychology paper 
was based on flawed mathematics is illustrative.338 The problem of 
flawed research getting past peer review seems particularly acute 
in open-access journals,339 but it is also present in the traditional 
print journals and in submissions from researchers at prominent 
institutions.340 The neuroscience community has not been immune 
                                                
336 Others have noted that the rote application of Daubert factors is a poor 
proxy for determining the reliability and validity of fMRI-based opinion on 
witness truthfulness. See, e.g., J. R. H. Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why 
Neuroimaging-Based Lie Detection Requires a New Framework for the 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under FRE 702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 37–40 (2010). The Daubert factors, should, however, lead to a more 
in depth inquiry and analysis of the scientific principles and methods at issue.  
337 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
338 See Ivan Oransky, Fredrickson-Losada “positivity ratio” paper partially 
withdrawn, RETRACTION WATCH (Sep. 19, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://retractionwatch. 
wordpress.com/2013/09/19/fredrickson-losada-positivity-ratio-paper-partially-
withdrawn/#more-15724 (reporting that AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST partially 
withdrew a paper because the mathematical modeling upon which some of the 
conclusions were based was “invalid”). 
339 John Bohannon, Who’s Afraid of Peer Review?, 342 SCIENCE 60 (Oct. 4, 
2013) available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/342/6154/60.full 
(reporting that author writing under false name from a non-existent institution 
received publication offers from 167 open access journals for a spoof article 
containing such obvious flaws that it should have been rejected out of hand). 
340 See, e.g., Archive for “Harvard” Category, RETRACTION WATCH, http:// 
retractionwatch.wordpress.com/category/by-institution/harvard/ (last visited Nov. 
5, 2013) (listing several instances of research published in print journals by 
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to the problem of questionable work getting past peer review and 
into publication.341   
This is not to suggest that fMRI researchers are not careful, 
ethical, and diligent in their research and reporting their findings. 
Nor does it suggest that peer review is ineffective. In fact, quite the 
opposite may be the case. When journals retract or clarify 
previously published papers it is because other scientists, or the 
original authors themselves, have noticed and reported flaws that 
undermine the conclusions. It does suggest, however, that merely 
counting the number of publications on a given topic is a poor 
proxy for scientific validity. Some analysis of the contents of those 
published and peer-reviewed papers is required, especially when 
considering novel scientific principles or the application of 
established principles and methods to new problems.   
Many of the articles relied upon by Dr. Laken to support the 
application of fMRI for lie detection in individuals contained 
caveats and reservations about the suitability of the principles for 
forensic purposes.342 That, however, did not seem to stop the 
magistrate judge from finding the Daubert peer review and 
publication query satisfied.343 Paradoxically, the magistrate judge 
                                                                                                         
Harvard affiliated researchers in which retractions or other clarifications were 
made after peer review and publication).  
341 See Archive for the “Neuroscience Retractions” Category, RETRACTION 
WATCH, http://retractionwatch.wordpress.com/category/by-subject/basic-life-sciences- 
retractions/neuroscience-retractions/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
342 See, e.g., Spence et al., supra note 44, 1760-61 (noting ecological validity, 
experimental design, group to individual inferences, and whether pathological 
liars would show similar activation patterns as study volunteers as problems that 
research must address); Frank A. Kozel, et al., A Replication Study of the Neural 
Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) 
(suggesting more work is needed to detect deception within individuals as 
opposed to group studies); Langleben et al., supra note 64, at 731 (calling for 
further refinement of test paradigm and image analysis to identify an activation 
pattern predictive of deception at the individual level); Kozel, et al., supra note 
31, at 611–12 (suggesting steps and refinements necessary to detect deception in 
individuals). 
343 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 
(W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
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found those same caveats and reservations as evidence the 
principles and methods relied upon by Dr. Laken had not gained 
sufficient acceptance in the neuroscience community to satisfy the 
general acceptance factor under Daubert.344  
Application of the Daubert factors without considering the 
larger question of the textual framework of Rule 702 was sufficient 
to resolve the question before the magistrate judge in Semrau,345 
and the deferential abuse of discretion scope of review on appeal 
affirmed the District Court’s exclusion of the evidence.346 But the 
standard of Rule 702(b), that the principles and methods 
underlying the opinion be reliable, requires consideration of the 
validity of the underlying scientific studies upon which those 
principles are based.347 While the Daubert factors are considerations 
in determining whether a principle or method derived from 
research is sound, it is important to place those factors into the 
context of scientific validity based upon Rule 702(b). 
Scientific research is routinely evaluated by considering its 
“reliability” and its “validity.” Reliability is a function of 
reproducibility. Does the test produce the same or similar results 
each time it is applied?348 It is a measure of stability, not accuracy. 
Validity asks whether the study or test produces accurate and 
credible data from which well-reasoned conclusions can be 
drawn.349 In the context of fMRI lie detection research, the 
scientific validity question requires consideration of: (1) internal 
validity, (2) external validity, and (3) ecological validity.350 
                                                                                                         
to exclude the fMRI-based expert testimony was adopted by the district judge 
and affirmed on appeal. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). 
344 Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092 at *11–13. 
345 Id. 
346 Semrau, 693 F.3d at 520–23. 
347 FED. R. EVID. 702(c). 
348 LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 335, at 42.  
349 Id. at 36. 
350 See Bruce R. DeForge, Research Design Principles, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF RESEARCH DESIGN 1253,1258 (Neil J. Salkind ed. 2010) (describing internal 
and external validity); Steve Fuller, Threats to Validity, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
RESEARCH DESIGN 1509, 1511 (Neil J. Salkind ed. 2010) (describing ecological 
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Evaluating fMRI research from the perspective of scientific 
reliability and validity reveals numerous shortcomings not 
identified by the court in Semrau. 
a. Replication 
A sound scientific technique or instrument should produce 
similar results each time it is applied. For example, if placing the 
same bag of sugar on the same kitchen scale consistently revealed 
the bag weighed five pounds, one could say the scale was a 
“reliable” instrument for determining weight. That is not the same 
as saying the scale was an accurate instrument for determining 
weight. Perhaps the scale is off by three pounds and the bag of 
sugar actually weighs eight pounds. One could not realize the 
inaccuracy of the scale, or the actual weight of the bag of sugar, 
unless the bag of sugar was weighed on another scale and got a 
different result or placed an object of a known weight on the scale 
and saw the weight indicated was off by three pounds. Replication 
of tests and experiments is an important feature in gauging the 
trustworthiness of the results of those tests and experiments. 
fMRI lie detection studies suffer from a lack of replication 
within and between laboratories. One of the leading fMRI lie 
detection researchers, Dr. Sean A. Spence, reviewed the published 
literature through July 2007 and was “unable to identify a single 
example of this basic requirement [replication] within the extant 
fMRI literature.”351  
More recently, Elena Rusconi and Timothy Mitchener-Nissen 
observed that, “it is very unusual to see a brain imaging experiment 
precisely repeated within and between laboratories.”352 This lack of 
replication may be due, in large part, to the tendency for scientific 
journals to publish novel studies instead of replications.353 The 
                                                                                                         
validity); see also Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: 
Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62 MERCER L. R. 861, 876–78 (2011) (discussing 
the impact of ecological and external validity on the admissibility of brain 
scans). 
351 Spence, supra note 46, at 24. 
352 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 3. 
353 Id. 
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incentive to publish pushes researchers to develop new test designs 
rather than seek to replicate the work of others.354 Spence’s analysis 
of the literature through July 2007 bears this out: of the sixteen 
published peer-reviewed studies he reviewed, he found researchers 
used different test designs, different scanner strengths, and 
different response modes in various combinations that produced 
different areas of brain activation.355 As a result, no single study 
was ever replicated by another lab or by the original lab.356 All 
were published but replication was lacking. 
A meta-analysis of twenty-three fMRI deception studies 
published between 2001 and 2011 revealed several brain regions, 
primarily in the prefrontal cortex, which were active across the 
studies at a rate greater than chance.357 Consistent with the findings 
of the earlier studies of replication, this analysis also noted 
“considerable variability from study to study, as no region was 
active in all (or nearly all) studies.”358 Like Spence’s 2007 study, 
the researchers found that differences in study design, variations 
among hardware and software, the number of trials each subject 
underwent, and the varying number of participants in the studies 
precluded a more precise and consistent identification of the sub 
regions involved in detection.359 While there was consistency 
across the studies of general brain regions of activation in 
deception, the meta-analysis was not able to find consistent 
activation in sub regions of the prefrontal cortex.360   
                                                
354 Id. 
355 Spence, supra note 46, at 14–21. 
356 Id. 
357 Farah, supra note 51, at 124. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. 
360 Id. The lack of replication and reproducibility is not limited to lie detection 
studies. fMRI, generally, has suffered from a lack of replication. See Tancredi & 
Brodie, supra note 31, at 280–82. Differences in hardware, software, and test 
designs have produced varying outcomes in studies across labs and even within 
the same labs. Id. The Functional Bioinformatics Research Network (“FBIRN”) 
established by the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) is an effort to address 
this problem and establish standards to bolster the reliability of fMRI studies. 
Functional BIRN, BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS RESEARCH NETWORK, http://www. 
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The testing, peer review and publication factors of the Daubert 
analysis reveal the shortcomings of the use of fMRI technology for 
lie detection if one considers the substance of the published 
literature instead of just counting the number of articles and asking 
whether the underlying principle can or has been tested. Only by 
using the Daubert factors as a starting point for analysis instead of 
the end point, will the reliability of the principles and methods 
become apparent.    
b. Internal Validity 
Internal validity “refers to the degree to which the research 
design isolates the variable of interest and permits drawing valid 
inferences about the relationships between variables from the 
resulting data.”361 An internally valid study reduces the influence 
that confounding variables might have on the results.362 In 
evaluating internal validity of the fMRI studies on lie detection, 
study design (sometimes referred to as methodological or construct 
validity) and data collection and analysis (sometimes referred to as 
statistical validity) are critical. If the study does not isolate the 
neural correlates of deception one cannot draw valid conclusions 
about whether the subject was lying or telling the truth during the 
test. If the subject does not comply precisely with the test design, 
the resulting data cannot lead to valid conclusions. If the 
assumptions used to construct the algorithms are manipulated, the 
conclusions produced will vary. The underlying principles and 
methods of fMRI lie detection must be internally valid in order to 
be “reliable principles and methods” under Rule 702(b).   
                                                                                                         
birncommunity.org/collaborators/function-birn/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). The 
project links major research labs in a network to share experience and analysis 
of fMRI data with the goal of minimizing image variability and increasing 
reliability of fMRI studies. Id. The issue of lack of replication and 
reproducibility in empirical studies has attracted attention in other areas of 
scientific inquiry, as well. The Journal of Social Psychology recently published 
a special issue devoted to the problem. 45 SOC. PSYCH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 137 
(2014). 
361 LAWLESS, ET AL., supra note 335, at 36. 
362 Id. 
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Considering internal validity in terms of the Daubert factors, 
the existence of standards, controls, and protocols, as well as the 
error rate associated with a particular principle or method should 
lead to an examination of test design, test execution, and data 
analysis. Flaws in one or more of these areas raise questions as to 
the scientific validity and the evidentiary reliability of the opinion 
based upon those principles and methods.   
i. The Problem of Defining Deception 
Any scientific principle or method to detect lies and verify 
truth must first isolate the construct of interest (i.e., the neural 
correlates of deception).363 This requires the researcher to identify 
or define “lying,” and then design a test that will isolate the neural 
activity associated with that brain state and that brain state only. 
The corollary of this first step is to consider the question 
philosophers over the ages have struggled with: What is truth? 
Considering the following statements by prominent individuals 
illustrates that defining a “lie” is not as easy as it sounds:   
• “I believe it is peace for our time.”364 
• “I’m not a crook.”365 
• “Read my lips, no new taxes.”366 
• “I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms. 
Lewinski.”367 
                                                
363 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 2–3. 
364 Neville Chamberlain, U.K. Prime Minister, Peace For Our Time Speech, 
Statement Made at 10 Downing Street, London, After the Munich Conference of 
1938 (Sept. 30, 1938), available at http://eudocs.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Neville_ 
Chamberlain%27s_%22Peace_For_Our_Time%22_speech. 
365 Richard Nixon's Question and Answer Session at the Annual Convention of 
the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, held at the Contemporary 
Hotel at Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida (Nov. 17, 1973), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/richard-nixon-im-crook-17736796. 
366 George H. W. Bush, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 
Republican National Convention in New Orleans (Aug. 18, 1988), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955. 
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• “[Saddam Hussein’s regime] threatens the peace with 
weapons of mass murder.”368 
• “I’ve never doped.”369  
• “I never bet on baseball.”370 
• “That is absolutely not true.”371  
• “What [the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Libya] 
began as was a spontaneous—not a premeditated—
response to what had transpired in Cairo.”372 
• “If you like the insurance you have, keep it.  Nothing in 
the proposal forces anyone to change the insurance they 
have. Period.”373  
In each instance the fact asserted by the speaker turned out to 
be false in some objective sense. However, several questions 
remain. Was the speaker lying when making the statement? Or was 
the speaker mistaken, naive, in self-denial, ignorant of the true 
state of affairs, engaged in wishful thinking, merely “spinning” the 
facts to suit his or her own interests, or justified in being less than 
forthright because of the greater good achieved if the hearer 
accepts the statement as true? Because “lies” are not always easy 
to define, and because in the forensic setting they come in 
                                                                                                         
367 William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at After School Program 
Event (Jan. 26, 1998), available at http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/ 
speeches/speech-3930. 
368 George. W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/ 
03/20030319-17.html. 
369 Larry King Live: Lance Armstrong (CNN television broadcast Aug. 25, 2005), 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/25/lkl.01.html. 
370 WILLIAM A. COOK, PETE ROSE: BASEBALL'S ALL-TIME HIT KING, 175 
(2004). 
371 Nightline: John Edwards Admits Affair (ABC television broadcast Aug. 8, 
2008), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/john-edwards-part-
5546322 (denying the allegation that he was the father of Reille Hunter’s child). 
372 This Week: Susan Rice (ABC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2012), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/susan-rice-week-17248141. 
373 If You Like the Insurance You Have, Keep It, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal/titlei/keepit (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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numerous and sometimes subtle varieties,374 constructing a research 
design that purports to isolate “lies,” identifies their neural 
correlates, and then applies that research to a real-life forensic 
setting is no small feat, and one that to date has not been 
accomplished. When applied to using fMRI as a lie detector, the 
question becomes whether the fMRI scan was actually capturing 
the BOLD response associated with lying.375 In the vast majority of 
underlying studies that support the theory of fMRI-based lie 
detection, the subjects were instructed to lie about their 
involvement in the simulated theft,376 mock sabotage,377 or other 
staged event.378 The real question, then, is whether the “instructed 
lie” is the same as a “real lie?” If not, the underlying principle and 
method used to determine whether a real witness is lying, the 
BOLD response measured while answering the SIQs, is not a 
reliable principle or method.  
Adlert Virj suggested that deception is a “deliberate attempt, 
without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the 
                                                
374 Judge Jed Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of New York, identified the problem: 
The law recognizes many kinds of lies, ranging from ‘white lies’ and 
‘puffing’ to affirmative misstatements, actionable half-truths, and 
material omissions . . . . [T]he differences are crucial in almost any 
case: a little white lie is altogether different, in the eyes of the law and 
of common sense, from an intentional scheme to defraud. Nothing in 
the brain-scan approach to lie detection even attempts to make such 
distinctions. And what might a brain scan be predicted to show in the 
case of a lie by omission; that is, the person whose statements are 
truthful as far as they go but who conceals a material fact that puts an 
entirely different perspective on what is being said? In my experience, 
these are the most common kinds of lies in court . . . . 
Rakoff, supra note 86, at 44–45.  
375 Shen & Jones, supra note 350, at 874–75; see also Anthony Wagner, Can 
Neuroscience Identify Lies?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE: A 
CONCISE INTRODUCTION, 13, 13–23 (2010). 
376 Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 605. 
377 Frank. A. Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection of Deception After 
Committing a Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 220, 220 (2009). 
378 Phan et al., supra note 62, at 165–66. 
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communicator considers to be untrue.”379 Three essential 
components of this definition of deception are important when 
developing neuroimaging studies to identify its neural correlates: 
(1) the communicator must deliberately intend to mislead another; 
(2) the deception occurs “without forewarning,” or without 
instruction; and (3) the “ground truth” or objective accuracy of the 
facts do not define the “lie.”380 For example, if the communicator 
subjectively believes that Fact A is false and deliberately attempts 
to create that same belief in the mind of his listener, he has 
engaged in deceptive behavior even if Fact A is true. Importantly, 
if he subjectively believes Fact A is true and deliberately attempts 
to create that same belief in the mind of the listener, he has not 
engaged in deceptive behavior even if Fact A is false.  
The definition of lying imposes serious obstacles to an 
internally valid scientific study. First is the requirement that the 
communicator deliberately intend to mislead another. In the typical 
fMRI deception studies, subjects are placed in constructed and 
controlled environments, told to engage in certain behaviors, e.g., 
“steal” a watch or ring from a drawer, and then try to fool the 
researchers with their answers during the fMRI scan. What we do 
not know and cannot measure is whether the brain state of 
deliberate intent to mislead another is the same in the laboratory as 
it is in the real world.   
Second is the problem of “forewarning.” As the definition 
indicates, this is a decision to deceive without being told or 
instructed to lie or attempt to deceive. Nancy Kanwisher describes 
the typical fMRI deception paradigm as an “instructed falsehood” 
which negates this essential element of the definition of deceit.381 
                                                
379 Aldert Pär Anders Granhag & Leif A. Strömwall, Research on Deception 
Detection: Past and Present, in THE DETECTION OF DECEPTION IN FORENSIC 
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Kanwisher asserts that study subjects are not lying; they are merely 
following the researcher’s instructions.382  
In the context of interpersonal communications, whether one-
on-one in private conversation or from the witness stand to a jury 
of twelve citizens, deception involves several cognitive processes. 
Kamila Sip and her colleagues explained the process of deception 
as requiring the communicator to continually weigh and analyze 
four mutually dependent factors before and during the process of 
deception: (1) information management; (2) risk management; 
(3) reputation management; and (4) impression management.383  
In making the deliberate and voluntary decision to deceive 
another, the prevaricator must manage the information and keep 
track of both the truth and the untruths, suppress the truth, 
construct a lie that is reasonably consistent with the known facts, 
as well as monitor the feedback from the hearer to assess how 
effective he is in creating a false impression.384 At the same time, 
he must manage the risks of deception in terms of gains and losses 
and long-term consequences.385 Reputation management involves 
the need to convince oneself, as well as others, that a greater good 
was achieved by engaging in deceptive behavior and the ends 
justify the means.386 Impression management requires constant 
efforts at building trust in the minds of the listener and closely 
monitoring verbal and non-verbal feedback and making 
appropriate trust-building adjustments to further the deception.387 
From a neuroimaging perspective, this process involves 
executive-level neural processes that are generally centered in the 
pre-frontal cortex, the same general area of the brain identified by 
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most fMRI deception studies as active during deception.388 
Importantly, however, the process described by Sip and her 
colleagues is one that is followed in deciding whether to deceive, 
as well as being active during the deception.389 Since the decision 
to deceive is an ongoing one, the cycle identified by Sip arguably 
occurs even if the subject decides not to deceive. An internally 
valid neuroimaging study to detect deception must isolate the 
neural processes that are applicable only to the deceptive behavior 
itself and eliminate those correlates that are also present when 
deception is not.390 Studies to date have not accomplished this 
important task.391   
The meta-analysis of twenty-three fMRI deception studies by 
Martha Farah and her colleagues found that “a number of 
experimental factors are confounded with the lie-versus-truth 
manipulation.”392 For example, they surmised the disparity between 
the number of times a subject pressed the “yes” and “no” buttons 
as required by the study design may have an influence on the 
activation pattern observed and reflect the neural activity 
associated with an infrequent versus frequent motor response 
rather than deception.393 Similarly, they observed that in many 
studies, the brain activation patterns may reflect the cognitive 
process of either selecting the object of interest in the study or the 
effect of memory rather than the act of deception.394     
Taken together, the research by Spence,395 Rusconi and 
Mitchener-Nissen,396 Kanwisher,397 and Farah398 all raise the serious 
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question of whether the fMRI deception research to date has really 
isolated deception. If not, the principles and methods relied upon to 
verify truth or identify deception based upon the BOLD response 
in the prefrontal cortex are not reliable. As Professors Francis Shen 
and Owen Jones have observed, “Researchers . . . are indeed 
measuring something—but they are not necessarily measuring 
‘lying.’”399 
ii. The Problem of Reverse Inferences 
The inability of study designs to isolate those neural processes 
that are active only when deception is present raises the problem of 
reverse inferences. Most would agree that while not completely 
consistent, the neuroimaging studies of deception all show brain 
activation in similar regions.400 This result would lead one to 
conclude that when a subject is engaged in deception, certain 
general brain regions are active. Researchers then conclude that 
when a certain region is active, the subject is lying. Inferring 
behavior from brain activation in certain regions is only valid, 
however, if activation of that brain region only occurs when that 
behavior is present. The regions of the brain identified as active in 
fMRI deception studies are regions known to be associated with 
higher-level executive functions and are activated in a number of 
situations unrelated to deception.401 As noted by Elena Rusconi and 
Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, “[J]ust because the prefrontal cortex is 
activated during deception it does not follow that every time the 
prefrontal cortex activates the individual is lying.”402 
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Martha J. Farah and her colleagues identified this same flaw in 
their meta-analysis of fMRI deception studies. They found at least 
one study where the activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex 
were greater in truth-telling than in deception, precisely the 
opposite of the theory upon which fMRI lie detection is based.403 
This observation illustrates the misleading results that can occur 
when one considers the difficulty of isolating the neural correlates 
of deception in the study design and then using reverse inferences 
to assume BOLD activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex 
indicate deception. Either one of those problems raises serious 
reliability concerns, but their combination poses a major obstacle 
in using fMRI as a reliable lie detector.     
iii. The Problem of BOLD Assumptions 
The underlying theory of fMRI as a lie detector relies upon the 
assumption that lying requires more brain energy than truth-telling 
and that more brain energy is identified by the BOLD response in 
the region of interest.404 Professor Brown and Dr. Murphy 
identified three important unanswered questions about the BOLD 
response that cast some doubt upon the underlying assumptions of 
BOLD fMRI as a reliable lie detector.405 They first found evidence 
that BOLD response may reflect neural activity related to synaptic 
input rather than output, the reverse of the theory upon which 
BOLD response to detect deception is based.406 Second, they also 
found a study suggesting that astrocytes, a structural but non-
neural brain cell, may be involved in the BOLD response in some 
yet unknown fashion.407 If non-neural brain cells are involved in 
the BOLD response it raises questions about whether the BOLD 
response is an accurate gauge of neural activity in the first place. 
Finally, they noted a third researcher who found increases in neural 
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blood flow in certain regions of the brain in anticipation of neural 
firing, but without actual neural firing.408 This finding also runs 
counter to the basic theory underlying the BOLD response as a 
reliable indicator of deception. Their survey of the relevant 
scientific literature led them to conclude: 
Each new finding about the BOLD response suggests that our 
understanding of its neurological basis and correlation to brain activity 
is just scratching the surface. Understanding this phenomenon at the 
level of the neuron is critical to understanding if it is capturing little, 
some, or most of the brain’s actual neuronal activity in response to an 
event. In turn, this knowledge is necessary to bridge the gap between a 
particular cognition or behavior and the neural mechanism underlying 
it.409   
iv. The Problem of Subject Compliance and Countermeasures 
Even the most carefully designed experiment will produce 
invalid results if the design is not followed scrupulously by the 
investigators and the participants. In the published studies, 
researchers generally took great pains to explain the process to 
ensure compliance with the test design. But this rehearsal and 
preparation may be a two-edged sword. While it is generally 
routine practice for subjects in fMRI detection studies to review 
the SIQs prior to the scan to ensure their understanding of the test 
requirements and reduce confusion, no one knows where the line 
between appropriate study preparation and extensive rehearsing is 
and what happens when that line is crossed.410 If the story told in 
the scanner is so rehearsed that Sip’s and colleagues’ cycle of 
deception411 is on autopilot and the responses to the SIQs require 
virtually no mental effort, will neural patterns of deception be 
detectable? No one knows the answer to this fundamental question.   
In the fMRI setting, movement in the scanner, whether slight or 
gross, intentional or unintentional, will introduce signal noise that 
will degrade the data and complicate analysis. Theoretically, 
engaging in some taxing mental activity, like complex 
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mathematical calculations, while undergoing fMRI could alter 
neural activation patterns and confound the resulting data.412 While 
some published fMRI lie detection studies have addressed subject 
compliance and even encouraged participants to “beat the test,”413 
there has been no comprehensive study of countermeasures. Self-
reporting by participants that they altered their breathing during the 
scan, visualized themselves in another environment, or delayed 
their responses to questions is not a substitute for controlled and 
careful studies of how participant non-compliance or deliberate 
employment of countermeasures might degrade the data and distort 
the results. 
A recent study by Giorgio Ganis and his colleagues, however, 
has demonstrated the importance of the countermeasure issue.414 In 
a version of the concealed information test, twenty-six Harvard 
University undergraduates were asked to view a series of six dates 
while in the scanner and respond by pressing a button with their 
right finger to indicate whether the date had any significance.415 Of 
the six dates displayed during each scan, four were insignificant to 
the study participants.416 The other two consisted of the subject’s 
birthdate and a personally insignificant “target” date to which the 
subjects were exposed prior to the scan.417 To test the effectiveness 
of countermeasures, the participants were scanned three times.418 In 
the first scan they were exposed to six dates, only one of which, 
the “target” date, was of significance and were asked to indicate 
their knowledge of the dates by pressing either the “yes” or “no” 
button with their right hand419. The only response that should have 
elicited a “yes” response was the “target” date.420  
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In the second scan the goal was to detect whether the 
participants had some concealed knowledge of a salient date.421 
They were instructed to respond truthfully to the irrelevant and 
target dates during this scan but to respond deceptively to the 
probe date, i.e., their birthdate.422 The post-scan analysis was 100% 
effective in identifying the “lie” about their birthdate.423 
Between the second and the third scan, the group was 
instructed in countermeasures to employ during the final scan.424 
Specifically, they were told to imperceptibly move their left index 
finger, left middle finger, and left big toe before responding to 
three of the irrelevant dates in the final scan.425 This introduced not 
only a delay in response time, but also required a contralateral 
motor movement, i.e., movement on the left side of the body in 
addition to the movement necessary to press the response device 
with the right hand.426 In response to the other three dates in the 
sequence, they were told to respond truthfully to the “target” date 
and to the other irrelevant date, but to press “no” indicating no 
knowledge of their birthdate.427 After practicing the countermeasures, 
the subjects were scanned.    
In the final scan, in which the countermeasures were employed 
before responding truthfully to three of the irrelevant dates, the 
accuracy rate in detecting the deceptive response to the salience of 
their birthdate dropped to only 30% with most of the incorrect 
classifications being false negatives.428 In other words, introducing 
imperceptible movements just prior to responding enabled the 
participants to conceal the lie about the salience of their own 
birthdate 70% of the time.    
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The ease at which the countermeasures could be learned and 
employed, coupled with the salience of the probe item, the 
subject’s birthdate, led Ganis and his colleagues to conclude that:  
[F]inding no difference between the activation to probes and the 
irrelevants in a typical CIT [concealed information test] paradigm does 
not imply that participants are honestly reporting ignorance about the 
probe; the result could instead be a false negative produced by covert 
countermeasures applied by individuals who have actually committed 
the crime under investigation.429  
They cautioned against using neuroimaging deception detection 
paradigms in an applied setting until the vulnerability of the 
technology to countermeasures has been studied more thoroughly.430  
Perhaps because the courts have had such a long history with 
polygraphy and countermeasures have plagued the reliability of the 
polygraph,431 courts will most likely require experts to study the 
effect of countermeasures and develop means to detect their 
employment before admitting opinion testimony on truthfulness 
based on fMRI scanning. Leading researchers in fMRI lie detection 
technology understand and agree with the courts’ concerns: “until 
conclusively proven otherwise, brain imaging should be expected 
to be no less sensitive to countermeasures than the polygraph.”432 
To date, this standard has not been met. 
v. The Problem of Data Analysis 
Brain scans are data intensive. Managing and analyzing the 
data is a complex process dependent upon important choices and 
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tradeoffs along the way.433 Two such choices that influence internal 
validity are the threshold at which voxel activation434 is considered 
significant in constructing the fMRI image and the “base rate” of 
liars in the population tested. The first is related to the BOLD 
theory itself. The second is one of applying statistical principles to 
determine the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and 
negative predictive value of a given test. Both of these factors 
should be explored under the “protocols or standards” factor and 
the “error rate” factor in a Daubert inquiry. 
(1) Threshold of Voxel Activation 
As outlined in Part II, the BOLD response is the difference in 
cerebral blood flow, cerebral blood volume, and cell metabolism 
between the two brain states of interest, truth-telling and lying.435 
Because the brain is always active, even when the subject is asleep, 
cerebral blood flow, cerebral blood volume, and cell metabolism 
are always present, as is every one of the brain’s over fifty billion 
neurons.436 The MRI scanner captures the magnetic resonance of 
this constant neural activity over the course of the scan.437 If 
hemodynamic activity was the only criteria by which to compare 
two brain states, the resulting images would show some 
hemodynamic activity in all areas of the brain at all times. But the 
BOLD response is a relative condition that compares 
hemodynamics between two brain states, such as lying and truth 
telling.438 By setting a threshold level at which to consider the 
hemodynamic response significant, the researchers can disregard 
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the “normal” hemodynamics of the brain and focus only on those 
areas that have a greater amount of neural activity. Setting the 
threshold level is part of the test design and therefore is a choice 
made by the researcher.439 There is no pre-determined level agreed 
upon by all research labs, and there is no standard set by scientific 
consensus.440 
If the threshold is set low, far more brain regions will appear 
active than if the threshold is set high.441 The low setting produces 
far more data points to analyze but will necessarily include activity 
in regions of the brain that may have nothing to do with the brain 
state under consideration.442 By the same token, if the threshold is 
set high in an attempt to narrow the area of interest, some regions 
actively engaged in the process may be excluded from the analysis 
because the hemodynamic response in those voxels does not reach 
the threshold level set by the researcher.443 The fundamental 
decision as to the threshold level of voxel activation considered 
significant may explain the wide variety of brain regions seen as 
active in fMRI deception studies across labs and test paradigms.444   
Craig Bennett and his colleagues dramatically illustrated this 
aspect of BOLD fMRI by placing a dead fish in an MRI scanner 
and exposing it to “a series of photographs depicting human 
individuals in social situations . . . [and] ask[ing] . . . [the fish] to 
determine what emotion the individual in the photo must have been 
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experiencing.”445 The result: “[s]everal active voxels were discovered 
in a cluster located within the salmon’s brain cavity.”446 Obviously, 
a dead salmon could not have any neural activity, much less neural 
activity associated with discerning human emotion based upon 
pictures of people in various social activities. Nevertheless, the 
BOLD fMRI images showed several active voxels in the salmon’s 
brain.447 By processing the data through two different correction 
algorithms the false positive result was eliminated.448 They 
concluded that reliance on standard statistical thresholds for voxel 
activation and low minimum voxel cluster sizes are ineffective to 
ensure valid conclusions and argued that multiple comparison 
correction algorithms should be standard practice in the vast 
majority of fMRI studies.449 Of course, these correction algorithms 
themselves are constructed based on various assumptions and 
decisions to apply one particular statistical approach instead of 
another, thus bringing choice into the equation once again.450 
Running multiple correction algorithms will tend to minimize the 
overall effect of a given choice, but the point remains that human 
choice, not the purely objective output of a computer, is 
influencing the data in a way that will influence the ultimate 
interpretation.451 
Unfortunately, most published fMRI studies do not go into all 
the detail necessary to identify the specific choices the researchers 
made from the study design to the colorful images said to represent 
a particular brain state.452 This makes it difficult to assess the 
validity of the studies that underlie the principles and methods 
                                                
445 Craig M. Bennett, Abigail A. Baird, Michael B. Miller & George L. 
Wolford, Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-mortem 
Atlantic Salmon: An Argument for Multiple Comparisons Correction, in OHBM, 
June 18–23, 2009, San Francisco, CA, 456 SA-PM. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. 
448 Id. 
449 Id. 
450 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 6. 
451 Id. 
452 Spence, supra note 46, at 11. 
220 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 16: 105 
relied upon by an expert offering an fMRI-based opinion on 
whether a witness is lying or telling the truth. If fMRI-based expert 
opinion on witness truthfulness was admitted, juries would be 
confronted with the range of statistical choices available to 
construct an fMRI image, whether those choices are reliable in the 
abstract and whether they were reliably applied in the case at trial. 
Only after resolving those difficult questions could the jury assess 
the credibility of the expert and, finally, evaluate the substance of 
the opinion itself and decide whether to believe the witness whose 
credibility is in issue. The jury, essentially, becomes a committee 
ruling on the propriety of the science behind the fMRI BOLD 
theory for lie detection before it can accomplish its task of finding 
the facts in the case. Until the science matures and test design and 
statistical choices that must be made to process raw data into 
images interpretable by the expert become standardized,453 
fMRI-based lie detection will have problems with internal 
validity.454 The jury’s task of deciding the facts of the case will be 
hindered and not helped by the distraction and confusion necessary 
to fully analyze the internal validity of a study on fMRI lie 
detection before being able to apply the opinion based on that 
study to the witness in question. 
(2) The Problem of the “Base Rate” of Liars 
Using fMRI to identify liars or to verify truthfulness is a 
binomial task. That is, it places individuals into one of two groups 
depending upon whether the brain state of interest, deception, is 
present, much like a medical test identifies whether a patient has a 
given disease. One measure of the “error rate” of such tests is the 
statistical validity of a test results. These results can be expressed 
in terms of the test’s “sensitivity” and “specificity.”455 Sensitivity 
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refers to the ability of the test to correctly identify the individuals 
who actually lied.456 Also referred to as the “true positive rate,” the 
greater the sensitivity the better the test design is at identifying 
liars as liars and reducing the false positives (calling a truth teller a 
liar).457 
Specificity, or the “true negative rate,” on the other hand, refers 
to the ability of the test to correctly identify those who did not 
display the brain state of interest. In the case of fMRI lie detection, 
this means correctly identifying those who actually told the truth. 
The greater the specificity the better the test design is at reducing 
false negatives (calling a liar a truth teller).458   
Calculating the sensitivity and specificity of a lab experiment is 
rather straightforward. Sensitivity is determined by dividing the 
number of true positives (those the test correctly identified as 
telling a lie) by the total of the true positives and false negatives 
(those the test incorrectly identified as telling the truth when they 
actually lied).459  
Specificity is determined by dividing the number of true 
negatives (those the test correctly identified as telling the truth) by 
                                                                                                         
Predictive Value, and Prevalence: Application to Surveillance Systems for 
Hospital-acquired Infections, 69 J. HOSP. INFECTION 164 (2008). The binominal 
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and negative predictive value to the results. See, e.g., Wolpe et al., supra note 
432, at 40 (calculating sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and 
negative predictive value to analyze the accuracy of an fMRI lie detection 
study).   
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the total of the true negatives and the false positives (those the test 
incorrectly identified as telling a lie).460    
Equally important is a test’s “positive predictive value” 
(“PPV”) and “negative predictive value” (“NPV”). The PPV is the 
probability that a person who the test identified as having the brain 
state at issue actually has that brain state.461 Conversely, the NPV is 
the probability that a person who did not exhibit the brain state of 
interest actually did not have the brain state of interest.462 In the 
context of fMRI lie detection, the PPV expresses the probability 
that one who exhibits the neural correlates of deception while 
answering salient questions is actually lying, while the NPV is the 
likelihood that a person who did not exhibit the neural correlates of 
deception was actually telling the truth.463 Going beyond sensitivity 
and specificity to determine PPV and NPV evaluates the test 
design in terms of probabilities and approaches a more realistic 
“error rate” of the test.464 
PPV is calculated by dividing the number of true positives by 
the total number of true positives and false positives.465 The 
resulting percentage is the likelihood that one whom the test 
identifies as a liar is actually a liar. Knowing the actual number of 
subjects who “lied” (the total of true positives and false positives) 
is required to calculate the PPV.466 
NPV is calculated by dividing the number of true negatives by 
the total number of true negatives and false negatives. The 
resulting percentage is the likelihood that one whom the test 
identifies as a truth teller is actually a truth teller. Knowing the 
actual number of subjects who did not “lie” (the total of true 
negatives and false negatives) is required to calculate the NPV.467 
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What is readily apparent from this brief discussion of the 
statistical methods used to evaluate the accuracy of a laboratory 
test is that the researcher must know the “ground truth” for each 
participant in the study in order to determine specificity, 
sensitivity, PPV, and NPV of the test. While that is not difficult in 
the controlled environment of the lab, it is virtually unknowable in 
real-world applications. After all, the whole purpose of 
administering a lie detector test to an individual, whether in a 
criminal investigation or security screening exercise, or in 
anticipation of trial testimony is to determine whether an 
individual is lying or telling the truth. In those settings, by 
definition, we do not know the “truth.”  
When fMRI lie detection is employed as a screening tool, we 
do not know the ratio of truth tellers to liars in the population 
screened. Furthermore, when fMRI is employed in a forensic 
setting to determine whether an individual witness lied or told the 
truth, the sensitivity, specificity, PPV, and NPV depend upon the 
test paradigm of the underlying studies. Any difference between 
the laboratory studies and the actual forensic application will 
influence the “error rate” of the forensic application. The different 
factual scenarios, fMRI protocols, and data analysis techniques 
used by the various published studies on fMRI lie detection makes 
it difficult to calculate an overall error rate for the technology, 
generally, and virtually impossible to calculate for an individual 
forensic application.468   
Daniel Langleben and Jane Moriarity question whether 
“overall error rates are a meaningful variable or whether error rates 
for each testing scenario need to be evaluated separately.”469 They 
argue, however, that “the inherent accuracy of lie detection within 
an individual subject is a prerequisite for further translational 
research [and that] understanding the error rate of a test is not 
complete until its positive and negative predictive powers are also 
                                                
468 Daniel D. Langleben & Jane C. Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie 
Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 
222, 229 (2013). 
469 Id. 
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known.”470 Complicating determination of the error rate is the need 
to know the “base rate” of liars within the population tested.471 
In a 2005 study, Paul Wolpe, Kenneth Foster, and Daniel 
Langleben illustrated the significance that the “base rate” of liars 
within the tested population can have on the predictive value of an 
fMRI lie detection scan.472 Using Ben-Shakhar’s and Elaad’s meta-
analysis of 123 polygraph studies using the Guilty Knowledge Test 
paradigm, in which the sensitivity and specificity ranged between 
70% and 85%,473 Wolpe, Foster, and Langleben calculated the PPV 
and the probability of a false positive in a hypothetical population 
group of criminal suspects with an assumed “base rate” of liars of 
50% and a group of Department of Energy employees with an 
assumed “base rate” of liars of 0.1%.474 They found when the 
prevalence of liars within the tested group was low, “the test will 
yield far more false-positive than true-positive results; about one 
person in five will be incorrectly identified by the test.”475 They 
also found that even in a population with a “base rate” of liars of 
50%, the PPV is “quite low.”476 Their study led them to conclude 
that “[n]ew technologies may—or may not—improve the situation, 
but clearly a very large improvement in the specificity of the test 
would be needed for its performance to be acceptable for most 
forensic or security purposes.”477 
c. External Validity 
External validity is a measure of how well the laboratory 
results can be applied to those who did not participate in the study, 
whether it is the population at large or to a specific individual.478 
                                                
470 Id. 
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The typical fMRI lie detection study usually deals with a small 
number of participants who are mostly undergraduate students. 
They are, generally speaking, young, healthy, eager to participate 
and further the cause of science, and without significant social or 
medical histories, such as drug or alcohol addiction, that might 
confound the results of the study. Ethical concerns require 
researchers to make sure the study participants are suitable 
candidates for the study and will not be harmed by the study 
procedures.479 
i. The Problem of Population Differences 
To be externally valid, however, the study results must be 
applicable to a wider population or demographic. In the forensic 
setting, one takes his subject as he finds him. In other words, 
applying fMRI lab research based on young, healthy, and 
unmedicated volunteers and comparing it to fMRI results based on 
individuals caught up in the criminal justice system ignores the 
difference in those two population groups. Mental illnesses, 
personality disorders, drug abuse, alcohol addiction, which are all 
factors screened for and eliminated in the lab studies, are 
encountered routinely in the criminal justice system. Whether any 
one or a combination of these factors would influence the outcome 
of an fMRI scan is unknown because it has not been studied.480   
                                                
479 See Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 606 (“The subjects were healthy 
unmedicated adults ages 18-50 years who were screened with a Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) . . . a pre-MRI 
screening form, a medical history, and a physical exam. They were evaluated 
with an Annett Handedness Scale . . . and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) . . . . A urine sample was obtained for a drug urinalysis and a urine 
pregnancy test if a female of child-bearing potential.”). 
480 See, e.g. Kozel, et al., supra note 377, at 228 (“[W]hether fMRI deception 
testing would work is unknown for participants who are taking a medication, 
who have a significant psychiatric or medical condition, or who are outside the 
18-50 year age range[,] [f]uture studies will need to be performed involving 
these populations.”); Simpson, supra note 31 at 494 (“There has been no testing 
of fMRI lie detection paradigms in juveniles, the elderly, or individuals with 
Axis I and/or Axis II disorders, such as substance abuse, antisocial personality 
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The significant difference between the demographics of the 
study participants and those typically seen in the criminal justice 
system does not exist in all potential forensic uses. For example, a 
“white collar” criminal defendant may exhibit all the 
characteristics of the typical study participant. By the same token, 
a percipient witness in a criminal or civil case may very well 
possess the same characteristics of the typical study population. 
The point is that external validity is an important consideration in 
every application of fMRI lie detection research and must be 
evaluated in each instance. In some situations weak external 
validity may render the application of the technology unreliable, 
while in other situations the similarity between the study 
participants and the individual may be sufficient to satisfy this 
important aspect of scientific research.  
ii. The Problem of Cultural Differences    
Equally problematic from an external validity standpoint is the 
cultural influence of deception. From a psycho-social perspective, 
“culture” refers to “features of human groups that typically vary 
according to geographic areas and which depend upon social 
learning; it includes shared attitudes, practices, and beliefs, 
together with languages and religions.”481 While some fMRI 
studies have noted the ethnicity of the study subjects,482 there has 
been no systematic consideration of the influence of culture on the 
neural correlates of deception. If lying is a social construct and 
deception involves intentionally creating a false belief in the mind 
                                                                                                         
disorder, mental retardation, head injury, or dementia. It is unclear whether and 
how such diagnoses would affect the reliability of the approach.”). 
481 Tommaso Bruni, Cross-Cultural Variation and fMRI Lie detection, 
TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS IN 
NEUROSCIENCE AND ROBOTICS 129 (2012). 
482 See, e.g., Tatia M. C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 15 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 157, 159 (2002) (identifying 
study participants as “native Chinese (Mandarin) speakers from Mainland 
China”). 
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of another, then the social and cultural milieu in which the 
exchange takes place may influence the brain’s processing.483   
iii. The Problem of Group to Individual (G2i) Inference    
Another important aspect of internal validity is whether BOLD 
responses generated by group-averaged studies can be applied to 
individuals.484 Most fMRI lie detection studies have averaged the 
degree of activation and location of active voxels of the study’s 
participants to create a graphical image that displays the average of 
the neural correlates for the group.485 Because the study produces 
an average of brain activation, some members of the group will 
have more areas active; some will have less. Some will show 
activation in areas that others do not. Conceivably, a given 
participant’s brain activation pattern may fall completely outside 
the graphical image constructed on the average pattern of 
activation across a group.486 
Extrapolating the group-averaged data to make definitive 
determinations about an individual is problematic, at best.487 
Science is concerned with universal conditions in populations; 
such an approach increases our understanding of ourselves and the 
world in which we live. A trial is concerned about the conduct of 
an individual. Does the individual about whom the law is 
concerned share precisely the same attributes as the average data 
from the subjects of the underlying studies? Unless and until more 
studies are done with larger numbers of participants, the attempt to 
apply group-averaged data to individuals will raise serious external 
                                                
483 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 6. 
484 For a discussion of the problem of group to individual inference (G2i) in 
scientific expert testimony, generally, see generally Faigman, Mohahan & 
Slobogin, supra note 279, at 23. 
485 Kanwisher, supra note 381, at 7. 
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487 See, e.g., id.; Shen & Jones, supra note 350, at 881 (2011) (“It is an 
inferential challenge to move from group-averaged neuroscience data to individual 
assessments.”). 
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validity problems and directly undermine the trustworthiness of an 
opinion based on that data.488  
d. Ecological Validity 
Ecological validity is a measure of the correlation between the 
controlled and structured laboratory conditions of the study and 
what one would experience in the uncontrolled and unstructured 
dynamics of a real-world setting.489 This inquiry looks at the 
underlying studies upon which the principles and methods used by 
the expert are derived. None of the studies relied upon by 
proponents of fMRI lie detection were designed to measure the 
neural correlates of deception in a real-world environment. Dr. 
Laken, one of the leading proponents of fMRI lie detection and the 
scientist who has studied this area more than perhaps anyone else, 
acknowledged, “I don’t know of a way to do real world scenario 
testing.”490 Dr. Laken was, however, willing to assume that the 
BOLD response observed by researchers in laboratory settings, 
using undergraduates who were instructed to lie about their 
involvement in a mock crime, would be the same as that of a 
criminal defendant facing a prison sentence.491   
Another ecological validity problem is illustrated quite well by 
the Semrau case itself. The fMRI deception studies generally 
require the participants to engage in some activity and then “lie” 
about their involvement.492 Apart from the difference between the 
artificial laboratory condition and what might exist in the real 
world, the typical test paradigm involves behavior or action on the 
part of the participants.493 In Semrau, on the other hand, Dr. 
Semrau was not asked about whether he engaged in certain 
                                                
488 Id. 
489 Id. 
490 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, 
Vol. II at 191, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.). 
491 Id., May 14, 2010, Vol. IV at 39–40. 
492 Spence, supra note 46, at 13. 
493 Id. at 14–21, Table 1 (describing studies). 
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behavior.494 Rather, he was asked about whether he had a certain 
state of mind or intent at a point in his past.495 No fMRI deception 
studies to date have explored whether lying about a past state of 
mind as opposed to past behavior would engage the same regions 
of the brain to the same extent. Assuming the neural correlates of 
deception when the subject lied about engaging in certain 
behaviors are the same when the lie involves a past state of mind 
instead of conduct or behavior is a question the neuroscientists 
have not explored.    
6. Reliable Application of Reliable Principles and Methods 
The sixth and final requirement imposed by Rule 702 is that 
the expert must reliably apply the appropriate reliable principles 
and methods to sufficient facts and data in reaching his opinion. 
This inquiry will always be case-specific. In the context of fMRI-
based lie detection, this involves examining the specifics of the 
fMRI scan of the witness in question, the creation of the graphic 
images of the BOLD response, and the expert’s interpretation of 
those images.  
Assuming there are standards or protocols that guide the 
application of the principles and methods to individual subjects, 
the inquiry will be whether the expert followed those standards or 
protocols in reaching the opinion offered in the case. Protocols 
applicable to individual lie detection have not been published in 
the scientific literature, though companies offering commercial 
services claim to follow their own proprietary protocols.496   
The importance of the case-specific analysis of this requirement 
of Rule 702 was apparent in Semrau. Dr. Laken’s first scan of Dr. 
Semrau concerning the AIMS testing issue revealed Dr. Semrau 
                                                
494 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010).  
495 Id. 
496 See, e.g., NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm 
(“No Lie MRI is a proprietary product that objectively measures intent, prior 
knowledge, and deception using algorithms to automatically analyze functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI).”) (last visited March 8, 2014). 
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was being deceptive.497 Dr. Laken surmised that the deception 
result was probably caused by fatigue.498 He then arranged for a 
repeat scan which revealed no deception. 
D. Frye: The General Acceptance Standard 
At the time of this writing, the only other courts to consider 
fMRI as a lie detector are the Supreme Court of New York in 
Wilson v. Corestaff Services, L.P.,499 a civil action for retaliation 
after plaintiff reported sexual harassment by a fellow employee on 
the job, and State v. Smith,500 a case where the defendant, a veteran 
of the Iraq War, was accused of murdering his roommate. Both 
courts rejected the fMRI evidence for failing to meet the “general 
acceptance” standard followed by their respective jurisdictions.   
In Wilson, plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s manager, 
Edwin Medina, instructed another Corestaff employee, Ronald 
Armstrong, to deny plaintiff a temporary work assignment because 
she complained of sexual harassment in an earlier temporary 
assignment.501 Armstrong was plaintiff’s only witness to the 
alleged retaliatory statement made by Medina and Armstrong’s 
credibility as a witness was central to plaintiff’s ability to prove the 
retaliatory action by her employer.502 Armstrong underwent fMRI 
testing by Dr. Laken who concluded that Armstrong was being 
truthful when he answered SIQs that Medina made the retaliatory 
statement.503 Plaintiff intended to call Dr. Laken to bolster 
Armstrong’s testimony as to Medina’s instructions not to provide 
temporary work assignments to plaintiff because she complained 
of sexual harassment.504 The defendant moved to exclude Dr. 
                                                
497 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *8 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
498 Id. 
499 28 Misc. 3d 425, 900 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
500 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C (Cir. 
Ct. Montgomery Cty., M.D., Oct. 3, 2012). 
501 Wilson, 28 Misc. at 426, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 640. 
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Laken as an expert witness under Frye, the standard for 
admissibility of scientific evidence in New York.505 
Expert testimony based on scientific theory is admissible in 
New York if the following conditions are met: (1) the scientific 
theory, principles, or procedures have gained general acceptance in 
the relevant scientific community; (2) the testimony comes from a 
qualified expert; and (3) the topic of the expert testimony is 
beyond the common knowledge of the average juror.506 The trial 
court found that Dr. Laken’s testimony went to a collateral matter, 
the credibility of Armstrong, which was clearly within the ability 
of the jury to determine without the aid of expert testimony.507 
Additionally, the court expressed great reservation and skepticism 
about ever admitting expert testimony on the credibility of a 
witness: 
How complex and confusing would a trial become for the jury if it were 
faced with conflicting expert opinions, each with scientific authority to 
support it, upon the collateral matter of credibility. The first question 
would be the credibility of the experts, and then the credibility of the 
witness. The battle of the experts might well be such that the jury 
would lose sight of the issues or, at the very least, would tend to regard 
the opinion of the expert as determinative of credibility of the witness 
rather than to the consider it only as one factor of many to be 
considered in concluding wither a witness is telling the truth.508  
While the court held that the failure of the proffered testimony 
to meet the third prong of the Frye test was sufficient to exclude 
Dr. Laken’s testimony, the trial judge commented that “even a 
cursory review of the scientific literature demonstrates that the 
plaintiff is unable to establish that the use of the fMRI test to 
determine truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable in the 
relevant scientific community.”509 The court granted the defendant’s 
motion to exclude Dr. Laken’s testimony and denied plaintiff’s 
                                                
505 Id. 
506 People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452, 835 N.Y.S. 2d 523, 375 (N.Y. App. 
2007). 
507 Wilson, 28 Misc. at 427–29, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 641–42. 
508 Id. at 428, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 641–42 (quoting People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 
18, 27, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 159 N.E.2d 549, 554 (N.Y. 1959)). 
509 Id. at 429, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642. 
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motion for a full Frye hearing on the general acceptance of fMRI 
as a lie detector.510 
In Smith, the defendant underwent fMRI scanning by No Lie 
fMRI, a company that, according to its website, uses technology 
that “represents the first and only direct measure of truth 
verification and lie detection in human history!”511 Smith offered 
expert opinion testimony that the BOLD response during Smith’s 
fMRI indicated he was being truthful when he denied shooting 
McQueen.512 In an effort to convince the trial court that fMRI lie 
detection was generally accepted by the scientific community and 
met Maryland’s standard for admitting novel scientific testimony, 
Smith argued that in twenty-five peer-reviewed scientific journal 
articles on fMRI lie detection, none found that “the technology 
does not work.”513 He also argued that in over ten years of research 
no published studies refute the validity or reliability of fMRI lie 
detection.514  
The state countered with scientific articles questioning the 
reliability of fMRI lie detection and offered the testimony of a 
neuroscientist declaring that the neuroscience community did not 
yet accept fMRI lie detection.515 
The court applied the Maryland general acceptance standard516 
and found that “it is clear to the Court that the use of fMRI to 
detect deception and verify truth in an individual’s brain has not 
achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.”517 The 
“tepid approval of a few scholars through twenty-five journal 
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511 NO LIE FMRI, http://www.noliemri.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
512 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C at 4 
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513 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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517 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C at 5–6 
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articles does not persuade this Court that such acceptance exists,” 
the court reasoned.518 
Wilson and Smith highlight the gap between the neuroscience 
community and the proponents of fMRI as a scientifically valid 
and reliable lie detector. Even some proponents and researchers of 
the new technology acknowledge that more work needs to be 
done.519 Aside from the few published studies of small groups of 
volunteers undergoing fMRI scanning under laboratory conditions, 
which all acknowledge further research is required, the 
professional literature uniformly demonstrates a cautious attitude 
within the relevant scientific community.    
VI. RULES OF EVIDENCE: BALANCING PROBATIVE VALUE 
VERSUS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
As the discussion of impeachment and rehabilitation indicated, 
the trial judge has tremendous discretion when it comes to 
admitting evidence to impeach or rehabilitate a witness. Rule 
611(a) codifies the inherent authority of the trial judge and 
provides textual support for much of the discretionary authority of 
the judge. It establishes goals for the conduct of the trial and places 
the responsibility for the “effective working of the adversary 
system” squarely on the shoulders of the trial judge.520 Rule 611(a) 
emphasizes the effective search for truth without wasting time and 
without subjecting witness to harassment or undue embarrassment. 
While Rule 611(a) establishes desirable objectives for the conduct 
of the trial, Rule 403 establishes a test for the admission of 
evidence that furthers those objectives.  
                                                
518 Id. at 4. 
519 See, e.g., Spence, supra note 46, at 24 (“While brain imaging is 
fashionable, and its data susceptible to multiple, aesthetic modes of presentation, 
further empirical data are required to justify its future application to the field of 
lie detection.”); Langleben, supra note 31, at 6 (predicting that demand and 
technical feasibility “are likely to produce a clinical fMRI-based lie detector in 
the near future”). 
520 FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (advisory committee’s note) (1972). 
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Rule 403 permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant and 
admissible evidence if the probative value521 of the evidence for the 
point for which it is offered is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the 
jury, waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.522 The balancing of probative value versus prejudicial 
effect has played a prominent role over the years in consistently 
excluding expert testimony of witness credibility generally, and 
polygraph evidence specifically.523 It is also clear that Rule 403 
operates independently of Rule 702 and evidence that meets the 
Rule 702 standard may still be excluded by Rule 403.524  
With regard to fMRI-based opinion of witness truthfulness, the 
Rule 403 equation considers many of the same factors considered 
in the “fit” analysis under Rule 702.525 Probative value is higher the 
closer the “fit” between the opinion and the issues to be decided by 
the jury. But also included in the Rule 403 balancing is the 
availability of other evidence probative of the same point,526 the 
relative importance in the case of the point for which the evidence 
is offered,527 and the need for the evidence in the context of the 
issues in dispute.528 
Against the weight of probative value, the trial judge places the 
danger of unfair prejudice, the risk of confusing the issues, 
                                                
521 “Probative value” is the strength of the logical chain of inferences from the 
item of evidence to the fact it is offered to prove. 
522 The use of the term “prejudicial effect” includes all of the countervailing 
factors to probative value. This does not imply that evidence that misleads the 
jury, confuses the issues, wastes time, or is cumulative is the same as evidence 
that unfairly prejudices the opponent by inappropriately appealing to emotion. It 
is used merely as label for the side of the scale opposite probative value. 
523 See supra note 287 (listing cases excluding expert testimony on credibility). 
524 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (explaining 
that Rule 403 applies to expert testimony); United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 
386 F.3d 1234, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Rule 702 and Rule 403 
“address different aspects of evidence and therefore act independently”). 
525 See supra notes 276–312 and accompanying text. 
526 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
527 United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1978). 
528 United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3d Cir. 1976). 
OCT. 2014] Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence 235 
misleading the jury, causing undue delay or waste of time, and 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.529 Unfair prejudice 
usually refers to an improper appeal to decide the case on emotion 
rather than the force of the probative evidence,530 but it also 
encompasses the consideration that the jury may give an item of 
evidence more weight than it deserves.531 Evidence that is 
confusing or misleading distracts the jury from the central issues in 
the case and/or raises issues to a prominence that they do not 
warrant.532 Undue delay and waste of time is, as Justice Holmes 
famously remarked, a “concession to the shortness of life.”533 The 
amount of time it takes to present the evidence, as well as any 
counter-evidence, is a very real and important factor in the context 
of our over-burdened justice system. Left unfettered, lawyers will 
offer proof of every fact remotely connected to the case through 
several different means. Without some tempering effect from the 
trial judge, cases would last even longer than they do now.     
Rule 403 balancing must be done in the context of the legal and 
factual issues in a given case and the nature of the evidence 
available to prove the point in question. While Rule 403 balancing 
in the abstract does little more than repeat the language of the rule 
itself, we know enough about fMRI-based expert opinion on 
truthfulness and the contexts in which it would be offered to apply 
the Rule’s standards to common scenarios.534 Semrau provides a 
                                                
529 Evidence that misleads or confuses the jury may also be categorized as 
“unhelpful” under Rule 702, further illustrating the overlap between the two 
rules. 
530 United States v. Pintado-Isiordia, 448 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). 
531 United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2005). 
532 Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., 594 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979).   
533 Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887).  
534 Professor Teneille Brown and Dr. Emily Murphy, PhD., explored the 
reliability and probative value of fMRI-based testimony as evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s past mental state. They found that the computer-generated 
images of the suspect’s brain produced by the fMRI scan and the expert 
testimony interpreting those images describing the mental state of the criminal 
defendant to be unreliable and a hindrance to the fact-finding process: “[The 
fMRI evidence] promotes unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues because it 
causes jurors to ground their decision making in emotional responses to images 
 
236 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 16: 105 
convenient example, but it did not address all the arguments on 
either side of the equation. 
The government moved to exclude Dr. Laken’s testimony 
under Rule 702 and, alternatively, under Rule 403, arguing the 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice to the government.535   
Three factors figured prominently in the magistrate judge’s 
decision to also exclude the evidence under Rule 403: (1) the 
unilateral nature of the exam;536 (2) the use of the evidence to 
bolster credibility;537 and (3) the gap between the opinion of 
“overall” truthfulness and the specific facts alleged in the 
indictment.538 
A. Probative Value: Unilateral Examinations 
In assessing the probative value of Dr. Laken’s opinion, the 
magistrate judge first noted that Dr. Semrau’s fMRI scan was done 
without notice to or participation by the government. Dr. Laken 
admitted that if the fMRI scans had shown Dr. Semrau was lying, 
the results would have never been revealed to the government.539 
Drawing upon precedent involving polygraph examinations, the 
magistrate judge found the “nothing to lose” aspect of the 
unilateral examination diminishes the probative value of the 
                                                                                                         
and distracts jurors from logical errors [in the basis of the opinion], thus causing 
them to make decisions founded on improper bases.” See Brown & Murphy, 
supra note 33, at 1204. 
535 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *14 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
536 Id.  
537 Id. 
538 Id. at *16. 
539 Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, Vol. II at 207, United States v. 
Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.) (“If Dr. Semrau failed [the fMRI 
test], and my conclusion was the he failed, he didn’t pass the test, you [the 
government] would never know that. There are no penalties for failing the test 
there.”). 
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proffered expert testimony on the subject’s truthfulness.540 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge’s analysis on this point 
and affirmed its appropriateness in justifying the exclusion under 
Rule 403.541   
Whether the unilateral polygraph exam is good precedent for 
evaluating the probative value of an fMRI exam raises an 
interesting issue. The theory of reduced probative value of a 
unilateral polygraph exam is that because there are no adverse 
consequences from failing the exam, there is little or no stress on 
the witness.542 If he fails the exam, no one will know and he will 
not suffer any adverse consequences because he failed. Because 
polygraph is based on the notion that heart rate, respiration, blood 
pressure, and skin conductivity increase with stress and lying 
produces stress, the absence of any consequences for lying reduces 
or eliminates the underlying stress upon which the test is based.543 
fMRI is not grounded on a theory of stress producing an 
identifiable BOLD response. In this respect, the reduction of stress 
due to the absence of any adverse consequences of failing an fMRI 
test does not necessarily undermine the probative value of the 
opinion based on the test. In the MRI setting, stress could be a 
confounding variable that the algorithms cannot identify and 
account for when processing the data from the scan. Stress may 
also increase the likelihood of movement of the subject in the 
scanner and introduce other artifacts and noise that could degrade 
the quality of the data. It stands to reason that a stress-free subject 
may be more comfortable in the scanner, more relaxed, better able 
to concentrate on the task at hand, and to otherwise cooperate in a 
way that minimizes movement and other confounds that may 
distort the data. Conceivably, a stress-free subject may be a better 
                                                
540 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 308–09 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995). 
541 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523–24 (6th Cir. 2012). 
542 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 13 
(2003). 
543 Id. 
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subject for fMRI truth detection and may produce a more reliable 
result, not a less reliable one.   
While the stress theory of polygraph that spawned the virtual 
per se rule of exclusion of unilateral tests may or may not apply to 
the fMRI, a unilateral fMRI is of questionable probative value for 
other reasons. First, researchers have not studied fMRI in situations 
where grave consequences might result from failure of the test. We 
simply do not know whether the BOLD response in one who is 
facing serious jail time if he is not believed, regardless of whether 
the opposing side is made aware of the result, is the same as an 
undergraduate psychology student who is paid fifty dollars to 
participate in a controlled study. The stress of consequences could 
play a role in the BOLD response, or it could not. The stress of 
consequences could make the collection and analysis of the MRI 
data more complex if anxiety and stress made it more difficult for 
the witness to lie still and cooperate fully with the examiner. The 
absence of any research on this important question leaves the 
expert to assume that the lack of adverse consequences will not 
impact the test. This, in turn, makes the testing environment 
significantly different from in-court testimony where adverse 
consequences abound. Accepting untested assumptions on such a 
critical question is the antithesis of the scientific method and 
seriously undermines confidence in the test. This, in turn, reduces 
the probative value of the test when it moves from the 
neuroscience lab to the courtroom. 
A second reason why unilateral fMRI exams have little 
probative value is that the opposing party is excluded from the 
process of developing the SIQs that will serve as the basis for the 
test itself. Excluding the opposing party from the development of 
SIQs permits the proponent to craft the questions consistent with 
his own factual and legal theory of the case. The resulting opinion 
of “truthful” is then based upon only those issues fairly 
encompassed by the SIQs and may not extend to other important 
factual questions—questions the opposing side deem critical to its 
theory of the case. The dynamics of adversarial litigation 
necessarily include differences over the facts themselves, but 
differences over the importance of those facts—and whether facts 
unimportant to one side’s theory of the case are important to the 
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opponent’s side—are omnipresent. A unilateral exam excludes 
consideration of the opposition’s theory or, at best, frames the 
opposition theory through the perspective of the proponent.544 In 
either case, the resulting opinion on truthfulness will not address 
the credibility question from a perspective that objectively 
considers both sides of the case, thus reducing the probative value 
of the opinion on the credibility issue.545 
B. Probative Value: Specificity of the Opinion 
The magistrate judge found the probative value of Dr. Laken’s 
opinion was lacking because Dr. Laken could not “offer any 
opinion as to whether Dr. Semrau was deceptive or truthful as to 
any specific SIQ.”546 An opinion as to “overall” truthfulness 
without an ability to determine the truthfulness of responses to 
individual SIQs, could not “assist the jury in deciding whether Dr. 
Semrau’s testimony is credible.”547 
                                                
544 In Semrau, the SIQs were actually drafted and submitted to Dr. Laken by 
Mr. Houston Gordon, Dr. Semrau’s defense counsel: 
Q: All right. The specific incident questions that you asked, though, 
that were on scan number one revolved around these two CPT 
codes, is that correct? 
A: That’s correct. Those were the questions that were presented. 
Q: Where did those questions come from? Can you tell me that? 
A: They came from Dr. Houston—they came from attorney Gordon’s 
office. 
Q: All right. So Mr. Gordon actually drafted—to your knowledge 
drafted the specific incident questions. 
A: Correct. 
Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, Vol. I at 
137, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.) 
545 An analysis of the SIQs by the opponent after the scan would give the 
opponent an opportunity to point out, from the opponent’s perspective, 
additional SIQs and flaws in the SIQs actually used. The extent and nature of the 
opponent’s objections to the SIQs used would still be factors to consider in 
determining the probative value of the opinion.  
546 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *16 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
547 Id. Evaluating the probative value of an item of evidence by analyzing 
whether it will assist the jury in his core function of determining credibility 
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An opinion that the witness was “overall” truthful during the 
scan may have some probative value as to credibility. The jury 
might infer that if he was “overall” truthful in the scan he is 
“overall” truthful in court, and if he is “overall” truthful in court he 
may be “overall” not guilty of the charged offenses. But Rule 403 
is concerned with the weight of the probative value and must 
balance that against the weight of the countervailing 
considerations. If an SIQ addresses a critical fact alleged in the 
indictment, the guilt or innocence of the accused may well turn 
upon whether the jury finds that fact established. An expert 
opinion on truthfulness that admittedly cannot determine whether 
the response to that SIQ was true or false simply does not carry 
much weight in determining the truthfulness of the accused’s in-
court testimony. Thus, the probative value of the opinion for the 
proposition offered—the truthfulness of the in-court testimony—is 
minimal, at best.548 
The Sixth Circuit agreed that the inability of Dr. Laken to 
“corroborate Dr. Semrau’s answers as to the particular offenses for 
which he was charged” was an appropriate factor to consider in 
assessing the probative value of the evidence.549 
C. Probative Value: Reliability 
Opinions based upon scientific principles and methods that are 
unreliable are inadmissible under Rule 702 irrespective of 
balancing under Rule 403.550 While a threshold level of reliability 
                                                                                                         
underscores the overlap between this aspect of Rule 403 and the “help the trier 
of fact” element of Rule 702. See supra notes 264–330 and accompanying text. 
548 The Sixth Circuit noted that, “Dr. Laken’s conclusion that Dr. Semrau was 
‘not deceptive’ as to the entirety of the alleged criminal conduct is fully 
consistent with the jury’s determination that he was guilty of only a small part of 
that conduct.” United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 524 (6th Cir. 2012). 
549 Id. 
550 See supra notes 335–499 and accompanying text. One commentator argues 
that when fMRI lie detection technology meets FRE 702’s reliability standard, 
FRE 403 will not be a barrier to admission. Note, Weighing the Admissibility of 
fMRI Technology Under FRE 403: For the Law, fMRI Changes Everything—and 
Nothing, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 715, 720 (2013). 
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is required to meet Rule 702’s reliability standard, reliability is a 
continuum; barely reliable is not the same as unquestionably 
reliable. The probative value side of the Rule 403 balancing test 
attempts to place the reliability of a given opinion somewhere 
along that continuum. The more reliable the principles and 
methods and the more reliably the expert applied those principles 
and methods to the question at hand, the greater the probative 
value of the opinion.    
Though not specifically relied upon by the magistrate judge in 
his Rule 403 balancing in Semrau, the Sixth Circuit found that 
“questions surrounding the reliability of fMRI lie detection tests in 
general and as performed on Dr. Semrau” also supported exclusion 
under Rule 403.551 The court did not specifically assign these 
concerns to the probative value side of the scale, but it seems 
rather obvious that doubtful reliability would weaken probative 
value.   
The Sixth Circuit’s concern over questions about the general 
reliability of the principles and methods underlying fMRI as a lie 
detector and Dr. Laken’s application of those to his scan of Dr. 
Semrau, indicates, however, that Dr. Laken’s opinion did not move 
the probative value side of the Rule 403 scale much at all. As the 
research continues and the principles and methods are refined and 
improved, the probative value of an opinion that properly applies 
those principles and methods should be greater. The Sixth Circuit’s 
reliance on this factor in assessing probative value is not the final 
word. As the questions that concerned the court are answered, the 
probative value of an opinion offered in future cases may move the 
scales. How far will depend upon the validity of the scientific 
research. 
D. Prejudicial Effect: Bolstering Credibility    
The magistrate judge in Semrau also found that expert opinion 
on lie detection results used “solely to bolster a witness’s 
                                                
551 Note, supra note 550, at 720. 
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credibility”552 was highly prejudicial in a case where credibility 
was of central importance.553 While this was the second of the three 
reasons supporting the magistrate judge’s Rule 403 exclusion 
ruling, it was not among the three reasons given by the Sixth 
Circuit in affirming the Rule 403 exclusion. The Sixth Circuit 
noted the three reasons the magistrate judge excluded the evidence 
under Rule 403: (1) the unilateral nature of the test; (2) the sole use 
of the evidence was to bolster credibility in a case where 
credibility was a central factor; and (3) the inability of the opinion 
to address the truth or falsity of specific allegations.554 In affirming 
the exclusion under Rule 403, the Sixth Circuit found no abuse of 
discretion in light of “(1) the questions surrounding the reliability 
of fMRI lie detection results in general and as performed on Dr. 
Semrau, (2) the failure to give the prosecution as opportunity to 
participate in the testing, and (3) the test result’s inability to 
corroborate Dr. Semrau’s answers to the particular offenses for 
which he was charged.”555  
The appellate court’s omission of any discussion of the 
prejudicial effect of admitting expert testimony “solely to bolster a 
witness’s credibility” aligns the Sixth Circuit with those who 
would reject the continued viability of that argument.556 If fact, one 
could argue that when credibility is of central importance, the 
probative value of otherwise reliable expert testimony on 
truthfulness is greater. Other courts would disagree.557   
E. Prejudicial Effect: Unreliability 
Instead of considering the bolstering credibility rationale on the 
prejudicial effect side of the Rule 403 scale as did the magistrate 
judge, the Sixth Circuit noted that “questions surrounding the 
                                                
552 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *14 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010) (citing Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 810 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 
1987)). 
553 Id. 
554 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523 (6th Cir. 2012). 
555 Id. at 524. 
556 See supra note 288. 
557 See supra note 287 (collecting cases). 
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reliability of fMRI lie detection tests in general and as performed 
on Dr. Semrau” support exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403. 
The court did not specify whether the unreliability diminished 
probative value or increased the prejudicial effect. It actually does 
both. 
Unreliable principles and methods diminish the probative value 
of an opinion based on those principles and methods for obvious 
reasons. An opinion based upon scientific principles and methods 
cannot be any more reliable than the principles and methods 
themselves. Both the magistrate judge and the Sixth Circuit found 
fMRI-based opinion on witness truthfulness unreliable when 
applied to real-world situations involving a sixty-three year-old 
witness and involving events that transpired some six to eight years 
before the fMRI scan.558 Accordingly, its probative value to prove 
Dr. Semrau’s truthfulness was minimal. 
But because the opinion comes from a respected scientist and is 
the product of machines that are relied upon for critical medical 
diagnostic imaging, the jury could assign the opinion more weight 
than the scientific validity warrants. Accompanied by visual 
images produced by the MRI scanner and enhanced by computer 
algorithms to highlight with bright colors areas of the brain where 
the lie is being processed, the danger of misleading the jury on the 
appropriate weight the evidence deserves is manifest. The 
questionable reliability of the opinion lessens its probative value 
while the risk the jury may give it more weight than its validity 
warrants increase the prejudicial effect. 
F. Prejudicial Effect: Confusing of the Issues   
Though not specifically addressed by the magistrate judge in 
Semrau, it is readily apparent that the danger of unfair prejudice 
and jury confusion may be enhanced because of the perceived 
powerful nature of scientific testimony.559 A neuroscientist 
prepared to show jurors fMRI scan images graphically illustrating 
                                                
558 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12 n. 17 
(W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010); Semrau, 693 F.3d at 522 n.10. 
559 See supra note 299. 
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the BOLD response in the prefrontal cortex of a trial witness and to 
explain that those images represented the brain lying and then to 
show them images without the BOLD response present when the 
witness was answering truthfully is powerful evidence. This 
“scientific proof” that a witness was or was not lying could cause 
the average juror to defer the credibility question to the expert.    
To overcome the perceived adverse impact to the government’s 
case should such evidence be admitted, the prosecution would 
likely call its own experts to refute the reliability of fMRI 
methodology and challenging the validity of the defendant’s 
expert’s opinions. The trial could become a referendum on the 
reliability of fMRI as a lie detector, and the jury may be distracted 
from the central issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. In 
Semrau, the Daubert hearing itself took two days, dozens of 
exhibits, and three well-qualified experts testifying as to the 
reliability of fMRI as a truth detector and Dr. Laken’s application 
of it to Dr. Semrau.560 Had the trial court admitted Dr. Laken’s 
opinion, the substance of the Daubert hearing would have been 
played out before the jury. The jury would then have to weigh the 
testimony of the various experts and the exhibits to determine what 
weight to give Dr. Laken’s opinion and then apply that decision to 
weigh the testimony of Dr. Semrau. Ultimately, the jury would get 
back to the underlying issue of guilt or innocence, but it would be a 
rather long and complicated detour taking significant time and 
requiring considerable concentration and attention on matters 
collateral to the substantive issues. 
VII.  RULES OF EVIDENCE: CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO 
OFFER EVIDENCE 
Rules of procedure may not arbitrarily deny the criminal 
defendant the right to present testimony in his own defense. In 
Washington v. Texas,561 the Court ruled that a Texas statute that 
precluded co-participants in a crime from testifying for one another 
                                                
560 United States v. Semrau, No. 07–10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *1-4 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
561 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
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violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory 
process.562 
In Chambers v. Mississippi,563 the Court held unconstitutional 
state rules of evidence that prevented the defendant from 
impeaching his own witness and from introducing hearsay to prove 
that another person was responsible for the shooting for which he 
was being tried.564 The Court held that in the unique circumstances 
of the case, excluding persuasive and trustworthy hearsay that was 
critical to the defense violated Chambers’ right to a fair trial. The 
Court went out of its way, however, to confine the case to its facts 
and did not “establish . . . new principles of constitutional law.”565 
Similarly, in Rock v. Arkansas,566 the Court found unconstitutional 
a per se rule that precluded the defendant from testifying in his 
own defense because he had undergone hypnosis to help him 
remember the events in question.567 The Court held that, “A [state’s] 
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to 
per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.”568 
Taken together, Washington, Chambers, and Rock might seem 
to offer some hope for the fMRI-based expert opinion on 
truthfulness that bolsters the credibility of the defendant. In a case 
that turns upon whether the jury believes the defendant’s or the 
government’s version of the facts, one might argue that rules 
placing conditions and barriers to bolstering credibility before it 
has been attacked and requiring rehabilitation evidence to meet the 
impeaching evidence,569 might infringe the defendant’s right to a 
                                                
562 Id. at 17. 
563 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
564 Id. at 302–03. 
565 Id. at 302. 
566 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
567 Id. at 62. 
568 Id. at 61. 
569 See supra notes 85–166 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
rules governing impeachment and rehabilitation and their application to 
fMRI-based expert opinion testimony on witness truthfulness. 
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fair trial. That argument became much less persuasive in 1998 
when the Court decided United States v. Scheffer.570 
The issue in Scheffer was whether Military Rule of Evidence 
707,571 which imposed a per se ban on the admission of polygraph 
evidence in court-martials, violated the accused’s572 constitutional 
right to present a defense.573 Airman Scheffer worked as an informant 
for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (“OSI”) on drug 
cases.574 As such, he was subject to periodic polygraph examinations 
and random urinalysis to ensure he was not using drugs.575 After a 
drug test, but before the results were known, Scheffer underwent a 
polygraph examination administered by an OSI polygrapher.576 The 
test results indicated “no deception” when Scheffer denied using 
drugs.577 Shortly thereafter, Scheffer went AWOL578 and was arrested 
by civilian police during a routine traffic stop approximately two 
weeks later.579 Meanwhile, the results of the urinalysis revealed the 
presence of methamphetamine.580 Scheffer was charged “for uttering 
bad checks, wrongfully using methamphetamine, failing to go to 
                                                
570 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
571 MIL. R. EVID. 707(a) provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph 
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a 
polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence.” The Rule was 
promulgated by Exec. Order No. 12,767, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,296 (June 27, 1991), 
pursuant to the President’s authority under UCMJ art. 36 to make rules of 
evidence for military courts. 
572 In the Military Justice system the criminal defendant is referred to as the 
“accused.” The trial judge is referred to as the “military judge.” The jury is 
referred to as the “members of the court.” 
573 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305. 
574 Id. 
575 Id. 
576 Id. at 306. 
577 Id. 
578 AWOL is the acronym for the military offense of absent without leave, 
UCMJ art. 86 (2012); 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2012). 
579 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306. 
580 Id. 
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his appointed place of duty, absenting himself from his unit for 
thirteen days without authority . . . .581 
At trial, Scheffer pled not guilty and denied “knowingly” 
taking any drugs.582 To buttress his claim of “innocent ingestion,” 
Scheffer offered the result of the exculpatory polygraph taken 
shortly after the urinalysis.583 The military judge, citing Military 
Rule of Evidence 707, excluded the polygrapher’s opinion 
testimony.584 Scheffer was convicted and appealed to the Air Force 
Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the military judge’s 
exclusion of the polygraph evidence.585  
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review and 
reversed, holding that the per se ban of Military Rule of Evidence 
707 was unconstitutional in a case where the accused testified at 
trial, was impeached with inconsistencies between his trial 
testimony and prior statements, and where the prosecutor argued in 
closing, “He lies. He is a liar. He lies at every opportunity he gets 
and he has no credibility.”586 Under these circumstances, the court 
found, a per se ban on polygraph evidence deprives the accused of 
his Sixth Amendment right to present a full defense.587 
The Supreme Court granted Scheffer’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
holding 8–1588 that the government’s interest in ensuring that 
reliable evidence is presented in criminal trials was sufficient to 
justify the per se of polygraph testimony.589 In light of the lack of a 
scientific consensus on the reliability of the polygraph and the 
general exclusion of polygraph evidence by state and federal 
courts, “excluding polygraph evidence in all military trials [was] a 
                                                
581 United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 443 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
582 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306. 
583 Id. 
584 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 307. 
585 United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc). 
586 United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
587 Id. at 445. 
588 Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer were in the majority. Justice Stevens dissented. 
589 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309. 
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rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate 
interest in barring unreliable evidence.”590 
Four Justices also found that “[p]reserving the court members’ 
core function of making credibility determinations in criminal 
trials”591 and “avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or 
innocence of the accused”592 were also legitimate governmental 
interests that justified the per se ban on polygraph evidence.593   
As it applies to fMRI-based expert opinion on witness 
truthfulness, note that Scheffer involved a trial where the criminal 
defendant testified, was impeached, and was specifically accused 
of lying on the witness stand at trial. The polygraph testimony was 
offered to rebut the charge of deliberate fabrication of trial 
testimony. Because eight justices found that polygraph evidence 
was unreliable and that unreliability justified the Commander-in-
Chief’s per se ban on all polygraph evidence, Scheffer’s Sixth 
Amendment argument failed. As noted in Part IV.C of this Article, 
this is one of the scenarios in which traditional rules of 
impeachment and rehabilitation would countenance extrinsic 
evidence to bolster credibility. Should fMRI lie detection 
technology reach a level of reliability to satisfy Rule 702, 
exclusion of opinion testimony is this situation would, arguably, 
violate the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. Short of 
reaching that level of reliability, or if the offer of fMRI-based 
opinion to bolster credibility does not come after the defendant has 
testified and been impeached with an express or implied charge of 
deliberate in-court fabrication, Scheffer is distinguishable and 
would not directly support the constitutional argument to admit the 
evidence.  
Assuming no significant advances in fMRI lie detection reliability, 
courts rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments for admission would 
seem to be on solid ground. Of course, should fMRI lie detection 
become more reliable, or if polygraph itself demonstrates significant 
                                                
590 Id. at 312. 
591 Id. at 312–13.  
592 Id. at 314. 
593 Id. at 314–15. 
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improvement in reliability, the Sixth Amendment argument would 
gain new strength in the circumstances of Scheffer. While Scheffer 
stands for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment does not provide 
a right to introduce unreliable evidence, it does not determine the 
reliability question for all time.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging as a lie detector is, 
relatively speaking, in its infancy. Its ultimate acceptance by the 
courts as a reliable indicator of credibility will require considerable 
advances in the science underlying the theory as well as 
considerable changes in attitudes of the judicial system towards the 
jury’s role in determining credibility issues.   
A number of scientific shortcomings must be resolved before 
fMRI can satisfy the exacting standards of admissibility in American 
trials. First, is the lack of any real world testing of fMRI’s 
reliability as a lie detector. The studies done to date have all been 
laboratory controlled experiments where subjects were paid to lie 
about certain recent events while undergoing fMRI scanning. We 
do not know and can only assume that the neural correlates of 
these “instructed lies” are the same as lies told in the “real world.” 
While laboratory experiments and tests are instrumental in scientific 
advancements, they do not and cannot duplicate the range of 
human emotions and responses one experiences when faced with 
accusations of wrongdoing in the real world. Unless and until 
fMRI proves its reliability as a lie detector in real world 
applications, it will remain an interesting area of scientific inquiry 
that may well lead to a better understanding of brain function that 
will have other benefits to society. 
Second, is the inability of the fMRI to distinguish between the 
subjective belief of the witness and objective truth. During cross-
examination of Dr. Laken at the Daubert hearing in Semrau, the 
following exchange took place: 
Q: You have not performed any fMRI testing in a situation such as we 
have here where an individual has been living with an alleged lie or 
a potential lie for a period of six to eight years, correct? 
A: So we tested and our conclusions are based on today, what does he 
believe today. 
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Q: But whether or not the effect of the memory or the fusing of that lie 
into the person’s brain, whether or not that is possible, you don’t 
know because you haven’t researched it. 
A: We don’t know.594 
Similarly, during direct examination, Dr. Laken testified that 
the fMRI scan showed that “[Dr. Semrau] believes that he is telling 
the truth at least.”595 Whether the witness believes he is telling the 
truth is not the question the jury must decide. The jury has to 
determine whether the witness is actually telling the truth. 
According to Dr. Laken, perhaps the country’s foremost proponent 
of fMRI as lie detector or truth verifier, the technology is incapable 
of making that critical distinction. 
Third is the lack of protocols or standards, specifically with 
regard to SIQ formulation, scanning procedures, and the computer 
processes necessary to convert the raw data to the final image 
reflecting the BOLD response. Dr. Laken concluded, without any 
research to support it, that the form of the questions during the first 
scan on the AIMS testing were in some way responsible for the 
initial deception determination. By revising the SIQs and 
rescanning, he obtained a truthful result. If the outcome can be so 
dramatically altered by reformatting the SIQs it would seem that 
appropriately designed studies would identify the critical components 
of SIQ formulations and standard protocols developed. Until then 
it appears that the person conducting the test can redraft SIQs and 
rescan until the desired result is obtained. 
Even if fMRI’s proponents can establish reliability in real 
world applications, there is still the well-recognized and almost 
sacred principle that the jury is responsible for determining the 
credibility of the witnesses at trial, and they do not need the 
assistance of expert opinion in performing that task. The average 
juror, as a citizen going through daily life makes credibility 
judgments about other people all the time. Sometimes they judge 
                                                
594 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. II at 221–22, 
United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. 
Tenn. May 13, 2010). 
595 Id. at 99. 
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rightly and sometimes they judge wrongly. Our judicial system 
expects those citizens to bring those experiences and that common 
sense into the jury box and apply them to the witnesses who testify 
at trial. But the American system of justice does not entrust that 
duty to a single person.596 The jury, as a group of citizens, must 
reach a collective judgment on who to believe and what weight to 
give the testimony of the witnesses at trial. In the criminal trial, the 
jury of twelve citizens597 stands as the bulwark between the power 
of the state and the freedom of the defendant. This citizen’s check 
on the power of the state is deeply entrenched in the American 
understanding of democracy and the people’s relationship with the 
state. Conceding that role to MRI scanners and expert witnesses 
with scientific opinions on who is and who is not telling the truth is 
a radical departure from our common law heritage and the very 
basis of the jury system. 
Compounding these problems is the reality that under the 
current rules and traditions of impeachment and rehabilitation, the 
use of extrinsic evidence in the form of expert opinion testimony 
on witness truthfulness is available only in a limited number of 
circumstances. Those circumstances are further limited by the fact 
that opportunities to offer fMRI-based expert opinion on 
truthfulness will depend upon the trial tactics of the opposing 
party; something the proponent of the expert testimony cannot 
control. Whether commercially viable lie detection will be 
available at prices litigants can afford when the opportunity for 
actually admitting the evidence at trial is remote is a problem. The 
time, effort, and expense of the neuroscience community to study 
“real world” application of the technology when its actual use at 
trial is rather remote may stifle the research. One company which 
                                                
596 Of course, a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial and elect to have 
a single individual, the trial judge, decide his fate. 
597 Some jurisdictions try cases with six jurors, but the tradition and usual 
practice is to empanel twelve. 
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had offered fMRI lie detection services, Cephos Corporation, has 
already abandoned the market.598  
While fMRI may hold great promise in neuroscience and 
eventually bring new understanding to human behavior, its use as a 
lie detector in American courts is stymied by the law of expert 
testimony under both the Daubert and Frye standards, the problem 
of creating jury confusion over the collateral issue of witness 
credibility, the tradition against bolstering witness credibility 
before it has been attacked, and the common law tradition of 
placing credibility determinations solely within the province of the 
jury. Separately, these evidentiary hurdles present significant 
challenges to the admissibility of fMRI based expert opinion 
testimony of witness truthfulness. Combined, they present a 
virtually insurmountable barrier.   
The advance of science and the tenaciousness of the 
neuroscience community may well solve the reliability issue that 
precludes admissibility under Daubert and Frye. Addressing the 
other barriers to admissibility will fall within the purview of the 
legal community. That debate is ongoing and will continue 
unabated. 
                                                
598 Cephos Corporation, the company providing the fMRI services in Semrau 
and Wilson, left the lie detection market in 2013. Apparently the time, effort, and 
expense to develop the technology to a point where it would meet admissibility 
standards was not commercially feasible. See supra note 194.  
